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SUMMARY
This thesis formulates a spatial econometric model of the Scottish 
housing market over the period 1980-81. The study is concerned with the 
role of space in the dynamic operation of an owner-occupier housing 
market, particularly as applied at the regional level. These four 
considerations - space, dynamics, tenure, and level of aggregation - are 
selected for attention after an examination of the approaches to housing 
market models in a number of disciplines, but in particular within 
economic and econometric models. It i s .found that the approaches used 
in other disciplines can be treated as alternative forms of, or special 
cases of, those based on the utility maximisation premise of economic 
theory. Existing utility maximisation housing models are generally 
specified at the urban level of aggregation, with private rental as the 
dominant form of tenure. Dynamics are an integral part of urban 
simulation models but in general the attainability of equilibrium is 
assumed. The aggregate counterpart to an urban model is a 
macroeconometric model, which is purely dynamic in specification, and 
the results from this approach are contrasted with those of 
microeconomic theories. It is shown that assumptions about the spatial 
structure of the housing market are implicit in macroeconometric models. 
Three housing market dimensions or analytical categories- - space, time, 
and house type - are identified, and this provides a basis for the 
classification of existing models. A matrix formulation is used to 
specify the theoretical structure of a dynamic regional owner-occupier 
model, and. the spatial econometric technique of the weights matrix is 
introduced as a parsimonious method for operationalising the theoretical 
structure. Empirical estimation of demand and supply equations gives an 
indication of the nature and scale of spatial interaction effects at the 
regional level. These indicate that there ; are grounds for including 
regional level analysis in any discussion of the operation of the 
housing market. The results are compared with those of the existing 
housing market literature, and possible extensions of the matrix 
formulation show that it is a useful framework for urban level analysis 
as well. The policy implications which follow from this thesis are 
then discussed and current policy is examined in the light of these 
findings.
iniTRODUCTIOU
11.1 INTRQDUCTTny
This thesis is concerned with the development of a regional housing
market model. This level of aggregation is a relatively neglected area 
i
of a literature which includes urban cross section and macroeconometric
time series models. A regional model provides a link between the two 
scales of aggregation, and may help to resolve some of the conflicting 
views of the operation of the housing market which arise from these 
different approaches. The notion of a regional model as a link between 
t h e •urban and national scales of aggregation implies the existence of a 
continuum of models across each aggregation level. This thesis will 
'opose the use of three housing market dimensions, namely space, time 
id house type or quality level. A regional model can be specified in 
:iy of these dimensions but ideally should take account of all three.
The reason for this is that urban and national models tend to differ in 
arms of their dimension of specification as well as in their level of 
aggregation,
Uirban models are primarily concerned with the roles of space and house 
tjypes, with particular reference to the impact of spatial considerations 
on location decisions. The paradigm which dominates this approach is 
hat of utility maximisation, which can be a powerful and flexible way 
of formulating models of housing market behaviour. Such urban models 
dkvelop the notion of space as a source of transport costs, and modify 
t in a number of ways to take into account social stratification and
house-type heterogeneity. These models generally deal in terms of long- 
run equilibrium, and with the exception of simulation models, eschew 
dynamic considerations altogether. The notion of a long run equilibrium 
is based on housing stock equilibrium, and for this to be valid in all 
txme periods presupposes system behaviour as if the entire housing ; 
stock is transacted every time period. Although this approach has had 
some notaDie empirical successes, the range of questions which can be 
addressed is limited by the relatively superficial treatment of the 
temporal dimension.
A second form of urban approach abstracts from the idea of the housing
system.as a market, and focuses upon the movement of volumes of persons 
ana vacancies. The '‘gravity" and "entropy" models use concepts, from the 
natural sciences to model flows of persons. These models have 
encountered some specific drawbacks, but nevertheless represent a
i..exiole and parsimonious representation 01 s p a n s !  sxructure and 
spatial dynamics. The gravity approach is used in the model developed 
here to represent spatial interaction via the spatial econometric 
technique of the weights matrix.
Vacancy and mobility models use the Markov transition matrix approach. 
This assumes that the process of household mobility can be represented
j
by a matrix of transition probabilities linking spatial areas or 
different house types. This requires some strong assumptions about the 
urban area as a self contained unit, rather than as a part of a larger 
system. The vacancy model illustrates the flexibility of a matrix 
formulation in representing interaction between spatial units or
different house types, and can incorporate a temporal dimension. It 
abstracts from the market process on the grounds that the existing 
housing stock exerts such a powerful influence on the housing system
that the flows into and out of the system are unlikely to influence
i
house prices. it tnus demonstrates tne importance ox volumes to housing, 
markets and this provides a useful basis for the model developed here.
Macroeconometric time series models use concepts from mainstream
I
macroeconomics and are particularly concerned with the notion of asset
1
market equilibrium. Vith recently developed econometric techniques, it 
is possible to use. the notion of a long run, steady state equilibrium 
aid to model short run dynamic fluctuations around this trend. The long 
run steady state corresponds to the stock equilibrium of the 
microeconomic urban models discussed previously. Macroeconometric 
models are primarily concerned with the temporal dimension.
£,nd implicitly incorporate Highly restrictive assumptions about the
spatial operation of the housing market, and about the role of the 
Quality dimension. Such models are almost completely aspatial and 
a ggregative, but are nevertheless used to make policy statements which 
have an explicitly spatial dimension.
The main contention of this thesis is that a regional model of the 
housing market is a useful construct but one for which there currently 
exists no readily applicable framework. The urban models discussed 
above have been developed primarily in the U.S. and are more readily 
applicable to the form of. housing market prevailing there, with a high 
egree of private rental tenure and car ownership. Time series models
are more common in the U.K. where the owner occupier tenure dominates.
I
A |regional model of any part of the U.K. has to rake account of the
|
tenure form and resultant spatial impacts. Scotland, in particular, is
1
interesting as an area m  transition irom p u d I i c . rental tenure to owner
occupier tenure dominance.
i
i
h ;regional model is a usefui construct Decause it provides a synthesis 
between the microeconomic and macroeconomic perspectives and in 
consequence highlights the inherent assumptions in each type of model.
For this to be possible, the basic-.criteria for the construction of a
regional framework are that it contains most other models as special
!
cjises. As such, it must be capable of making statements in a number of
\
dimensions and of determining values for certain key variables. As 
discussed previously, the dimensions of time, space, and quality, are 
central to the housing market and the framework to be developed is 
capable, given suitable data, of modelling in these three dimensions 
using the matrix format and giving specific interpretations to the 
matrix elements. The key variables are prices, volumes, and tenure, 
although the latter could equally be argued to be a dimension. Tenure 
affects the model in that owner occupiers who buy a house will also, in
general, be sellers of their original house. This duality has
i
i
implications for the way in which prices are determined and for the way
i
in which owner occupiers time their market transactions. It will be 
argued that as a result of this duality, an owner occupier market may be 
more sensitive to volumes of demand and supply, or to prices, depending 
on the state of the market.
Tiie discussion of price determination suggests that a probabilistic 
definition of equilibrium is necessary. This means that observed prices 
will be distributed about some mean, with the mean representing the long 
run equilibrium. In this thesis, a deterministic model is specified but 
this represents the expected rather than actual equilibrium.
The concepts of stock and flow equilibria are central to the discussion 
of the definition of housing market equilibrium. The stock formulation 
views the existing stock as exerting a powerful influence over the 
actual, transacted market, whereas the flow formulation ignores the 
existing stock on the grounds that only a relatively small proportion is 
transacted at any one time. This study focuses on a flow specification 
for a number of reasons. First, macroeconometric studies have tended to 
indicate that the adjustment to stock equilibrium is slow; hence in a 
short run model it can be ignored. Second, this study argues that the 
modern housebuilding industry is more flexible than has historically 
been the case which will tend to favour the short run, flow based 
equilibrium. Third, and perhaps most important, it is possible to argue 
that the concept of a stock equilibrium is irrelevant without some 
discussion of the process by which such an equilibrium is achieved.
This study focuses on the process of adjustment within the housing 
market, and on the reasoning that the long run stock equilibrium is the 
result of a series of short run flow adjustments, the study of the flow 
adjustment process is logically prior. Fourth, given that a regional 
model focuses on the importance of space, the influence of the existing 
stock is reduced by spatial separation of sub sectors of the housing 
market. Fifth, mobility studies show that households often utilise long
arming horizons and their capacity to alter their plans in response to 
short run market pressures may be limited. This will be asymmetric, 
however, in that the decision to move can be delayed if short term
market pressures are too great. whereas it will tend to take time tor 
iiiubiij.rv plans to ds lormulaiecL ana imDiementea, ihis process may De 
compounded by imperfect information on the part of incumbent households.
!
For empirical purposes, this study will assume either that the influence 
of the existing stock is negligible or that the market is initially in 
stock equilibrium; however, a formulation which incorporates a stock
i
equilibrium is also discussed (in the appendix to Chapter Five) and the
r
npirical results are interpreted with the proviso that specific 
a$sumptions have been made about the nature of equilibrium.
) THESIS STRUCTURE
This thesis is in nine chapters. The first three chapters contain a 
stalled review of the literature outlined above, indicating specific 
trengths and shortcomings in each approach. The next two chapters 
espectively outline the key concepts relevant to the development of a 
sgional model, and present the formal and operational structures of the 
model. The next chapter discusses the data and the study area, and the 
fallowing chapter reports the estimated equations of the model.. This 
aapter also discusses the implications for model dynamics of the 
etimates. The penultimate chapter indicates possible extensions to the
model structure and draws out the policy implications, and in addition 
discusses current policy in the light of model findings. The last
chapter summarises the conclusions.
i
Chjapter One discusses a range of urban models based upon the premise
i
thjat individuals maximise utility. This notion can be employed in a 
number of ways, depending on the specific form given to the maximand and 
constraint functions. It has been used in uni-dimensional access-space 
models with highly stylised and restrictive utility functions to give a
reasonable approximation to the observed density profile. This chapter
)( . 
goes an to examine simulation models which attempt more detailed
examination of urban structure, and of changes in that structure through
time. One of the key criticisms of access-space models is the reliance
on long run equilibrium, and in response simulation models use a number
j *
!
of techniques to incorporate dynamics. Apart from disaggregation of the, 
housing stock and households, to allow for heterogeneity, the processes
of mobility and location are seen to be central to the operation of the
i
urban housing market. It is seen that a key of the housing market model 
"problem" is the allocation of households to dwellings and the various 
ways in which this can be achieved. The last section of this chapter 
discusses the discrete choice modelling approach, which is a technique 
used both in simulation models and in studies of specific housing choice 
processes. This technique can be used for forecasting most housing 
related decisions, such as mobility, tenure choice and household 
formation.
Chapter Two examines geographic models, in particular the "gravity" 
model, the related "entropy" model, and Markov chain mobility models.
All of these models focus on the volumes of flows of persons or 
vacancies, based on notions of locationally specific characteristics 
which repel and attract individuals. It can be shown that all of these 
models are special cases of a general formulation and that they can ail
be[ derived under the assumption of utility maximisation as readily as
j * "
under their own rather more ad hoc paradigms. These models generally
i
I
ignore market considerations, since they treat demand and supply volume 
flows as being independent of one another. The Markov model, in 
particular, imposes constant transition probabilities on specific 
classes of movers, spatial units, or house types, and this is equivalent
I -
to’ assuming that the housing market is always in long run equilibrium. 
With some adaptations, it is possible to state the Markov model as a 
special case of the model developed here. The general formulation which 
contains al± geographic moQ.ei3 as special cases takes m e  xorm of a set 
of logistic gravity interactions; specific restrictions on coefficients 
of the general form yield specific models. The model developed here 
uses the weights matrix technique and the general formulation can be 
nested within this.
Chapter Three discusses macroeconometric models. It is observed that 
there are definite relationships between the activity in the economy 
generally and that of the housing market, but that the form of these 
relationships differs between the U.S. and the U.K.. The credit market 
is seen to be influential but two of the most important elements in the 
behaviour of housing market variables over time appear to be real
V
10
incomes and douse price expectations. It is shown that inacroeconametric 
models make restrictive assumptions about the homogeneity of housing and
hence about the interactions between the markets for new and existing
|
houses. In particular, the implicit view of the building industry may 
be inaccurate. The discussion of macroeconometric models highlights the 
stock and flow equilibrium approaches, with flow equilibrium models 
tending to show a much more rapid process of adjustment than stock 
equilibrium formulations.
Crlapter Four sets , out the key concepts behind the regional model, and in 
particular discusses the role of space and tenure in the behaviour of 
owner occupiers; it is shown that in an environment of imperfect 
information, the owner occupier has a number of search and bidding 
strategies available which are dependent on the prevailing state of the 
market. Gwner occupation implies that many market participants are both 
suppliers and demanders with the spatial impact of each role differing. 
This discussion also illustrates that to be fully specified, a model of . 
the housing market needs to determine both prices and volumes, in 
contrast to many of the macroeconometric models discussed in Chapter 
Three which only deal in one of these. The introduction of an 
environment of imperfect information demonstrates one of the reasons why 
short run flow equilibrium and long run stock equilibrium may diverge, 
dnce the long run stock equilibrium position can be stated as one of 
perfect information and frequent mobility. A discussion of the current 
cructure of the building industry shows that a rapid response by 
housebuilders to market conditions is passible. The chapter also 
discusses the likely interaction of the markets for new and existing
11
ma
iiouses along with the iBiplicat-1ons tor house price determination, This 
scussion demonstrates that the generalised geographical formulation 
y' not be flexible enough to model a housing market characterised by 
imperfect information and .ioint determination of prices and volumes.
Chapter Five brings together the review and analysis of the preceding 
four chapters and sets out the formal regional model in matrix form. 
This formulation is stated in flow equilibrium terms, but a chapter 
appendix shows that a stock equilibrium formulation is also feasible, 
and subsequent empirical work must be interpreted with this in mind..
It: is shown, that the matrix framework is highly flexible and is capable
I1
ofj making statements about all three housing market dimensions. The 
sy'stems of equations are specified per time period, with the basic
I
elements of the matrices representing spatial units; no a priori 
1 limitations are placed on the extent to which all spatial areas 
interact. The matrices of price coefficients represent own price and 
cross price elasticities of demand and supply; these will'partly 
reflect quality differences between the housing stock in different 
spatial areas. In addition, the weights matrix technique provides an 
operational version of' the model and permits detailed hypotheses about 
spiatial structure. The system of equations is then solved and its 
dynamics are analysed; this analysis can be contrasted with the 
discussions of prices and volumes in Chapter Two and with the differing 
views of stock and flow equilibria in Chapter Three. It is also 
possible to make specific statements about the dynamic implications of 
estimated coef-ficients. The regional model is then used to-demonstrate 
the specific spatial assumptions inherent within a macroeconometric
model, and is further used to illustrate that the general geographic 
del farm of Chapter Two can be stated as a special case. It is shown 
at although the operationalisation of the regional model poses some 
obiems, these are partially resolved by the use of the weights matrix.
mo
th
pr
Chapter Six discusses the relevant history of Scotland's economy and 
housing market, and the recent changes which have been occurring as a 
result of Government policy. The data to be used in model estimation
I
are discussed and transformed to yield the exogenous and endogenous 
variables for the model. Expectations of empirical results are then set 
out along with the implications which particular results have for the
J ‘
models discussed in previous chapters.
j
Chapter Seven gives regression results for the model and indicates that 
while exogenous factors are important, the operation of the housing 
ma.rket is highly sensitive to changes in volumes, and market failure is 
possible. The spatial scale of operation confirms the validity of the 
regionaljconcept, and the market dynamics results suggest that the view 
market dynamics promulgated by macroeconometric models should be
j
treated with some caution. In particular, the results appear to 
dicate that the Scottish housing market is dynamically stable but 
dilatory, implying a degree of price overshooting; this may reconcile 
the factj that macroeconometric flow equilibrium models show rapid price 
adjustment, with the finding from stock equilibrium models that
of
lr
adj ustme nt to equilibrium is slow.
Chapter Eight demonstrates that the regional model form used here is 
only one of a number of potential more complex forms, and investigation 
of these is likely to be a fruitful avenue for future research. The 
other forms focus upon more sophisticated price adjustment processes, 
and on the possiblity of building in longer price adjustment lags. This 
chapter also expands on the policy implications of the model findings, 
|with ramifications for, in particular, Local Authority attempts to 
^measure demand and the current controversy over land release. It is 
{also shown that the current government policy of promoting owner 
^occupation is desirable provided the preconditions of an orderly market 
are satisfied. In particular, the spatial concentration of unemployment 
Iblackspots is likelv to contribute to housing market failure.
Chapter Fine draws together the conclusions to the thesis and relates 
the work done here to the literature discussed in the first three 
chapters.
CHAPTER OFE 
UTILITY MAXIMISIIG MODELS
1.1 INTRODUCTION
There exist a large number of housing models based upon the premise that 
individuals maximise utility. Model forms range from neoclassical long- 
run equilibrium land use models to complex short-run simulation models 
and discrete choice models covering particular aspects of the housing 
demand process. Many of these theoretical forms have been subjected to 
empirical testing, with a variety of results.
Recent work, notably Porell (19S2) and Van Lierop (1985), has devoted 
considerable effort to classification of previous theoretical and 
empirical studies. The taxonomies which have emerged are detailed and 
go some way towards making sense of a voluminous literature. Van 
Lierop stresses the importance of intended use as a determinant of model 
form but such a caveat still leaves some considerable variation in 
approach. The categories of analysis which have emerged take into 
account whether "housing" is treated as a homogeneous or heterogeneous 
good, whether a micro- or macro- approach is employed, and whether the 
model solution is one of short- or long- run equilibrium. Further 
distinctions cover the labour-housing market relationship and the 
treatment of mobility transaction costs. These categories collectively 
exhaust the kind of assumptions which can be made in constructing a
i
utility maximising model.
1.2 LAND-USE MODELS
Land use models are the earliest economic models of urban spatial 
structure and the best-known examples of work in this field are Vingo 
(1961), Alonso (1964), Muth (1969) and Solow (1973).
The essence of these models is that all employment is located in the 
Central Business District (CBD) and that work place position dominates 
the household's choice of location.
Bach household is assumed to have a utility function of the form:
U = U (q(d), X) (1.
where qcd) is the quantity of homogeneous housing service 
consumed at some distance, d, from the CBD.
X is a composite good representing all other goods.
The household's budget constraint is represented by:
Y = Pf,(d)q(d) + P,.,X + T (d, Y) (1.
where Pi~,(d) is the price per unit of housing services, P:-.,; is the price
of the composite good, and T(d,Y) is generalised transport costs, 
reflecting the fact that such costs have a fixed, distance-dependent 
'component but are also a function of the individual's income, which 
measures the value to him of time spent commuting.
From this a Lagrangean function can be constructed to yield the first-
order condition:
6' P* <S T(d,Y)
  = ------- — - (1.1.3)
tS d 6 d
That is the household will locate where the saving in transport costs 
from locating marginally closer to the centre is just balanced by the 
additional housing expenditure which will be incurred.1
In most of these models housing is produced by a neoclassical production 
function exhibiting a constant elasticity of substitution between land 
and non-land inputs.2
Mills (1972) used a Cobb-Bouglas production function whilst Simians, Ilau 
and Lee (1980) employed a variable elasticity of substitution. The main 
thrust of such refinements has been to achieve better empirical 
performance - Solow (1972), for example, introduced congestion costs and 
finds a significant improvement in statistical fit over models which 
lack this feature.
Whilst early models assumed uniformity of demand functions, Solow 
introduced the idea of differing preferences for space between different 
income groups. This, the first step towards disaggregation, was 
undertaken with respect to households rather than the housing stock 
which was still assumed homogeneous. Mills (1972) included a non-housing 
sector competing with households for space, and a transportation sector 
to move goods and workers to the Central Business District. The
interesting feature of this work is its explicit account of the 
"economic base" underlying the housing market; this is a point which 
will be discussed more fully later in this chapter.
Underlying these models are the interdependent assumptions of a "unit of 
housing service" and long run equilibrium. In the long run, arbitrage 
permits the use of one price for the homogeneous good, housing. This is 
facilitated by the assumption that the choice set is continuous, such 
that the number of households in any one annulus, n(d), can be given by 
the total quantity of housing available in that annulus, Q(d), divided 
by the quantity demanded by each household, q(d):
QCd)
n(d) = -------  (1.1.4)
q(d)
This approach continues to be employed e.g. Altmann & De Salvo (1981). 
Parrel1 has painted out that these models all contain the implicit 
assumption that the locating households are immigrants to the urban area 
and can costlessly locate anywhere; this entails the further assumption 
that the locating household's decision is in no way dependent on its 
prior residence.
The response from advocates of the neoclassical approach is well summed 
up in Solow*s comment that "Existing patterns of location must have been 
determined in large part by decisions that were made and events that 
happened under conditions that ruled long ago... Nevertheless it turns 
out that the equilibrium states of simple models of urban location do
actually reproduce some of the important characteristics of real cities" 
(Solow, (1973) P.1.). However, Whitehead and Odling-Smee (1975) 
attribute the empirical success of long run equilibrium models to the 
slowness of adjustment of all variables which tends to generate observed 
significance, in cross-sectional data, without yielding information 
about causality. More specifically, they point out that model 
calibration based on the assumption that the data are from a long run 
equilibrium state will yield biased estimates, if adjustment is still 
occurring. There are a variety of reasons why the long run equilibrium 
position is unlikely to be satisfied at any one point in time. Kain & 
Quigley (1975) have both argued that the extreme durability of the 
housing stock, the high costs of physical transformation, construction 
lags, and mobility costs or transactions costs all weigh against the 
attainment of long-run equilibrium. As Ingram et al (1972) put it: "In 
effect, in existing theories of location it is assumed that either 
cities are destroyed every night and rebuilt the next morning or that 
households live in house trailers that are relocated daily". (P.16)
More seriously, in the absence of long run equilibrium, the concept of 
homogeneous units of housing service is weakened. Straszheim suggests: 
"...households regard housing services as multidimensional, with some 
of their attributes directly associated with particular characteristics 
of the capital stock (the housing stock)". (P.21) But whilst through 
time, there will be spatial variation in the demand for housing, and 
consequently its price, "...these price variations are not likely to be 
sufficient to make it worthwhile to tear down the existing stock".
(P.21) There have been attempts to handle such considerations within a
neoclassical framework, notably the model developed by Muth (1973), and 
applied empirically by Brueckner (1981), which generated explicit 
predictions about the age structure of the existing stock. The most 
important development to arise out of dissatisfaction with the long run 
equilibrium housing service concept is the introduction into the basic 
access-space model of heterogeneous housing.
1.3 SEGMENTED MARKET MODELS
In models which depart from the long-run equilibrium assumption, it 
becomes necessary to deal with housing stock heterogeneity. The 
simplest way to do so is to define:
U = U (A-i  .......A*. X , d ) (1.5)
quantity of the ith“' attribute which can be present in a house 
. . .k
K
This is maximised subject to: PxX + Z Pi-,iAi + T(d) = Y
i  I
Pc-.iAi is the implicit price of the i u~' attribute.
Fallowing Lancaster's (1966) presentation of consumer choice in the 
characteristics or attributes domain, utility can be described as 
deriving from fundamental attributes which the individual chooses by 
constructing^ convex combinations of available goods so as to maximise 
utility. The drawback in applying this approach to urban analysis is 
that housing is available in discrete structures which will tend to be
where A s. = 
i = 1.. . . .
prohibitively expensive so as to disallow most individuals from owning 
and consuming more than one unit.
Straszheim (1975) circumvents this by suggesting that the individual 
chooses the discrete bundle closest to the optimum. Once heterogeneity 
of the housing stock is admitted, in conjunction with the previous 
attempts to disaggregate consumers, there is a veritable explosion in 
the number of subcategories which can be dealt with: e.g. race, tenure, 
house type and age, spatial location, transportation and accessibility 
to the workplace. Straszheim takes a number’.of these aspects into 
account. He studies the correlations between a variety of housing 
characteristics, and finds the strongest negative correlation between 
access (travel time to employment) and space (average lot size)., and the 
strongest positive correlation between average structure age in an area 
and the percentage of pre-'1950 units (as might be expected). This last- 
variable acts as a measure of neighbourhood homogeneity.
Straszheim also finds that areas of concentration of owner occupiers in 
very low density housing have the highest mean income, although 
surprisingly central city older housing of high density also shows a 
high mean income. On this basis he is able to construct a standardised 
price per dwelling unit in each submarket, by looking at the "premiums" 
paid, in a variety of submarkets, for particular housing attributes.
Straszheim's data, which'deals with multiple employment locations, 
supports the conclusion of land use models that households tend to 
commute in order to secure lower unit housing expenditures.
Straszheim's conclusion is that employment location and life cycle 
stage, as well as income, are important determinants of residential 
location choice as well as the amount of housing consumed and the 
particular attributes preferred - suggesting that analysis of housing 
market changes needs to disaggregate by house type as well as household 
type. (e.g. households with more children will demand greater house 
sizes).
Straszheim finally constructs and estimates a model' where average 
neighbourhood incomes and house prices are endogenous, because 
households will relocate in response to the prices of housing "bundles", 
but this will in itself influence overall house prices. To simplify 
estimation, he ignores spatial interdependencies between submarkets and 
rules out substitute relationships with other submarkets. Market 
equilibrium is given by stock equilibrium, since data on stock 
utilisation (i.e. on vacancy rates) are unavailable.
Endogeneity of income is, to an extent, desirable given the relatively 
small spatial units used. It may also, however, have proxy peer group 
effects which, in conjunction with a heterogeneous stock, contributes to 
submarket price differentials through time.
Goodman (1981) has extended the submarket notion to study the optimum 
submarket grouping, using Cliff, Haggett and Ord's (1975) criteria of 
simplicity, and compactness; in essence these state that the best 
grouping has as few submarkets as possible, maintains within-submarket 
homogeneity, and only groups contiguous zones.'3
The studies which have been examined so far all focus primarily on 
location, and would be classed as "micro behavioural" in Van Lierop's or 
Poreli's taxonomy. The micro-macro distinction will be discussed 
shortly, but it should be borne in mind that location is only one 
aspect of housing choice; tenure is another important element. There 
also exist a number of "micro" models which deal with the decision to 
move (e.g.Sossi (1955), Wolpert (1965), Brown and Moore (1970), Hanushek 
and Quigley (197S), and Cronin (1978) ). The basic hypothesis 
underlying these approaches is that the household has some notion of the 
utility it derives from its current residence and this utility is 
continually re-assessed; the household is likely to be in disequilibrium 
at any given point in time and the probability that in will move is a 
positive function of the extent of the disequilibrium.
The importance of mobility models lies in their attention, albeit 
partial, to the process of movement from one micro equilibrium to 
another; in long run equilibrium models such a transition (associated 
with, say, an exogenous change in transnort costs) generates, for each 
household, an instantaneous and costless adjustment to the new 
equilibrium (a macro equilibrium).
The boundaries between micro and macro are not distinct but Porell 
points primarily to differences in the treatment of the allocative role 
of price, especially with respect to mobility models. Prices are 
endogenous in Straszheim's model but he does not deal in changes over 
time.
Many location and mobility models, and their syntheses, relocation 
models, are rooted in the discrete choice framework which results from 
McFadden's (1973) random utility theory.
This will be dealt with at a later stage in this chapter, but first it 
will be instructive to examine how some models have dealt with the macro 
effects of micro behaviour and which combine mobility and location.
Forrester (1969) states that "...it is almost an act of faith that
large, complex systems give rise to counter-intuitive consequences".
With this in mind, attention can be turned to simulation models.
1.4 SIMULATION MODELS
The two most famous simulation models are those developed by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBEE) and the Urban Institute 
(UI). A variety of writers have dealt with these models as they have 
evolved over the years, but the names most closely associated with them 
are; Ingram, Kain and Ginn (1972) and Kain and Apgar (1985) (NBER-HUDS); 
and de Leeuw and Struyk(1976) and Macrae (1982) (UI). These models both 
incorporate an explicit model of supply, which takes a variety of forms 
from newbuild to existing stock conversion.
In terms of purpose, simulation models are firmly in the sphere of 
policy and planning analysis. A variety of simulation models were 
developed in the 1960’s, notably the Penn-Jersey Transportation Model of 
Herbert and Stevens (1960) which suggested the use of a linear 
programming algorithm. Such models were based on observed statistical 
regularities rather than any theoretical framework, although Herbert and
Steven viewed the linear programming solution as a direct analog to the 
utility maximisation process.
The NBER model is described by those who developed it as a hybrid of 
empirically based simulation models and economic theories of location*. 
Both the models under consideration view the essence of the housing 
market "problem" as the allocation of households to dwellings, and 
effect a solution within an explicitly temporal framework. In terms of 
complexity, the NBER model is much larger, so the UI model will be 
considered first.
1.4.1 The Urban Institute Model
The UI model developed by de Leeuw and Struyk (1976) is based on a set 
of "model" households (differentiated by race and age (elderly/non- 
elderly), and further by household income A ). The model invokes the 
housing service assumption and household choice is made with respect to 
the available price-quantity configurations, as well as the 
characteristics of the zone in which a dwelling is located. The 
characteristics are accessibility, race, and average net rent per 
dwelling; the latter two are endogenous.
There are four groups - owners of existing dwellings, the government, 
construction companies, and households seeking a dwelling. The "model" 
dwellings are characterised by the quantity of housing services 
supplied.
Owners aim to maximise profit by choosing a point on their supply curve, 
which refers to supply over a ten year period, and depends on the 
depreciation rate and the price elasticity of supply. If the price per 
unit service falls below the operating cost level, the dwelling is 
withdrawn from the stock (it is demolished or becomes long term vacant). 
Builders have perfectly elastic supply functions and respond passively 
to changes in the price of the existing stock.Government is primarily 
important due to tax and transfer activity, and also zoning (the 
imposition of a minimum amount of housing service per dwelling in the 
"newbuild zone").
The model searches for an equilibrium solution; in the process of doing 
so it is passible that some households will move very frequently 
although de Leeuw & Struyk suggest that the means of achievement of 
equilibrium is unimportant. This is in direct contrast with the IIBER 
model where it is suggested that the final equilibrium may be path- 
dependent .
The UI model consumer choice framework posits a quasi-Cobb-Douglas 
utility function for the household:
Uij = H X TTkZk (1.6)
In a linear expenditure system, utility is a function of quantity over 
and above some minimum threshold level. In the UI model, this minimum
threshold, in the case of housing, is a function of income. Thus we
have:
Ui.j = Utility to the itl'"’ household of the j'u''dwelling
Zfc: = Utility of Zonal characteristic k
H = Utility of housing services
= [Qj - Xi.Q (Yi/Pn)]® (1.7)
CXi
= Quantity of housing services offered by dwelling j 
= Strength of household type i's preference for housing
= tt.nji.Qpnnl .-1 i < *caxes and Pransxers.
P,-, = Price per unit of housing service of newly constructed
dwe11i ngs.
o> = Parameter expressing degree to which households alter their 
choice on receipt of a price discount. If a) = 0, 
then the utility function is properly Cobb-Douglas.
X = Utility of non-housing goods.
The supply function for existing dwellings is given as:
P.J -  Po
P<=
(1.8 )
where Q.j = level of housing services currently provided by dwelling j 
Qo = level of housing services provided by dwelling j ten years 
ago
Pj = price per unit of services offered by dwelling j 
Po = operating costs per unit of service
Pe = capital costs per unit of service for a new dwelling.
J3-i , {5:2, are parameters
In application, hedonic regressions are employed to construct rent 
deflators for each zone and are then used to generate housing service 
distributions for each zone, by applying the deflators to zonal rent 
levels.
The model generates a series of prices giving the distribution of prices 
per unit of housing services for a variety of structures representing 
quantity of housing services. Such a distribution is termed a price- 
structure curve.
It is quite possible for zoning restrictions, in conjunction with the 
income distribution, to generate higher prices per unit of housing 
service for houses supplying quantities of service below the legal 
newbuild limit, due to excess demand in that sector. Meanwhile real 
income and population growth , plus depreciation, create continual 
excess demand for housing at the higher end of the value spectrum; 
sufficiently high as to be equal to the threshold level just sufficient 
to introduce new building. In this scheme, then, new building will be 
clustered at the top end of the market.
The model is used to simulate exogenous effects such as an increase 
in construction costs, a decline in population growth, a housing 
allowance programme, and a new construction subsidy (see Ingram (1977)).
The most important feature of the UI model is its separate treatment of 
households and house owners. Whilst this is a conceptual separation 
only it is not clear how different the results would be if modelled as 
an explicitly owner-occupied market. A key drawback from the point of 
view of short-term forecasting is the 10-year perspective and the broad 
aggregative groupings used. As an indicator of long term trends, 
however, the UI model remains an important contribution to the study of 
housing market dynamics.
Macrae (1982) has modified the algorithm employed in the UI model such 
that households should, in equilibrium, be indifferent between their 
current dwelling and the next best alternative. (He also points to the 
inconsistency in supplier behaviour implied in the original UI 
formulation where the supplier is simultaneously a price taker and a 
price setter). There is no restriction, however on the mobility rates 
required to attain equilibrium although allocation of households in 
descending order of income should mean that this is not too unrealistic.
1.4.2 The national Bureau Model.
Although the IBER model is considerably more detailed in input and 
output than the UI model, its structure is, paradoxically, much more 
simple. It consists of a series of submodels, summarised in Table 1.1
TABLE 1, 1 COMPONENTS QF THE NBER MODEL
Employment Location Submodel
Movers Submodel
Nj'
Vacancy Submodel
)emand Allocation Submodel
Filtering Submodel
Supply Submodel
Market Clearing Submodel
Model Simulation
Source: Ingram et al (1972)
The first and mast noticeable difference between this and the UI model 
is the treatment of the economic "base". The assumption of workplace 
dominance which pervades the literature in this area suggests that 
employment location is a fundamental constraint on residential location 
s and this is included in the choice process of moving households. By 
contrast, the UI model imposes exogenous travel costs for each zone 
(the implication being that all the residents in one zone work in the 
same place). The need to take explicit account of employment location 
means that household details include occupational attainments, employing 
industry, and labour market status (i.e. whether currently unemployed). 
One worker per household is assumed.
A further major difference is in the simulation period. Although the 
MBER model aims at 10-50 year projections, each iteration of the model 
refers to one year so there exists potential for short term forecasting. 
Moreover, the 1IBER model contains more specific spatial detail. This is 
partly in terns of the number of alternatives (19 workplaces, 44 
residence zones compared with the UI model's 6 zones) and partly in the 
operation of zoning and land markets. The UI model has one "newbuild" 
zone in its original formulation, whilst the 5BER model deals explicitly 
with the amount of vacant land available in each zone.
The two models also differ in their price formation processes. In the UI 
model, prices are set by suppliers with the intention of maximising 
'profit - although as Macrae (1982) points out; this is inconsistent 
supplier behaviour in a perfectly competitive market.. . Macrae's 
response is to alter the allocation algorithm, which it should be
remembered is not intended to be realistic. The MBER modellers tackle 
the issue more directly, although stating:
"The difficulty of devising an operational, yet theoretically 
defensible, technique of forming prices in a dynamic context may have 
been the greatest single obstacle to the development of a market model 
of housing choice and residence location". (P.51)
The MBER model employs shadow prices from the linear programming 
solution; for any given house type these are interpreted as the 
"location rents" accruing to a particular zone. These are then used to 
adjust expected price rises, via an adaptive expectations formula, which 
influence demand decisions. However, the model does not calculate a 
transaction price for each period. The coefficient of expectations in 
the adaptive expectations formula is determined experimentally.
On the demand side, movers are generated by application of historical 
mobility rates to household classes, ^ and this is subsequently modified 
by workplace-specific alterations. These movers are then allocated to 
submarkets, which they choose by minimising gross prices (gross prices 
include travel-to-work costs, and as usual include fixed and income- 
dependent elements).
Assignment is to house type (via household demand functions) and then to 
residential location on the basis of minimisation of travel-to-work 
costs; since higher income groups value commuting time more highly they 
choose accessible locations within any submarket. Since this process is 
carried out for each house type, it is equivalent to minimisation of
aggregate costs. Ingram et al (1972) claim that evidence suggests that 
gross price effects ( i.e. travel-to-work cost effects) are large.
On the supply side, vacancies are created by movers, out migrants, and 
income/household-type specific changes in occupancy rates. To this is 
added new supply by house type either from newbuild or from 
transformation of units. The supply function for new houses uses the 
Dow Jones Building Cost Calculator, to compute the costs associated with 
the production or transformation of units, in the form of an input- 
output array and includes some consideration of the quality'7 of any 
given house type.
Supply can also change by change in the quality level ("filtering") 
which any unit occupies. This can happen via (costless) downgrading 
(i.e. natural depreciation) or by conscious upgrading by the owner who 
perceives the quality "premium" as exceeding the upgrading costs.
The last stage in the process, the market clearing submodel, carries out 
a variety of accounting procedures (e.g. updating the pattern of work 
trips). For the purposes of achieving market clearing, households can 
substitute locations, according to previous period prices, but not house 
types. In practice there is no one-to-one allocation of households to 
houses, rather a tally of net numbers is kept. s Excess demands 
(unallocated households) are carried forward to the next period, and 
shadow and expected prices are updated for the next iteration. Thus the 
"equilibrium" to which the model tends is a moving target.
The choice process, then, is sequential, and the mobility, house type, 
and location choices occur independently. At the market clearing stage, 
substitution is in terms of spatial units rather than house types.
The Kain and Aogar '..1965) RUDS simulation model expands the NBEK 
model. The most important new features which it contains are 
population-serving employment (which is endogenous) and a tenure choice 
submodel. Tenure choice occurs after the demand equations have 
allocated households to house types and locations, and is dependent on a 
variety of factors such as past tenure, current income, previous 
dwelling, and the age/race of household head.
Simulation models have been considered here at some length to illustrate 
the complexity with which it is passible to model housing markets, and 
the specific assumptions involved when using a more aggregative 
modelling approach. The most important aspect of simulation models is 
the treatment,of time. Introduction of dynamic elements do, however, 
pose problems - not least the decision as to what is endogenous, as 
opposed to exogenous - in the longer period. Forecasts and simulations 
of any kind require projections of exogenous variables and in the UBE'S - 
HUDS models this is mainly achieved by use of state-space transition 
matrices. The merits and demerits of this technique will be discussed 
in the next chapter but it can be stated here that it is clearly a 
powerful accounting procedure in the handling of large numbers of 
subcategories.
One of the main reasons that simulation models were initially developed 
was the considerable observed complexity of urban systems. But 
disaggregation alone dGes not automatically solve the problems arising 
from such complexity; it generates its own dilemmas of model 
calibration, partly due to data volume considerations and partly from 
the more fundamental problem of the exogeneity/endogeneity dichotomy.
In the HUBS version of the SEER model, demand equations are estimated b
multinomial logit and tenure choice by binomial logit. These decisions
still occur sequentially and are assumed independent. Kain and Apgar 
claim the evidence does not suggest otherwise, but this raises the 
calibration and model design problem. Whilst it might be felt that man
factors are important at each choice level, and indeed that there exist
interdependency between choices, only empirical applications and 
evidence can ultimately suggest the best form. The alternative is to 
be faced with so many variables, and "imposed" parameters, as to render 
the model incapable of meaningful detailed predictions, turning it 
instead into a "black box" even for the researcher.
With this in mind, attention can now turn to examine the theory and 
practice of discrete choice models as applied to housing.
1 , 5  DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS
1.5.1 Theory
Underlying discrete choice models is the assumption that whilst a 
variety of factors may be important in determining the likelihood of any 
one individual making a particular choice, the relationship between the 
explanatory variables and the choice probability is non-linear. In the 
Case of the logit model, the function is cumulative logistic, and in the 
case of probit it is cumulative normal.
The random utility framework is given in McFadden (1973), and its 
essence is as follows: Let Ui be the utility attached to the i
alternative and let Xi be a vector of attributes associated with an 
individual, or broadly homogeneous group of individuals, which influence 
choice. Let Vi and Vs denote functions, and let e u  be an independent, 
identically distributed (but not necessarily normal) disturbance 
associated with the it*h alternative. Finally let 0 be a vector of 
coefficients and let y be a coefficient vector which varies from one 
individual to another even within the same group.10 So for one 
individual, this gives:
U 4 = Vi (XiTj3) + VsCXL'y) + e u  (1.9)
with E  ( U i )  =  V- ,  ( X i T j 3 )
y, the individual taste variation parameter, is not assigned any 
systematic pattern so it is assumed that its influence can be subsumed 
into a composite disturbance, £ - i.
Thus the utility expression becomes:
The probability that the itf~' alternative is chosen, Pr±, is taken to be 
the probability that the utility associated with the i'-1”’ alternative is 
greater than all other alternatives' utilities.
This yields the fundamental equation of the random utility approach:
where E±Pr± = 1.
The use of normally distributed disturances is undesirable because in 
this framework they are heteroskedastic. The commonest form employed 
for multinomial logit purposes is a Viebuli distributed disturbance. 
The exact form is not relevant but does satisfy independence and 
identical distribution.
Ux = V-, < X i T J3) + £ ( 1. 10)
PrE £ 2 j $ Vi (XiTj3> + £2:l - Vi(XjT0)] ( 1 . 12)
Under the v/iebull distribution, the basic model becomes:
V,  (X: ,  r B)
Pr :L ( 1 . 1 3 )
V t  (X. j  T {3)
The individual's ranking of all the alternatives can be given by a 
series of paired comparisons - this is the "independence of irrelevant 
alternatives" property.
The binary logit case is given as:
set of all explanatory variables, X.
Since the joint probability of' an event's occurence is the. product of 
the marginal and conditional probabilities, the logit model can be 
extended to deal with sequential choice. The random utility function is 
assumed to be linearly seperable into those attributes that vary across 
both levels of the choice procedure ( the conditional choice 
probabilities) and those that vary across only one (the marginal choice 
probabilities).
In —
P--
In V-, (X,Tj3) - Vb (X:;Trjl) = V, <XT 3> (1.-14)
McFadden's (1978) nested logit model generalises the sequential logit 
procedure to allow for some correlation between disturbances; he goes on 
to show that all of these logit models are members of the family of 
general extreme value choice models.
In applying these models, there are a number of considerations to be 
borne in mind. Firstly, estimation of model parameters requires 
software with non-linear estimation routines and appropriate disturbance 
distributions. Secondly, the models are "micro" in the truest sense and 
require individual-level data. It is possible, especially in the binary 
case, to use the least-squares approximation applied to aggregate data. 
Such an approach is, however, only valid if. there are likely to be large 
proportions choosing the appropriate alternative 1 ' (i.e. where the
relevant behaviour is on the approximately linear portion of the 
cumulative logistic function).
1.5.2 Practice
1.5.2.1 Tenure and Housing choice
The more straightorward applications of discrete choice models pertain 
to the choice of tenure and the mobility decision. Applications to 
spatial choice or relocation are more complex.
In the models reviewed thus far, the implied tenure form is rental.
This is primarily because it is assumed that there exists a 
straightforward relationship between rents and capital values; capital
values are the present discounted value of the future net benefit stream 
arising from rental income.
In a perfect market this will be valid, but if there exists any form of 
market segmentation, imposed by an institutional framework of rent 
controls and other subsidies, the relationship between rents and capital 
values may not be maintained.
Struyk (1976) examines the tenure choice process. He eschews the notion 
of a segmented housing market on the evidence of an earlier study 
(Schnare and Struyk (1976)) and invokes the housing service assumption; 
that is, housing is homogeneous and the only difference between 
structures is the quantity of services supplied. This can be viewed "as 
if" it is the case by the choice of suitable hedonic indices as weights 
to transform the multi-dimensional housing bundle into a uni-dimensional 
good. In the absence of market segmentation and false trading, this is 
valid.
Struyk points out that most studies which attempt to evaluate the price 
elasticity (e.g. de Leeuw (1971)) and income elasticity (Wilkinson
(1973)) of demand for housing separate results for owners and renters. 
Struyk suggests that tenure is important in housing analysis because of 
housing's dual role as an investment and consumption good. There will 
exist interdependence between the owner and rental markets because both 
compete for housing services, whilst only owners demand for investment 
purposes.
functions although these are implicit - renters desire to avoid 
maintenance and transaction costs, and so it should be theoretically 
possible to deal in risk aversion as a key determinant. (This has been 
proven to be the case in a study by Ioannides (1979)) But Struyk also 
suggests that owners and renters have different house structure 
preferences; the single unit (detached) structure is the dominant form 
available to owners, and is desirable as such when the owner has a 
family. In addition, inelasticity of sunr.-iy in the short run will 
mean that at any point in time there will be a mismatch between the 
supply and demand of structures demanded by owners and renters; this 
mismatch partly accounts for differences in the price per unit of 
services facing owners and renters.
In conjunction with this, the tax subsidy to owner-occupiers acts as a 
very obvious incentive to own but is one which is dependent on income. 
These considerations lead Struyk to estimate a model in which tenure, 
housing consumption and subsidy received are simultaneously determined 
for each household.12 Prior to this he estimates a binary choice 
model13 for tenure choice alone, with probability of ownership a 
function of permanent income, life cycle and marital status, number of 
persons in the household, the value of subsidy received 
and the tenure chosen by the household's peer group. This effect is 
also suggested for location behaviour by Ingram et al (1972).
Struyk splits the sample by age and household type, and” finds almost al 
variables are significant ''A for husband-wife families with the age of
head of household in the ranges 30-44 and 45-65. He achieves similar 
results for the under 30's with the exception of the peer group effect.
Struyk criticises Kain and Quigley (1972) (amongst others who have 
studied tenure choice) for aggregation across households and for 
concentrating on newly formed or relocating households. This criticism 
is made because it is suggested that viewing recent movers as being in 
equilibrium represents substantial myopia on the part of the relocators; 
if they have a view to future housing requirements, their new residence 
may still represent a short term disequilibrium position. Struyk also 
points out that current income may affect the timing of the mobility 
decision. Kain and Quigley experiment with current and permanent 
income, but not in the same equation, as Struyk does. He goes on to 
suggest that by using aggregate probabilities of owning and renting, 
(presumably derived from relative frequencies) it should be possible to 
construct an aggregate tenure choice, housing consumption and supply 
model.
Quigley (1976) has estimated a conditional multinomial logit model to 
analyse housing choices. He first of all points out the distinction 
between service price and gross price, determined by travel to work 
costs (as in the HBER - HUDS models). He then estimates the model with 
the sample split by income and family size, with the relative likelihood 
of choice of any one housing type as a function of density, size 
(rooms), quality (age), availability and effective (gross) relative 
price of each house type. To satisfy the conditions of negative own- 
price elasticity and positive cross-price elasticity, the coefficient on
relative prices should be negative. Invoking Sweeney's (1974) commodity 
"heirarchy" notion, it is to be expected that households prefer more to 
less quality, ceteris paribus, so one expects the age coefficient to be 
negative also. By the same reasoning the size coefficient should be 
positive. The results bear out these hypotheses fairly closely although 
size tends to show perverse signs for small families ( as might be 
expected) and relative price effects become unimportant at high income 
levels. The availability variables are nearly all significant.
Quigley's work shows that it is unwise to ignore house types and the 
effects of travel to work casts on choice. This would suggest that 
Struyk's model may be mis-specified in that travel costs are ignored; 
his peer group variable may go some way towards proxying this, however.
Boehm (1932) has suggested that house type choice and tenure choice 
cannot be treated independently. Quigley's samples are all recently 
relocated renters and Struyk's work would suggest that results for them 
cannot be generalised, or are mis-specified because they treat the 
tenure decision as independent. Boehm views the tenure, size and 
quality choices as occurring within a "hierarchy" The consumer is 
viewed as making the tenure choice first.1S The order in which the 
subsequent choices are made, conditional on the tenure choice, is varied 
experimentally. If hierarchy level is unimportant, it would be expected 
that (for example):
Pr (HQt ! Qt,Lt) = Pr (Lt I Qt,HQt) for all t (time periods)
where HQ denotes "high quality" ownership (proxied by neighbourhood 
income)
0 denotes ownership tenure
L denotes "large" (definition varies by tenure )
Pr denotes choice probability
Boehm estimates equations with first quality and then size at the lowest 
level of the hierarchy. Some of the parameters vary considerably, '1'* 
although Boehm does not discuss this. The regressors used in the first 
hierarchy are family size age of head of household, marital status, 
race, one of three "wealth" variables (prior house value, estimated 
permanent income, and actual wealth), average price of owner-occupied 
dwellings, relative costs of owning versus renting, expected mobility, 
and expected house price changes. The latter two variables are giver 
directly by survey data. The results show expected signs for all 
variables except house price changes, with wealth, family size and 
marital status showing a strong positive effect, whilst average price, 
owning costs, and expected mobility are strongly negative. The 
equations at the lower level of the hierarchy17- include relative price 
terms although the results tend to be insignificant, especially with 
respect to quality choice.
This gives eight possible housing choices. Given that the joint 
probability of any one of these choices is the product of the marginal 
and conditional probabilities, it is possible to construct a matrix 
showing the change in the probability of making any one' housing choice 
due to a change in any,one explanatory variable. This has the advantage
of ease of interpretation. Also, since each decision in the hierarchy 
| is treated as dichotomous (binary logit) the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives assumption can be avoided. There is the disadvantage, 
however, of rapidly diminishing sample size the more hierarchy levels 
are estimated.
1.5.2.2 Mobility and Housing Choice.
The discrete choice models reviewed so far have highlighted the
'
| difficulties involved in modelling complex choices in a framework which 
: does not take account of the heterogeneity of households, house types,
t
and the institutional environment. They demonstrate that "feedback" 
effects from one choice to another may be strong. Underlying this is 
the tension which exists between two schools of thought on the mobility 
decision. One such view is that households move in response to 
disequilibrium, and thus recent movers, being in equilibrium , are the 
only ones to give a true picture of their preferences. This is the 
rationale used by Quigley for studying only recent movers. Struyk 
rejects such a notion and would probably reject the possibility of 
modelling mobility at all, on the grounds that current residence choice 
reflects all the information about future circumstances available to the 
household at any one point in time. Weinberg (1979) has suggested that 
mobility is due to unexpected disequilibrium.
Rejection of the disequilibrium - mobility hypothesis outright is too 
harsh without investigation of the evidence. Mobility is a major means 
of adjusting housing consumption (although the NBER - HUDS model and
Struyk suggest maintenance ana upgrading expenditures are equally 
important; this is especially so in Struyk's analysis where the asset 
demand for housing is stressed. The force of Struyk's argument depends 
on disequilibrium costs in relation to mobility and search costs.>
The earliest studies of mobility aim at discovering empirical 
regularities, and the strongest associations found are between socio­
demographic factors, tenure, and movement propensities. Pickvance
(1974)1:3 uses path analysis to disentangle causal relationships in the 
mobility decision. He finds that life cycle position and age have a 
positive impact on tenure (ie choice of owner-occupation) which affects 
desired mobility negatively. By contrast Boehm reverses the causality 
and employs expected mobility in his tenure choice equation, yielding th 
result that higher expected mobility lowers the probability of choosing 
| owner-occupation. Since both techniques aim to show causality this 
leaves the question "Do renters avoid owner-occupation because they are 
more mobile (avoiding some transactions costs) or are renters expecting 
to move to owner-occupation because they view renting as inferior to 
owning?" This demonstrates the problems inherent in mixing temporal 
! data (expectations) with data on the household's position which 
effectively reveals previous choices (although not necessarily previous 
preferences).
The conceptual causal model employed in early mobility studies suggests 
! that over time, life cycle changes generate a mismatch between housing 
needs and a household's current housing situation, resulting in a move. 
The subsequent choice is viewed as more or less independent of the
decision to move itself, but important linking factors are life cycle 
stage and permanent income.
The unification of the mobility - location decision is achieved by the 
introduction of the notion of search,especially by Clark & Cadwaller 
(1973), Speare et al (1974) and Goodman (1976). The household is viewed 
as continually re-evaluating the "place utility" of its dwelling.
Either an alteration of its needs or of the immediate environment will 
generate "locational stress". This initiates search, which is in effect 
an information gathering process. Of all the opportunities available, 
the household only has sufficient information to assign "place 
utilities" to some. This defines the household's "awareness space".
The household is also assumed to have defined its "aspiration region" - 
the upper and lower bounds of dwelling and neighbourhood attributes 
which the household deems acceptable. The intersection of the 
"aspiration region" and the "awareness space" gives the "search space".
This sets the framework within which search operates, but constructing 
and testing a model raises a number of questions.The first point is that 
search involves a variety of costs and is subject to constraints (eg 
time). McCall (1970) suggests treating search as a sequential sampling 
procedure, whilst Rothschild (1973) (among others) suggests that 
"learning" effects will also operate.
The literature on search is vast and much of it is not directly 
pertinent to housing, but is rather aimed at macro theories of the 
labour market. Nevertheless, many of the concepts translate well:
Stigler (1962) viewed search as sampling from a vacancy distribution, 
whilst the learning effects mentioned above refer to a probability 
distribution of prices.
Hanushek and Quigley (1978) formulate a mobility model which implicitly 
incorporates search by assuming that search and moving costs are 
randomly distributed. Their model postulates that household 
disequilibrium can be decomposed into two components; first is the 
expected change in the equilibrium demands of the household over the 
forthcoming time period, second is the extent of current disequilibrium. 
Deviations of this kind can be positive or negative. Equilibrium demand 
is a linear function of a household's income, its size, and the age of 
the head. Hanushek and Quigley employ probit estimation1 on the 
differences between the actual and desired demands. The desired demands 
are calculated using equations estimated in Hanushek and Quigley (1979)
- since these apply to recent relocations they are taken as representing 
equilibrium (Struyk's criticisms notwithstanding). They find that 
disaggregation of "stress" into two component yields superior 
statistical fit; and since their data consists of longitudinal 
interviews, they are able to suggest that at any point in time a large 
number of households are in disequilibrium.20
Although in the "stress" model of search and mobility it is suggested 
that the household is unaware of external opportunities until it 
reaches a threshold level of dissatisfaction there is at least the 
possibility that consequent upon search the household may decide not to 
relocate. This can be contrasted with the mechanical view held in, say,
the NBER - HDDS model where excess demand is carried forward from one 
period to the next, and mobility is automatically "triggered” (as in 
e.g. Jones (1981)). Speare et al (1984) points out that selection of a 
new residence may occur prior to the decision to move, whilst Cronin 
(1978) found in survey data that 31% of respondents expressing very 
great dissatisfaction with their current housing situation did not 
search, whilst 33% of those claiming to be satisfied did search.
Cronin (1979) estimates the probability of search in any one year as a 
logit function of cost and benefit factors, including dissatisfaction 
with current housing circumstances, search and mobility costs, social 
ties with the current neighbourhood, past mobility, and race. He also 
suggests that different household characteristics will result in 
different information sources or information gathering activities (and 
hence differing search costs). For those restricted to public 
transport, or who make infrequent use of newspapers, search will be more
costly for any given expected benefit. Cronin uses the income 
equivalent variation (the amount necessary to render the household in 
equilibrium again) and finds that as this value rises, the search period 
falls whilst search intensity rises. He finds inconsistencies in the 
signs of mobility cost variables. Previous mobility is insignificant 
when household demographic characteristics are included. In a 
subsequent study, Weinberg et al (1981) found previous mobility and age 
of household ' head, as well as dissatisfaction, to be important in 
explaining the probability of search.
Whilst the evidence suggests that search is important for gathering 
information and will be sensitive to a variety of factors, household 
disequilibrium amongst them, in practice a household needs to have some 
notion of its desired housing consumption given current constraints 
prior to initiating search. The basis of this is that some information 
about housing is available- at very low cost in newspapers, so that all 
households will have some knowledge of the external market situation, 
and the distinctions between "searching" and "not-searching" are likely 
to be blurred, "Search" then takes on the characteristics of "fine- 
tuning" of information. MacLennan (1977) defines the search-mobi1ity 
process as occurring in conjunction with an "aspiration set redefinition 
circuit". In the process of redefining the aspiration set (i.e. 
completing the preference map), the awareness space and consequently the 
search space are also redefined.
The micro-level models discussed so far implicitly utilise the notion of 
revealed preference; that is, at any one point in time a household’s 
situation reflects its preferred position subject to constraints.2:2 
This is valid provided the household is known to have possessed perfect 
information at the time of the choice. 23 Empirical refutation of this 
would require demonstration that a strictly preferred alternative had 
not been chosen (assuming rationality) or alternatively the ability to 
read minds!
In the absence of this, there is always the danger that the need to take 
into account important constraints will have been ignored (e.g. 
"gatekeeper" effects, operating especially in the rental sector, where'
public and private landlords may impose their own criteria for 
acceptance of tenants.) Longley (1935) suggests that in analysing 
housing choice, separation of the sample into tenure groups is a pre­
requisite given that a free tenure-choice environment cannot be assumed. 
He also suggests that, in the case of spatial choice (of, say, housing 
alternatives) information or market entry constraints represent a 
breakdown of the fundamental discrete choice modelling assumption, of a 
universal choice set faced by all decision makers.
MacLennan and Williams (1980) have investigated revealed preference in a 
spatial context when preferences are of the neoclassical (that is, 
constraint - independent) type. In the case of the homogeneous-housing 
location models, preferences for space in terms of density determine 
spatial choices; in heterogeneous discrete structure housing, house type 
choice is determined by life cycle factors as well as attribute 
preferences, whilst location is chosen by transport - cost minimisation 
(so choice of peripheral location due to low density is viewed as 
conceptually part of the house type choice). This reflects the 
traditional role of space in neoclassical economics as a source of 
transport costs a l o n e . T o  this might be added the potential for 
spatial clustering via peer group effects and stock durability, either 
:as a social phenomenon or as a reflection of information networks. 
MacLennan and Williams also suggest that in the absence of an optimal 
stopping rule (e.g. Flowerdew (1976)) in cases of spatial choice, 
changes in knowledge due to continued search will create problems in 
specifying demand or more generally will result in a breakdown of the
traditional choice axioms. Van Lierop (1985) suggests the use of stated 
and revealed preference data in combination.
1.5.2.3 Household Formation
All of the models examined so far contain the assumption that the 
household is the basic decision-making unit. The market size may change 
through papulation growth (a change in the absolute size of the various 
categories to which headship rates are applied) or through a long term 
change in population age structure affecting the relative size of the 
: headship categories (given by life cycle factors in temporal 
1 comparisons). It will also obviously change through real income growth.
I A much neglected possibility, however, is that of systematic changes in
!
headship rates; that is. in the actual propensity to form households.
I
The conventional treatment of demand in housing is in terms of household
i
expenditure, either on housing services or their equivalent scaled into 
one dimension using hedonic indices. As has been seen however, such an
i
approach implicitly assumes long run equilibrium and apart from the 
factors likely to prevent this discussed in Whitehead and Odling-Smee in 
Section 1.1, the failure of perceived and non-perceived feasible sets to 
! coincide will also militate against it. The NBER-HUDS and UI models at 
least deal in actual numbers of households but even in the NBER model, 
which requires household projections, headship rates are used. Struyk 
(1976) in his suggested form for an aggregate simultaneous equation 
model treats the number of households as exogenous, since: "...to make 
it endogenous would involve incorporating central place or differential
regional growth theory in the model" (P.178; This is a crucial 
statement, but discussion of it will be left until Chapter Four where 
regional factors will be analysed.
Ermisch (1981) has suggested a utility maximising framework for the 
analysis of the household formation process. He- suggests that the 
decision to form a separate household is a special case of the more 
general choice of optimal household grouping. The suggestion is, in 
| effect, that household members engage in "home production" and that 
there exist economies of scale in this respect, notably deriving from 
quasi-public goods (consumer durables in the house and the house 
itself).
|
l^ore formally, let X be services yielded ter canita bv a market s'oodj •' - . * .
(i.e. housing) and let Z be the quantity of housing available. Let q be 
the number of members of the household, giving
X= X (q,Z) (1.16)
Ermisch suggests that:
<5 X q
<   * 0
S q X
and imposes X = q~~* Z
0 ( ^ ( 1  (Scale economies)
i.e. the elasticity of output of housing service per capita with respect
to numbers of persons in the household demonstrates economies of scale.
If the elasticity is -1, no economies of scale operate,‘whilst if it is
zero, the house is a pure public good.
In order to benefit from owning a house it is suggested that household 
members have to combine the purchased goods ( housing and consumer 
durables) with time spent in the home (at the expense of time spent 
supplying labour to the market).
Thus there is the (concave) "home-produced commodity" production 
function:
where L = hours of time spent in the home.
Lastly there is the utility function:
U = U (C q>
+ - (1.1 
where signs denote expected signs of first-order- derivatives.
Letting T be the total time available ana If' be the hours of time spent 
supplying labour to the market the time constraint is :
Letting w be the hourly wage rate and V be non-labour income, and p the 
price of "housing services", the budget" constraint is:
C = C (X L q) (1.17)
(1.19)
pZ
(1.20)
q
for any individual.
The individual chaoses Z,L and q so as to maximise (1.18) subject to 
(1. 19) and (1.20).
The model allows for corner solutions (e.g. L = T) such that some 
houshold members may not work at all, and empirical results23 suggest 
| that Sq/£W is negative. (The elasticity of household size with repect 
j to income is approximately -0.2; Hickman (1974) found it to be -0.18 
! using numbers of households).
Ermisch and Overton (1980; 1985) have applied these ideas to explain two 
I housing-related demographic phenomena: the decrease in marriages and
| the actual household formation decision. With regard to the first, 
given that female earnings have risen relative to male earnings in the 
post-war years, Ermisch's model predicts a decrease in marriages (or at 
i least an increase in the average age at marriage) and empirical work 
appears to support this. Marriage is not, however, the only source of 
I new households and is becoming less important in this respect.
s
Ermisch and Overton (1985) use the notion of "minimal household units" 
(MHU's) to analyse household formation. There are four kinds of MHU's:
|
I ■
U t : Single adults without children
Us : Lone parent families
Us : Married couples without children
Ua : Married couples with dependent children
It is possible for individuals to move from one type to another via 
marriage, divorce, illegitimate birth, and so on. The MHU's are 
regarded as the basic economic decision taking unit. Households, on th 
I other hand, may be "simple" (one MHU) or "complex" (more than one MHU).
: The optimal MHU grouping for any set of individuals will be determined, 
as in Ermisch's household formation model, by earnings, desire for
I privacy, and economies of scale in "home production".
i
Using General Household Survey data, Ermisch and Overton estimate a 
probit model which predicts the probability of being a separate 
household for a variety of categories (classified by age and previous
marital status) of nan-married individuals, one-parent families, and fo
! ’
couples (with husband aged over 65) categorised by whether or not the 
wife works.
Amongst single people, the biggest differences are for "never-married" 
compared with those widowed or divorced. The presence of children 
considerably increases the probability of living alone when all other 
factors are controlled (i.e. age, marital status, income and place of 
residence).
This approach is superior to the traditional "headship rate" method 
which employs age, sex, and marital status categories, especially for 
the younger sections of the adult population. By paying specific 
attention to economic factors, the approach has the potential for 
extension to take into account the possible simultaneous determination 
of household formation and house availability. This raises some key
issues: the first is that in a single-equation probit framework, there
is the implicit assumption of the congruence of revealed and actual 
preferences, whilst this in turn presupposes perfectly elastic supply.
1.6 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter the intention has been to illustrate a variety of points 
which will be pertinent to subsequent discussion. It has been seen that 
the utility maximisation premise is a powerful one which can handle a 
variety of situations, assumptions, and levels of detail. It has been 
shown how the assumption of revealed preference can be employed to 
generate quantitive predictions concerning choice probabilities in a 
number of different contexts relevant to housing, and that there exist 
I many ways in which multi-level choice can be modelled.
Further, it is clear from the above that space is, initially, treated as 
a source of transport costs alone in utility maximising models and this 
is its only path of influence on the housing market. In the polycentric 
workplace case, households which are identical in all other respects may 
I face spatially different gross prices for housing in a given system, by 
virtue of their employment locations. In the IBER-HUDS model, 
households may substitute across space according to transportation cost 
minimisation criteria in order to achieve an equilibrium position.
Space may also enter indirectly in the form of externalities, (which 
generate location rents for particular areas) which may have a 
systematic spatial pattern - for example, the East-West dichotomy in
urban areas in the UK where the prevailing wind is from the Vest; clean 
air becomes a non-traded good, reflected in location rents.
Space is only one dimension of the market. Many of the studies 
discussed here employ the "expenditure on housing services" concept as a 
measure of demand, but at the aggregate level this takes the form of a 
volume of expenditure distributed (non-uniformly) over a number of 
households. That number will be variable (and possibly endogenous) as 
seen in Ermisch's household formation studies, and its distribution by 
tenure will also depend on a variety of factors, including past building 
and demolition activity and government policy, reflected in rent 
regulations and the tax treatment of owner-occupation.
The bulk of discrete choice models deal with individual level data, and 
transferring these to an aggregate level (for the purpose, say, of 
constructing a simulation model) requires explicit aggregation 
assumptions; for example about the shape of the income distribution.
The naive approach integrates individual level relationships across all 
individuals, employing some income distribution (e.g. lognormal) to do 
so. The discussion of simulation models, however, has illustrated the 
interdependency that exists between individual choices. This implies 
the possibility of multiple equilibria for the individual particularly 
if the model incorporates false trading. If any one individual's choice 
is frustrated, the individual has to decide whether to keep searching 
and remain in disequilibrium or break off search and revert to 
equilibrium.
The apparent need for multiple equilibria to reconcile macro and micro
, models is false, however. The process of search by the individual has
been seen to be one which alters the individual's information set in an
uncertain environment. The time constraint (possibly self-imposed) is 
I '
the "slack" for any one individual, and in practice the housing system
will "grope" towards a possibly unique equilibrium which would exist in
a world of perfect information.2* In practice there will be some number
of individuals in disequilibrium at any one time (as suggested by
Hanushek and Quigley) and an equilibrium to which the system tends. The
allocative role of price over and above location and quality premia is
( one which operates slowly (as reflected in the IBER-HUDS model where it
| takes some time for shadow price changes to affect decisions
significantly).
The MBER-HUDS model is non-Valrasian by construction,2'7, although the UI 
model (by allowing unlimited mobility for some households) is likely to 
attain a unique equilibrium. It seems intuitively unlikely, however, 
that the MBER-HUDS model will have a unique equilibrium given that 
spatial substitution is possible and excess demands are carried forward 
from one time period to the next. In the next chapter some of the 
methods employed to model vacancies more formally (in a non-utility 
maximisation framework) will be investigated, as opposed to the ad hoc 
algorithms used in simulation models. A feature which is common to most 
of the studies discussed here is that they treat the core of the housing 
market "problem" as being the allocation of households to houses, where 
such an allocation takes time to happen and is of a speed such that 
i changes in both dimensions, households and houses, can also occur.
60
Overlaying this is the strong spatial component which means that the 
"housing market" is the result of interconnections between desires, 
opportunities, and information, where all three are simultaneously 
;determined.
Some researchers have tackled these aspects, either on a theoretical 
(Gale and Ifoore (1973)) or an empirical level (Van Lierop (1985)). 
begin at the micro scale and imply considerable expense in data 
gathering. For this reason, this study will be restricted to a more 
"macro" oriented approach.
Both
CHAPTER TVO 
GEOGRAPHIC MODELS
2 .1  INTRODUCTION
The models discussed in the last chapter possess the common feature of 
assuming utility maximisation or its supply side counterpart, profit 
maximisation. By contrast the models examined here employ a variety of 
approaches, although they all address similar questions. Consequently 
the classification adopted is one of technique, since all the models 
address mobility, location, or relocation at the macro or micro level of 
aggregation. The boundaries between these latter categories tend to be 
diffuse and will not be adhered to here in a rigid manner. The Porell 
(1985) and Van Lierop (1985) taxonomy draws a distinction between 
"statistical" models based on empirical regularities and 
"analogue/heuristic" models which employ concepts developed in the 
natural sciences. Such a classification is useful, but the broad 
headings predominately used here are threefold: firstly, the "gravity" 
model of spatial interaction will be examined; then the "entropy" model 
which derives from it; thirdly, those models which employ variants of 
the Markov Chain stochastic processes will be evaluated. The first two 
forms are broadly of the analogue type, the latter is statistical.
These categories are not, however, mutually exclusive.
The models to be reviewed have developed from the disciplines of 
sociology and economic geography. They have a strongly spatial bias 
although the form of such "space" varies - from "social space" (between, 
say, social classes with applications of a geographic nature) to 
"economic space" (however defined). Space is the motive force, in 
contrast to the last chapter where behaviour flows from utility
functions. As will be shown, however, a number of the model forms to be 
discussed can be arrived at by some form of constrained optimisation 
process, with benefits (such as "attractiveness") maximised subject to 
| costs (such as "congestion"). It will also be shown that most of the 
models discussed in this chapter can be analysed within the common 
framework developed by Alonso (1978).
The earliest form of spatial interaction posited is'the "gravity" model, 
which has a number of housing market applications, and this will be 
discussed first.
2.2-GRAVITY MODELS QF SPATIAL INTERACTIQM
The nation that analogues to the laws of Newtonian physics can explain 
human behaviour is first set out in Carey (1858), who suggests that the
i
attractive force of a geographic area will be greater the higher the 
population concentration. In the Newtonian formulation, the amount of 
"interaction" between two bodies is directly proportional to the mass 
of the two bodies, and inversely proportional to the square of the 
distance between them. Zipf (1947) points out that although the 
exponent on distance in a three-dimensional system (e.g planetary 
motion) is 2, in a two dimensional system it should be 1. An exponent 
of 1 does imply that interaction is an inverse linear function of 
distance, which seems intuitively difficult to accept.
The model presented by Zipf is:
where b j  is the "interaction" (usually flows of persons or goods) 
between areas i and j 
Pi is the population of area i
d:i,j is the distance (however defined) between i and j
i
A is a constant
This formulation has been applied in two main ways, depending on the 
"interaction" being examined. The first application (used by Zipf) 
models interurban migration flows, which in effect is an aggregate, long 
distance, housing relocation model. The formula in (2.1) aims at 
modelling two-way flows. For unidirectional predictions, only the 
destination "attractiveness" is required. Zipf suggests that population 
adequately proxies "attractiveness" when income and unemployment are 
uniformly distributed. Stouffer (1940) suggests that "attractiveness" 
should be replaced by "opportunities", proxied by the total number of 
immigrants to an area (implicitly invoking revealed preference).
Stouffer's measure of distance is the number of "intervening 
opportunities" between i and j, whereas Zipf's is geographic 
(transportation distance).
Anderson (1955) compares Zipf's and Stouffer's hypotheses and finds 
that, in aggregate, there is little difference between tfie two in terms 
of predictive capacity, although for any one source area, predictive
power varies. Anderson also finds that using higher exponents for the 
distance figure does not yield statistically superior results. Ke 
suggests that in Zipf's formulation, raising distance by an exponent 
I which itself is a positive function of the size of source area will 
improve results, and that amending the destination population figure to 
take account of unemployment will do likewise, probably because it is 
closer to Stouffer's notion of opportunities. He does not find 
. Stouffer's intervening opportunities distance measure to be superior.
I
The implicit hypothesis in these models is that employment "drives" the 
! migration process, or at least is the ma.ior source of relocation. UseI ^
of population is intended, however, to proxy a variety of factors, 
including housing and recreational opportunities. The second usage of 
the gravity formulation is an extension of this, which suggests that 
residential location around a workplace can be similarly modelled. This 
is used by e.g. Lowry (1960) as a component of a general urban model. 
After workplaces (and hence the number of jobs in any one area) are 
generated, individuals are allocated subject to the constraint:
liTu = Ej (2.2)
where Ti;i is the number if people working in j who live in i, and Ej is 
the number of jobs in j. Since the origin of trips is generated first 
and constrains the location activity, models of this form are termed 
"origin-constrained" or "production-constrained". Within the context of 
an.urban model, the employment "base" will consist of industrial 
(exogenous) employment. The location of primary workers results in a
derived demand for secondary and tertiary employment. Apart from the 
origin constraint, location is subject to a constraint resulting from 
"spatial deterrence", and commonly in these models this is some function 
of commuting time. The parallels with the neoclassical land use models 
are clear, although the solution process varies from iterative 
algorithms to linear programming (see Batty (1978)). This usage of the 
gravity model will be examined in more detail later in the discussion 
of the entropy approach.
Both the gravity formulations outlined above use the workplace-dominance 
jassumption, but employ different definitions of "space" according to 
usage. In application, gravity models have shown some empirical
success, but one of the major criticisms has been the lack of
theoretical underpinnings; Niedercorn and Bechdolt (1969) employ utility 
maximisation 1 to provide a vigorous framework which can be applied to 
gravity models in general. (They also provide a comprehensive account 
I of previous work on the gravity formulation). They suggest that 
individuals derive utility by "interacting" with others, and this is 
realised by making trips. In the origin constrained case, the k'1-1"1 
individual's "total net utility of interaction" is
Uik = A Pj U(Ti,)k (2.3.1)
where UCT a j ) is the utility derived from the trip from i to j
Pj is the population at j which proxies "attractors" inviting
interaction 
A is a constant
:The formulation suggests the utility function is additive (in 
destination utilities). The individual is assumed to allocate some set 
proportion of his time and income for the purpose of deriving utility in 
|this way, and the budget and time constraints are:
r 1.,dij Ti j ( Mi,,: (2.3.2)
1
1/s Ejdi/Ti.,,, ( K,,; (2.3.3)
'where Mxi,; and Hi* are the proportions of income and time allocated, 
respectively, and
r is the cost per mile of distance travelled 
1/s is the average speed of travel in the area 
dij is the distance from i to j, as before.
Maximisation of (2.3.1) subject to (2.3.2) and (2.3.3) when there are n
|
^destinations yields n-1 equations (excluding the constraint derivative). 
iThe precise solutions depend on the form of utility function chosen, and 
Feidercarn and Bechdolt experiment with logarithmic and power functions.
I f  the  g e n e ra l  form of the  g r a v i t y  model is
I x A  =  A P:i.B Pd * did"6' (2. 4)
(where in (2.1) 3 = 'i = £ = 1), then (2.4) can be shown to follow by
manipulation of the n-1 equations under each functional form for
utility.
Taking logarithms gives:
In lid = In A + 31n P :i. + vln P j “ din did (2.5)
Miedercorn and Bechdolt show that if, in a regression of (2.5), Y = 6 ^
1, then a logarithmic utility function can be inferred, whilst if 6 >
1, a power function is suggested. (Here, l u  and Tid are identical.) 
This model generated a series of comments and replies (Mathur (1970)), 
Medercorn & Bechdolt (1970), Allen (1972) resulting in a reformulation 
Neidercorn and Bechdolt (1972).
Mathur suggested that trips are the means of achieving utility by 
accessing "characteristics" (cf. Lancaster 1966) associated with trips - 
therefore trips represent a form of consumption technology; subsequent 
debate centered around the minimum number of trips that it is necessary 
for the individual to make in order to maximise utility.
This model is interesting because it indirectly raises a number of 
important issues. The first is that it employs a micro perspective 
which is subsequently aggregated. It thus becomes necessary to deal
j with behavioural consistency at the micro level, a point ignored in the 
j  earlier macro formulations. More specifically, the constraints relevant 
| to any one individual (time and money) must be made explicit. Secondly,
i it could be argued that the Keidercorn and Bechdolt model is unrealistic
|
in as much as the individual is allocating a fixed time and money budget 
to the trip-making process; this assumes independence between the 
utility attached to the products of trip-making and those available 
elsewhere (see Strotz (1957)), or else the much stronger assumption that 
it is possible to abstract from the price changes of all other goods.
! Since the model does not specify the nature of the goods acquired when
j tripmaking occurs, and does not detail a production side (even though
i
some trips will be for the purposes of supplying labour) the latter 
assumption is difficult to maintain. Applied to shopping and recreation 
however this model is probably not too unrealistic. The last point 
concerns a more housing-specific consideration - whilst the model 
represents a general framework for (implicitly return) trips, it does
not accommodate migration (inter-urban relocation) at the micro level; 
yet if the individual is concerned with maximising utility, the option 
of centering one's activities elsewhere should be included.
Black (1972) applies the gravity model to inter-regional commodity 
flows. He suggests as a general form:
Pi Aj Fi.i Du
Ti j = ---------------------  (2.6)
I j (Aj F i d D u )
where Aj measures "attractiveness" (eg the demand for the product) at j 
Fij is a general "friction of 'distance" measure between i and j
is a measure of the demographic similarity of i and j (to 
proxy demand factors)
P-- is the level of production of commodity i
The denominator represents ail possible destinations. Ke uses an 
unconstrained approach, that is. the T±.- figures generated do not need
I
to sum to observed totals leaving i or entering j. Black sets Fij = 
dij'"*' where dij is Euclidean distance. In common with Mera (1971) he
I
finds the unconstrained gravity model to be adequate. Mera finds that 
the unconstrained gravity model fits best at the aggregate level; as 
disaggregation increases linear programming is to be preferred. This
I
mirrors the empirical success of the gravity model in the absence of 
theoretical underpinnings; the use of the model at the individual level 
normally requires explicit hypotheses (e.g utility maximisation).
It has already been shown that the gravity model can be estimated in the 
specification of (2.5). Ewing (1974) generalises this to suggest:
log In.j = Tog A + Zkk log Vi.,j r |31og Pi + Vk + ilog Pj - Slog dij (2.7)
where Vnj is the k^ '"1 attractor variable's value in j .
de criticises the gravity model for its "independence of flows" 
property; that is, the introduction of a third location will not change 
the flows between the first two locations. In an extension of 
Stouffer's intervening opportunities model, Ewing suggests the inclusion 
of S .1 log Oi.i in place of S log dij, where 0±j is the number of
alternative destinations of r  distance or closer. To relax the
assumption that 6 is homogeneous for all destinations, this would 
become:
Stouffer (1960) has amended the intervening opportunities model to take 
account of competition for the intervening destinations with migrants 
from other origins. Alonso (1978) provides the most general statement
opportunities, competition, and flow interdependence. He suggests:
Vi is a function of the characteristics of the papulation in i, 
or the population of i itself
V.i is a function of the characteristics of the population in j, 
or the population of j itself
ttj is some linking factor specific to i and j (for example, a
transport network) and in effect, a weight
Di is the "draw" of the entire system generating movers
leaving i, per unit of Vi
Di,:x:L is the actual numbers leaving i
C.i is the "pool" of movers available to j per unit of Wj 
Ci*-1 is the actual number who choose j
I $.i log Oi.i (2 . 8 )
of the gravity model in a form which incorporates intervening
(2.9)
where:
So D i ’0 " 1 and C 1 give the proportions oi actual to potential movers 
< out from i and in to j respectively). These variables are determined 
by the entire system and hence are termed "systemic""-. The marginal
That is, potential arrivals per unit of V, are the total opportunities 
<outmovers) in the system outweighted from j's point of view. Summing
(2.9) across j , setting it eaual to (2.11) and rearranging gives:
I ' “
I D:i. =  ( 2 . 1 3 )
I
and (2,10) and (2.11) give:
I , L j I i. j  = I  i  V :i. I).x :i. 1 =  E ,  V j  C j  B J ( 2 . 1 4 )
Alonso does not apply this model, but the theoretical formulation 
demonstrates the interdependency -which exists between pairwise 
comparisons and system-wide factors. Alonso provides a table which
enumerates all passible interregional migration as special cases of 
i (2.9) (see Table 2.1 in Section 2.5) and it will be useful to review 
this at a later stage in this chapter, after the entropy and Markov 
models have been presented.
The majority of the models discussed so far pertain to interregional 
flows, either of goods or of individuals. With the exception of Lowry 
(1964), these models, as applied, bear only a tangential relationship to 
the housing' market; one of the reasons for this is their relatively 
aggregate spatial perspective, compared with most studies of housing 
which posit an individual-orientated, locally based form of spatial 
interaction. This question can be examined in more detail in Chapter 4. 
In the meantime, attention can be focussed on a derivative of the 
gravity model which deals more explicitly with housing and which takes 
into account the "systemic" factors mentioned by Alonso; this is the 
entropy-maximisation model.
2.3 ENTROPY MAXIMISATIOff MODELS OF SPATIAL INTERACTION
Regressions of the form (2.4) and (2.7) require data on Oi.j before model 
calibration can be achieved; one possible interpretation of the entropy 
model is as a means of estimating these flows. The method employed is 
set out in Wilson (1970) and consists of an objective function 
("entropy") which is maximised subject to a variety of origin, 
destination, travel cost and housing-specific constraints. In the 
simplest model, the distribution of workplaces is given and the problem 
:ls to allocate households around the workplaces. A worker living in a
house in i and working in j generates a commuting trip, and the sum of 
all such workers gives the commuting flow i to j , Ti.i. The matrix I = 
lT,j] is termed a trip distribution. Residential location is given by:
that is, the total number of workers living in i (H:i.). Any particular 
assignment of workers to workplaces is termed a microlevel state, this 
being the case where there is differentiation between the identity of 
otherwise homogeneous workers. Without regard to their identities, an 
assignment gives an intermediate representation of flows of individuals 
(a "mesolevel distribution"); any one mesolevel distribution can • 
correspond to a number of microlevel states (it is assumed that all 
microlevel states are equiprobable). In the thermodynamic analogy from 
which the entropy approach is derived, the subject matter is gas 
molecules in a closed system. Under such circumstances, it is possible 
to supply a fixed amount of energy to the system (for example, by 
heating). The social equivalent is the commuting budget, and 
consequently total transport cost is imposed as a macrolevel constraint:
Two other macrolevel constraints which guarantee logical consistency are 
the familiar origin and destination constraints; that is, (2.15) and
H :L ~ L j T :i. (2 . 15 )
16)
(2.17)
These ensure that the estimated T u  and the resultant Ej and Hi are 
consistant when totalled.
The aim is to find the most probable mesolevel distribution conditional 
on the three macrolevel constraints. This is achieved by developing a 
combinational formula for the assignments of microlevel states to
i
' mesolevel distributions and is given as3
T i ,  !
S = ----------------------------------- (2. 18)
If i j T i !
The logarithm of this is defined as the "entropy" of the system. 
Maximisation of the log of (2. IS) subject to (2.15), ‘(2.16) and (2.17) 
gives:
T u  = AiBj HiEj (e"Bc:, ,j) (2.19.1)
where A :L = C Z jB.i E.-j (e~"Bc i j ) ] (2.19.2)
and B.j = CI ± Ai Hi (e'~-Bc ± ) 3"1 (2.19.3)
J3 is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with (2. 16)
(2.19.2) and (2.19.3) are directly analogous to the "balancing factors" 
(2.12) and (2.13) in Alonso's model.
"Entropy" can be interpreted as uncertainty, and the opposite of 
information (c.f. Theil (1967)); consequently the entropy model is
maximising the uncertainty as to the particular microlevel state 
prevailing, by choosing the mesolevel distribution consistent with the 
largest number of such microlevel states. The imposition of further
I
constraints represents additional information and a reduction in 
entropy. .
In applying this model to the analysis of residential location, Wilson 
identifies four kinds of location behaviour, depending on the
constraints facing the locators. These are:
I
i
i n = 1 Unconstrained (not tied to a particular residence or 
workplace)
n = 2 Origin constrained (fixed residences) 
n = 3 Destination constrained (fixed workplaces) 
n = 4 Doubly constrained (hence non-movers)
This categorisation provides a counter to the suggestion that the 
entropy model is unrealistic or orientated to long run equilibrium. By 
changing the proportion of the population with type 4 location 
behaviour, the implicit time scale in the model can be altered, and the 
corresponding solution can be deemed "short-run" or "long-run" as 
appropriate. Type 2 location behaviour might be appropriate to those 
resident in council housing or in private rental under rent control, 
whilst type 3 are the classic "workplace-dominated" locators. Type 1 
may be immigrants or the independently active elderly. For simulation 
and solution purposes some form of estimate of the proportions in each
I
location category is required, as well as their travel cost expenditure
Wilson suggests a variety of methods for this, dependent on data 
availability.
Disaggregation of the model to take account of different income classes 
(or social groups) and house types is possible; Wilson assumes that the 
average proportion of income devoted to housing varies by income class.
Given exogenously imposed prices for each house type, it is assumed that
!
j  the within income class variance of actual housing expenditure around
i
each house type price is normally distributed for each income class.
This is then imposed as a constraint before re-solution of the model*
■ Neoclassical economic theorists might object to these assumptions 
concerning the exogeneity of prices, total travel costs , and average 
housing expenditure. Wilson does suggest that in practice prices will 
j  be determined by market forces, such that:
!
i
Pk i = hk x + lk i (2.20)
This states that the price of the k'tk' house type in the i ^ 1 zone 
is made up of construction costs specific to that house type (hk :L.) and a 
location premium specific to the house type and zone <lk x). Wilson does 
not however , elaborate on how the location premium is arrived at in 
practice.
Removal of the simplifying assumption of one worker per household, and 
the introduction of new supply allows re-solution under household 
formation with the constraint that new household •formation and new 
supply be equal in magnitude. There is, however, no interdependence
between the two and the means of estimating them is not elaborated. In 
a sense this is because the entropy model is a framework and technique, 
not a theory per se. It would be possible, for example, to have a 
"market sub-model" which would estimate supply and demand in each zone 
for each house type as a function of price, and a household formation 
model based on demographic characteristics and house availability. This 
would, however, compound the calibration problem, when the number of 
simulation possibilities is already large.
Baxter (1975) applies the entropy model to Road Research Laboratory data 
on trip-making in Reading, together with small area housing and 
employment data, using three socio-economic groups; manual, 
professional/managerial, and non-manual/non-managerial.
Baxter hypothesises that ,3 in (2.19.1) has a different value for each 
socio-economic group (that is, there exists j3ri where n=l,2,3). The 
intention is to estimate the "housing attractor" terms, Zr’j which 
represent the different housing preferences of each socio-economic group 
(SEG, hereafter). The Z^j are constrained such that EvxZ’T-j = 1, and it 
should be noted that the subscripts here are reversed - i denotes 
workplace and j denotes residence.
Initially, the are set arbitrarily and the values of T i a r e  
calculated. This allows calculation of total travel costs by SEG, which 
can then be compared with observed costs; the process continues until
I
observed and modelled costs converge. The first such procedure is 
carried out with housing floorspace as the sole "attractor" at j , and
uniformly so for all SEG's. This process then outputs values of ft” and
Wr\j (where = 1% T *.v>) under the assumption of housing stock
homogeneity. Comparison of the Vv\, estimated by the model and the
j
pbserved Wv\j show discrepancies and it is assumed that these can be
accounted for by inter-SEG differences in "preferences” for housing in
particular small areas. Z".-, are calculated by the formula
W'"\i (obs)
gv,.. ----------------
Vv\j (obs)
En ----------
V",
(2 2 '
: In the extreme case, where, for example, ¥";j = ¥ri.-, (obs) and V r , j  (obs)
0 for n=l only, Z’"\i would be 1.0 for SEG 1, and 0.0 for SEG’s 2 and 
•B, suggesting that this zone would be very attractive to SEG 1, but not 
it all attractive to SEG's 2 and 3.
As a final step, Baxter uses regression equations to model the as a 
function of housing— relevant variables for each zone. These variables 
are house age (proportions pre/post 1914), house condition (proportions 
good/medium/poor), residential plot area, and accessibility (to 
shopping/public and private open spaces/.]ob opportunities). For all
| * • i i
SEG's he finds no significant results for the spatial variables (plot 
area and accessibility). The remaining coefficients are used to predict 
residential location (with an assumed participation rate to convert 
employees to total residents). On goodness of fit criteria they achieve 
some success.
The abstraction from market forces which this model involves leaves some 
grounds for criticism - the term "attractor" has causal connotations 
which may be misplaced, although the disaggregation by SEG means that 
SEG - specific regression coefficients could be interpreted as hedonic 
prices in the presence of an income constraint. The other potential 
source of criticism is the statement of the entropy maximisation process 
as a behavioural hypothesis: "The premise adopted is that individuals
behave collectively so as to maximise entropy " (Baxter, P. 144)
This is potentially misleading because it confuses technique with 
behaviour. In practice, however, it should not make any difference to 
Ithe final result, since Vilson (1970) has demonstrated the formali
t
jeqivalence of the entropy maximisation process with the behavioural 
utility maximisation process. An alternative interpretation of the 
entropy maximisation process is given in Hijkamp (1975). He 
demonstrates the formal equivalence between the entropy model and a non­
linear programming problem, which leads to his describing the entropy 
model as one which "attempts to maximise the net surplus of total push
j
and pull effects with respect to total loss of interaction owing to cost 
frictions" (Hijkamp, P214). The "net surplus" notion corresponds to a 
form of collective utility.
It is worthwhile considering the gravity and entropy approaches qua 
housing market models. Both forms deal with location or relocation, 
treating mobility as a side issue or else as a process inseparable from 
location. In the gravity model of migration flows, the timing of a move 
(which gives the flow magnitude per unit of time in aggregate) and the 
direction of a move are simultaneously determined. The intervening
opportunities hypothesis is a form of assumption about search behaviour 
which suggests that the moving household looks at areas closest to its 
point of origin first, then searches further afield if no closer 
iopportunities are available. The additivity constraints are introduced 
!to ensure logical consistency of departures and arrivals, rather than
.paying explicit attention to housing availability.
i
■'This suggests a very long run perspective, when housing supply is 
perfectly elastic, and this is reinforced by the universal neglect of 
the .allocative role of prices in the housing market. Transport cost is, 
in effect, the only "economic" factor systematically included. Given 
the implicit long run perspective, it is questionable to what extent 
such models would be of use in short-term forecasting, in their present 
form. Gravity models are also very general in form: for example the 
"flow generators" and "flow attractors" relevant to a migration model 
may differ considerably from those of an inter-regional commodity flow 
model, and may even vary for differing aggregation levels of the same 
process.fS The model form as given does not provide any guidance in this 
respect. The entropy model suffers from similar drawbacks but the 
location behaviour distinction allows some variation in the time horizon 
used. It is passible to incorporate mobility into these models by 
having some households move, supplying one form of house and demanding 
another. As presented, however, it is possible for households to move 
between identical house types with no apparent reason for doing so, and 
again the researcher has no guidelines as to what factors are or are not 
relevant. Calibration of such models relies heavily on the existing, 
historical distribution of the housing stock and employment location,
and these are unlikely to change in the short run. The entropy model is 
probably better suited to simulating the long run results of exogenous 
shocks (e.g. a sudden increase in travel costs) on location; as a local, 
short run indicator of housing market activity it has a number of 
disadvantages. The treatment of mobility in the location-based entropy 
model is cursory and restrictive, whilst in the gravity model it has 
been suggested that it is too general. Consequently it is appropriate 
to review more direct approaches to mobility.
2.4 GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY ’MODELS
Ii
This discussion is in three sections. The first is concerned with the 
theory and matrix representation of Markov Chains. The second examines 
t|he Markov Chain approach to mobility, which can be viewed as a macro- 
lows approach; as will be seen, however, subsequent work has been 
undamentally micro in orientation. The third section deals with the 
macro-flows Markov Chain approach to vacancy chains.
2': 4.1 Markov Chain Models 7 (I): Theory
Consider a system where there are a finite number of
"states",Si.............So, such as quality levels in a housing
hierarchy. Let the conditional probability of moving from the i t1"’ to 
the state be P u ® .  This gives the nxn transition matrix;
i
P = C Pi. j 3 (2.22)
This gives, in the housing example, the probability that the individual 
moves to i conditional upon their most recent place of residence being 
in state j .
Let -jit. be the n ■.*: 1 vector of probabilities of being in each state at
;time t. Then the vector of probabilities of being in each state at time
I
t + 1 is given by:
it-t i-1 = PT Jtt (2.23)
with Eiiuit. = 1 (2.24)
(2.24) simply states that the system must be in at least one state at 
any one time. This is an example of a first-order Markov Process. If 
such a process is allowed to continue indefinitely, the values of irt. for 
all t will normally settle down to a perpetually repeating sequence of 
values (periodic case) or else to a single, repeated value (aperiodic 
case). In the latter instance, this gives
7L= = Pt ji« (2.25)
A first-order Markov Chain possesses the property of "forgetfulness"; 
chat is, that the present system state probabilities (irt) are completely 
determined by the previous period's system state probabilities. It is 
possible to allow for a "longer memory" by using higher order processes:
(2.26)
with as many transition probability matrices as the order of the process 
requires. It is difficult, however, to intuitively interpret high-order
Markov Chains and in practice they are infrequently used. Three
l
i
assumptions are made about the matrix P. These are:
; (1) That the Pij do not change through time (Stationarity)
I (2) That the population being dealt with is homogeneous
| (Homogeneity)
I (3) That the length of time in one state does not influence the
transition probability d o  Duration - of - Stay effects
,
or no Cumulative Inertia)
(3) is a special case of (1)
If a population is considered which is homogeneous, except that any one
i
individual can be in one state whilst another individual can
|
simultaneously occupy a different state, then the transition matrix 
(which is assumed to satisfy (1) - (3)) can be used for population 
forecasting. The system state probabilities become relative frequencies 
and the state-space transition matrix maps a population into itself with 
a one-period time lag. A variant of this approach which relies heavily 
on assumption (1) maps a population into sub-classes (e.g. households, 
employees) and this assumption in effect is that of constant headship 
rates. This method is used in the HBER - HUDS model.
2.4.2 Markov Chain Models (II): Residential Mobility Models
The model presented in the last section appears to be suited for
Application to a variety of social processes and has been employed in
he basic form by Blumen et al (1955) to labour mobility. This and
similar studies uncovered a problem. McGinnis (1968) describes it thus:
The failure of the Markov model shows up in a peculiar and
characteristic way that might be called 'lumping on the diagonals'.
That is, observed transition matrices often display markedly higher 
j '
diagonal values, than are predicted from the model". (McGinnis, P715)
McGinnis suggests an explanation for this and gives an amended model 
form to deal with it. Essentially, he points out that the simple Markov 
model ignores the "identity" of individual elements (in much the same 
way as the entropy model does.) "Identity" refers, in McGinnis'
I
analysis, to the individual's past history. This is ignored in the 
imple Markov model, due to the "no memory" property which states that:
t t-1 t t-1
Pr( Si -* Sj i s,. ) = Pr( Si sj I s* ) (2.27)
That is, the probablility of moving from state i to state j in time t is 
idependent of the state left at time t - 1 .
j
McGinnis suggests that in the case of mobility, especially residential 
mobility , the "no-memory" property will not operate, and cumulative 
inertia will be exhibited. The cumulative inertia hypothesis can be 
stated as follows: "The probability of remaining in any one state of
nature increases as a strict monotone function of duration of prior 
residence in that state". (McGinnis P716)
The observed result will be a violation of assumption (3), (cumulative in 
m e  nypotnesis is oases on tne empirical worn of Myers et ai (iuc? > wno 
j. ilid evidence of a prior residence efiect using survey data. Morrison 
(1967) regresses migration probabilities on the logarithm of prior 
residence duration and i i m s  that a Quadratic spec!xication fits best. 
Land (1969) finds similar evidence of non-linearity for the inertia 
effects. Mcu-innis constructs a "duration — specixic" transition matrix 
with monotonically higher inertia probabilities as residence duration
As constructed, the decision to move is independent of the choice of 
destination, 3 and if allowed to continue indefinitely mobility will 
cease altogether. Morrison finds that age interacts with prior 
residence history suggesting that McGinnis' model fails to take account 
of the counteracting effect of household life cycles on transition 
probabilities. Recalling the last chapter, Poreli suggests:
"In fact, the strong empirical associations of household size 
age of head of household, and housing tenure status with mobility rates 
have made the life cycle explanation of mobility...a cornerstone in the 
literature" (Porell (1982) F.17 ) ) This suggests that an alternative 
or additional explanation for .observed effects is violation of (2), the 
homogeneity of the population. McFarland (1970) states the 
I heterogeneity problem as follows:
1 Let m be the population and let llo(m) be a matrix with l's on the 
diagonal elements corresponding to person m's initial state and define
i
! Bo = I™ Bo(m) (2.28)
Hence the diagonal elements of Bo contain population counts in each 
category. Let each member of the population have their own transition 
matrix, P(m). Define the k-step population transition matrix as
i
I
'
qk = jJo~1 Emlo(rn) [P(m>] k (2.29)
f
for a sufficiently high k, (2.29) gives the long run individual and 
papulation transition matrices:
Q;|!: = Bo-1 Em Bo(m) P*'(m) (2.30)
|
In this amended form, Q* gives the long run population flows between any 
■two states.
j
I ■
Spilerman (1972a) points out that even ii" P(m) is stable, shifts in the 
distribution of population between states through time will generate 
observed changes in the "■ aggregate transition matrix", Q:|,;. This 
implies that stationarity is not necessarily violated at the individual 
level. For the purposes of operationalisation, sub-group homogeneity 
can be assumed where sub-group characteristics explain inter-group 
differences in transition matrices. (For example, Taurer and Gurley 
(1965) disaggregate population by age and race to analyse migration in
a Markovian context). Spilerman suggests using regression to model the 
prigin-destination flows for all sub-groups (as in the empirical work on 
the. gravity model discussed previously). If there are m sub-groups, 
this gives m~ equations, and simultaneous zero coefficients on all 
egressors means that the null hypothesis of "no heterogeneity" cannot 
be rejected.
I
Ginsberg (1971) claims that in the work of Land and Morrison it is not 
possible to distinguish between heterogeneity and cumulative inertia,
and the latter may result from the former. In the simplest case, the
.
population consists of only two groups, "movers" and "stayers". As the 
duration of residence for any one cohort rises, fewer movers are left 
leading to apparent cumulative inertia. A similar process applies in 
the work of McFarland and Spilerman. Spilerman (1972b) suggests
uniformity of transition matrices for all members of the population;
i
heterogeneity arises because mobility rates vary across individuals. In 
the special case of "movers" and "stayers", stayers have a mobility rate 
of zero, whilst movers will have some finite probability of mobility in 
any one time period.
Clark and Huff (1977) attempt empirical replication of the work of Myers 
et al, Morrison and Land in the light of such theoretical 
considerations. They aim to disentangle the observed effects of non- 
stationarity, non-homogeneity, and cumulative inertia. They use paired 
comparisons of proportions of the population experiencing the same 
n!umber of moves in different sequences, and reject an independent trials 
model controlled for heterogeneity an this basis. By similar methods
they reject an independent trials model after controlling for 
heterogeneity and mobility rate variation through, time. Significant 
differences remaining in paired comparisons are assumed to be due to
prior residence or inertia effects. Further subdivision is carried outr
l
by age and tenure; this results in she conclusion that for owners and
renters in the 45 - 65 age group, cumulative inertia does not operate, .
!
but is also important for renters in the 25 - 44 age group. Lastly they 
Investigate the effect of different waiting times since the last move, 
and these do not tend to support the cumulative inertia hypothesis.
6insberg (1979a) sets all of these notions - heterogeneity with respect 
to mobility propensity, mobility rate differences through time, and 
waiting time differences, in a theoretical framework with a variety of 
waiting - time distributions. He states the residence history of an 
individual as a sequence of places in which the individual lives and a 
sequence of times at which he moves. He demonstrates that depending on 
the duration specific move rate assumed, a variety of mobility 
hypotheses can be incorporated. In a further paper (Ginsberg (1979b)) 
these hypotheses are applied to longitudinal mobility data, with the 
main conclusion being that waiting time between moves and selection of 
subsequent destination are broadly independent.
Huff and Clark (1978) explain mobility as the result of interaction 
between cumulative inertia and the "residential stress" notion mentioned 
n the last chapter. Individuals with a high stress - to - inertia 
atio will have a higher probability of mobility; stress in this case 
epresents the process whereby life cycle factors generate a mismatch
Detween household and house characteristics. Their theoretical model 
predicts that, through time, mobility rates for any one household will 
iollow a "sawtooth" pattern of the form where "peaks" in mobility rates
i -  -  J
! I
correspond to life cycle events. Gne spatial prediction which flows 
from this model is that households moving in the same neighbourhood will 
have less inertia since social ties are not being ruptured. The 
corollary to this is that after a long period of time in one residence, 
any move which does occur will tend to be within the immediate 
neighbourhood.
i
Huff and Clark's work is a ]}recursor to the developments in the field of
i
Search and mobility which use the notion of utility (for example Smith 
et al (1979)). The line of development of mobility models described in 
this chapter has demonstrated that approaches based on statistical 
regularities alone (as is the simple Harkov model) will tend to require 
some form of underlying causal mechanism in order to be successfully 
applied. The alternative, detailed in Ginsberg (1979a) is to employ 
somewhat cumbersome operations - research based methods which 
necessitate making a variety of assumptions about behaviour without
I
clear grounds (other than empirical) for doing so. The Markov model and
i
its extensions demonstrate the need to control for heterogeneity; in 
contrast to the gravity model where such heterogeneity is included as a 
causal factor in explaining flows, albeit in the very general form of 
"attractive" and "generative" indices. The elements in Markov models 
which relate to the timing of moves will tend to be determined by the 
external market environment. The models discussed in this section bear 
only a tangential relationship to the housing market per se; they ignore
house prices and essentially take a mechanical view of mobility which 
assumes away market factors.
i
i
|n the first chapter, the models reviewed employ demand and prices as 
central to household decision taking. The allocation of households to 
houses is achieved using somewhat ad hoc algorithms. An extension to 
the Markov Chain approach models the household - house allocation 
procedure more formally, although continuing to abstract from other 
market factors. This is the vacancy chain approach to mobility
analysis.
1
II
g. 4.3 Markov Chain Models (III): Vacancy Chains
White (1971) draws on the work of Kristoff (1965) to argue that the 
housing system demonstrates behaviour which violates the classical 
axioms used by Koopmans (1957) to define a "market". White states:
"Net yearly increments to houses and to families in a metropolitan area 
cannot be seen as real flows to be matched to each other in a market.. A 
different view is required, a model of continuing realignment between 
huge existing stocks of houses and families. In this model, price levels 
are no longer the dynamic element in the housing 'market'. Moves fit 
together in chains of cause and effect identified-by careers of 
vacancies" (White p. 88)
White suggests that financial and fiscal factors dominate suppliers of 
new housing, and consequently: "The stream of new houses can be treated
i
as a flow relatively independent of the exact state of any current
'housing market' in one area" ((White P88). Similarly, he suggests 
that flows out of the system (death of head of household, interuban 
migration) can be viewed as exogenous. Each move into a dwelling is 
conditional upon its prior occupants leaving, and the sequence of moves 
generated has one unifying feature, namely that a vacancy changes its 
Location. It will be recalled that the first-order Markov Chain 
possesses the "no-memory" property and the fact that this is unrealistic 
with respect to a heterogeneous papulation resulted .in the series of 
amendments proposed in the last section. By contrast there are stronger 
grounds for supposing that the mobility of vacancies can be approximated
i
by a simple first-order process.10 In White's model, vacancies are
i
created by the (exogenous) flows of out-migrants, deaths, and new 
construction, and are terminated by being filled by a household from 
outside the system or else by demolition. From this it follows that:
"Once the vacancy jumps and extinctions can be predicted, then mobility 
a.nd change in the housing system can be predicted from the rates of 
creation of vacancies" (White, P90)i ’
White cites evidence which estimates the vacancy "multiplier" as 4; i.e.
very new unit built results in four moves, with the vacancy "filtering"
down through price bands in a relatively short space of time (compared 
! *
with the rates of depreciation of a house). The process can be 
illustrated as the following:
Let V denote a k x k ( where there are k "strata"(for example, house 
types or submarkets)) transition matrix for vacancies, such that is
the probability that a vacancy created in price band i attracts a family 
from price band j, thus creating a vacancy there. Note that Z.i V u  (
1. in contrast to (2.24). Define d± = 1 - IjVij; this denotes the 
'probability that a vacancy created in i will attract a mover external to 
the system, or leave due to demolition.
et F(t) be the total number of vacancies in each strata arriving from 
outside the system at time t, and let M(t) be the cumulative number of 
vacancy arrivals to each strata of the housing market. Hence: 1 1 :
M(t) = M(t)V + F(t) (2.31)
=> M(t) = (I-V)'F (t) (2.32)
This model is analogous to Leontief’s (1951) input-output model. Sands 
(1976) cites evidence which puts the new housing unit multiplier 
(average first row element of (I-V)- '1) i n t h e  interval 2 - 2.5.
However, the differences in incomes between the families exchanging 
dwellings tends to be small, with correspondingly questionable effects 
on low-income families. This is contrary to the conclusions of White, 
who suggests that the vacancy multiplier can be used to indirectly 
benefit low income families by building high quality new units.
Porell (1981) analyses the spatial impact of a Markov vacancy chain 
model, as part of the policy question about the optimal spatial 
distribution of housing programmes. He states (following Anderson and
Goodman (1957)) that the maximum likelihood estimators of household and 
vacancy transition probabilities will be given by:
I.i.i
p.1.1 = -----  (Households) (2.33)
I j Iij
■L i  J
Vi,j =   (Vacancies) (2.34)
E 1 11 j
This latter is defined as the probability that a vacancy in j moves to
i  -
I
i|. Generally, p ^  ± Vtj since Ejlij * Eili.-*
Both White's and Povell's models use the vector d, which gives the 
probability for each state that a vacancy will leave the system. -For 
proper specification, this implies that if a vacancy leaves, it does not 
return. In this case d. is termed an "absorbing" state. The validity of 
this assumption depends on the level of aggregation used, that is, in 
the boundaries which are set up for the system. It seems likely that 
there will exist some "distance", either geographic or in terms of 
housing quality, beyond which the absorbing state assumption is valid. 
Finding this will be termed the "system boundary problem".
11; has already been demonstrated that the simple gravity model 
implicitly assumes perfectly elastic housing supply. Housing market 
assumptions become more relevant in a vacancy transfer model, and it is 
illuminating to examine the asumptions which underlie the present 
approach. Consider an element of the matrix V*, v * i j . This gives the
probability that a vacancy created in j moves to i, by virtue of a
!
household moving in the opposite direction. Such a move is conditional
upon the existence of a vacancy in j . But is it unconditional upon the 
uptake of the vacancy in i ? If it is, then the vacancy model is valid 
as presented. If not, the notions of ownership, holding costs, and 
uncertainty become relevant, and the "vacancy chain" becomes an infinite 
regress until some exogenous form of vacancy closure is found. Barring 
Acts of God, this takes the form of household formation and truly 
exogenous inmigration. As constructed, the vacancy model has as its 
driving force new vacancies entering the system; hence the need for 
exogenous vacancy creation, either through outmigration (with attendant 
system boundary problems) or through household "deaths" and exogenous 
new supply. This last assumption, stated by White, can be compared with 
the supply elasticity assumption commonly made in other models. It is 
questionable whether the vacancy chain model adequately describes the 
housing system. By casting new vacancies as the motive force, it can be 
argued that the housing market process is completely inverted. In 
Leontief's open output-input model there is an exogenous final demand 
vector, and new vacancies are the vacancy chain analogue. But 
japproaching from this direction generates system boundary problems of a 
jform not encountered by Leontief. These points will be developed more
i
fully later.
2.5 SYNTHESIS
It has already been stated that the models discussed in this chapter 
ifall into two broad categories - analogue models and statistical models. 
As mentioned previously, Alonso (1978) has developed a general framework
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□r all the models examined here, and his presentation forms the basis 
f this section.
Tonso's taxonomic table is given in Table 2.1. There are six rows and 
ive model types. The first row gives the equation for flows, Ii.i (Mi., 
i'n the table), and the subsequent two rows detail departure and arrival 
terms respectively. The next two rows are concerned with the systemic 
tjsrms in each model - the opportunities which "draw'* persons into the 
system from'any one origin, and the competition for any one destination 
by persons in the system. All of the model types nest within Alonso's 
general model with suitable restrictions on the "elasticities" 
associated with each systemic term, a and j3, and these are detailed in 
the last row. In the first entry in the fourth row (equivalent to
I
i
(2.13)), the system draws migrants depending on the attractiveness of
■
all destinations, but flows are attenuated by "congestion" at various 
destinations. The degree of attenuation is given by so
that J3.j is the elasticity of in-migrants to "congestion" or
j
"competition" at destination j. If J3j = 1, no congeston occurs.
Similarly, the first entry in the fifth row (equivalent to (2.12)) 
demonstrates the extent to which entry to destination j is attenuated by 
changes in the "draw" from any one origin. <x± may differ from 1 because 
as more people leave any one origin, the incentive to leave
simultaneously falls - e.g., if there- is regional unemployment, relative
opportunities rise when out-migration occurs; in this case ou is less 
tlian 1. If out-migration is completely insensitive to system
opportunities, ou = 0. If "bandwagon" effects occur, a* may be greater 
than 1.
The models reviewed in this chapter can be summarised by the values 
assumed for a amd j3. These will, for simplicity, be assumed the same 
, for all i and j .
I .
i
| In the simple Markov Chain, cc = 0 and J3 = 1.
:The system is completely determined by the pair-specific relation tij;
Ii
jw.i = 1, and Vi = Pi (the population in i)12 The Cj term drops out;
i
Di is given by :
Di = Zj Wj Ca*5-'1 tij (2.35)
= Ej (1) Cj° tu
= Ej tij = 1 by definition in the simple Markov
model.
Consequently I u  = tij Pt
Thus the perfectly elastic supply at destination j is made explicit, as
its the complete inelasticity of outmigrants from i to general systemic
factors.
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The second type is the workplace - dominant gravity - location model. 
(Alonso terms this a "pull" model). Here a = 1 so that the "draw" into 
the system is completely responsive to (and not constrained by) 
opportunities; j3 = 0, so a fixed number of jobs are made available and 
■:he supply of opportunities is perfectly inelastic, and the inflow is 
unresponsive with respect to opportunities elsewhere in the system.
'This can be regarded as pertaining to either the competition (other 
opportunities) or congestion (fixed number of jobs) effect).
he next model is the unconstrained gravity formulation with a = ]3 = 1.
There are no constraints on the numer of individuals leaving one
destination and arriving at another; systemic factors are irrelevant.
|
By contrast the doubly constrained entropy model sets ex = j3 = 0 such 
that binding constraints operate on original and destination zones. The 
probability of successful entry by a migrant is C.i-B~'1 = C.j"1 ; that is, a 
linear inverse function of the number of competing migrants.
In models where a = j3 = 1 the exponents on Di and Cj become zero;
onsequently these terms are implicit and can be suppressed under these 
assumptions.
Alonso's general formulation sets 0 ( a ( 1 and 0 ( j3  ^ 1. These are
theoretically estimable if values are given for Di and C.i; their values 
may alter over time depending on circumstances.
I:a White's version of the vacancy chain model, there is inelasticity in 
the vacancies drawn into the system (a = 0) but perfect elasticity at
100
he vacancy destination (ft = 1). Given that vacancy moves are the 
dpposite of household mobility, is this assumption (a = 0, ft = 1 in the 
vacancy model) compatible with a = 0 and ft = 1 for the mobility model? 
In practice the two should be modelled as interdependent - a household 
njove is conditional upon a vacancy existing and vice-versa. Estimation 
f transition probabilities from ex post flows will yield logically 
onsistent results by default; the ex ante theoretical parameters may 
njot, however, even though the aggregate flows (total vacancies and total 
movers) are compatible. Consequently this inconsistency problem is not 
the same as that of the gravity model, whereby interzonal flow totals 
are incompatible with opportunities due to simplifications in 
construction. The two problems are similar in so far as in each case, 
tie mechanism used to resolve the potential inconsistencies takes the 
fjjrm of systemic terms which do not have exponents constrained to be 
zero or one. These points will be developed more fully in Chapter 5,
i
where the general problem of system interdependency is discussed..
I
It is clear, then, that most of the models in this chapter can be
analysed in a common framework. At the heart of this framework, the
j
notions of benefits (utility, attractiveness) and costs (distance, 
congestion) are fundamental. Markov Chain models are special cases of 
gravity models; these in turn nest within the entropy formulation, and 
the gravity and entropy results can be achieved by some utility
malximisation process.
!
It is appropriate to ask why such models should be used in a non-utility 
framework at all. The most pressing reason is their relative simplicity
n terms of parameters. Wilson. (1970) suggests that the entropy model 
is superior to a utility based approach because to achieve similar 
esults the entropy model is less tedious algebraically, and can have a- 
riori information imposed as additional constraints. From the point of 
i7iew of economic theory, it is reassuring to know that if techniques of 
this kind are to be "borrowed" their derivation is possible through 
utility maximisation.
2.6 CONCLUSIONS
niis chapter has shown the ways in which spatial interaction can be 
modelled from a theoretical and partly empirical point of view. The 
main results can be summarised as follows:
1) Gravity flow models perform best at a relatively aggregate level.
2) Implicit in each model sub-group are assumptions about supply and 
demand elasticities.
3) The Markov Chain stationarity assumption is relatively robust and 
a pparent violations can often be traced to inadequate disaggregation of
the relevant population into homogeneous groups.
Whilst the long run market equilibrium models of the last chapter 
fbcus on location and prices to the exclusion of mobility, there exists 
a literature which deals explicitly with the mobility process '(of 
households and vacancies) and implicitly with location as a system to 
the exclusion of other market factors.
■5) The household-vacancy mobility model may be viewed as a form of 
input-output, giving a more parsimonious representation of the
essentials of dynamics than the cumbersome allocation algorithms of
I
simulation models.
These results will all be employed in the development of the regiona 
model in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER THREE 
MACROECQNOMETRIC MODELS
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3 ,1  INTRODUCTION
This chapter focusses on studies which attempt to formulate national 
housing market models. The model specification depends on the intended 
purpose, and is broadly of two types. The first is as a means of 
forecasting, either for the housing market per se or as an input to a 
more general macroeconomic model; in each case, a reduced form equation 
is likely to be used. The second approach aims at establishing 
■causality and consequently attempts to estimate structural form 
equations. Some reduced form equations have been employed in an
explanatory role, so the boundaries are not distinct.
The data used are time series data at the aggregate (and hence aspatial) 
Jlevel. An inseparable element of this approach is the use of 
macroeconomic theories to guide econometric work; theories of economic 
cycles, investment behaviour, and sectoral versions of simple 
macroeconomic theory which focus on the demand for housing as an asset
(as in Struyk's work in Chapter 1). In recent years, it has been
possible to subject the resultant specifications to the battery of 
econometric tests developed for time series data and this has resulted 
in some consensus concerning the "best" model form.
The sectoral models constitute the bulk of this chapter but it will
!
i ■
first be illuminating to review their antecedents in the form of 
analyses of construction cycles and residential investment behaviour.
3,2 RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTIOF CYCLES
One of the earliest established features of economic data is its 
tendency to follow cyclical fluctuations. From quarterly and seasonal 
variation to the much disputed fifty-year Kondratieff waves, attempts to 
quantify and predict such cycles have been numerous. The role of 
construction generally as a provider of infrastructure necessary to any 
economic upturn has been examined in Matthews (1955). Gottlieb (1976) 
has analysed the details of construction cycles, especially urban 
building, citing work which estimates the long cycle period as fifteen 
to twenty years. He focuses on two sets of questions, the first 
pertaining to the overall pervasiveness of cycles in time and space and 
their similarity with the trade cycle and cycles in other countries; the 
second to links with land markets, labour and raw materials markets, 
property values, and migration and demographic trends. He also 
investigates the interconnections between local and national cycles, 
arguing local cycles to be:
"..simply a local phase of a national movement, while the national 
movement is in turn mainly a coalescence of local cycles" (Gottlieb.
P9)
He finds that long swings in migration and household formation, 
especially rural to urban migration, and the marriage rate, explain, in 
part, residential building cycles. Property vacancies tend to follow a 
similar;but leading pattern to building rates, with a lead of about 5 
years, with the suggestion that building tends to overshoot demand.
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Building materials costs exhibit,long cycles similar to building 
activity, with a lag, although building labour costs do not. Turning 
points in the rents of vacant properties lead building cycles by about 
tirio years. This suggests a market cycle whereby vacancy rate changes 
are the earliest indication of a demand upturn, followed by.rent levels, 
followed by an upswing in building activity which generates derived cost 
inflation amongst building raw materials and reduces profit margins. 
Eventuality building activity declines, but has a tendency to overshoot 
thus creating the vacancies for the next cycle. This mirrors the 
housing market dynamics described in Blank and Winni'ck (1953).
Gottlieb’s work draws on a long tradition of analysis of the residential 
construction long cycle although he also discusses shorter waves. 
Analysis of the short cycle is relatively recent. Guttentag (1961) used 
time series data on non-farm housing starts, non-farm mortgage 
recordings, and residential contract awards. To qualify as a "cycle" in 
Gujttentag's analysis, all three series have to exhibit the same 
behaviour. Guttentag finds evidence of a five-year cycle (as Gottlieb 
does) for short term dynamics and suggests that (in the USA) the
equency of construction is countercyclical with respect to the rest of 
onomic activity. Guttentag suggests that it is possible to 
stinguish betwen demand-led and supply determined construction 
activity by the behaviour of mortgage yields; if they move together, 
demand determinants are paramount whereas a negative relationship 
suggests supply of credit drives the market. If demand for funds rises, 
mortgage rates and construction rates rise. If supply increases mortgage 
rates are driven down but construction rises or stays the same,
fr
ec
di
depending on how elastic demand is with respect to mortgage credit 
costs. Guttentag traces a variety of other routes by which mortgage 
credit affects the market, and suggests that:
"Demographic factors and the relative price of housing which must be 
^crucially important determinants of housing demand and construction in 
jthe long run, ordinarily do not change very much in the short run." 
KGuttentag. P286)
One of the suggested reasons for this is that households take a long 
term view of their future income and this dampens any tendency to short- 
run fluctuations in demand - in effect invoking the permanent income 
hypothesis.
Guttentag suggests, then, that the supply of mortgage credit dominates 
construction, and such supply will be inversely related to the overall 
level of economic activity; when other sectors are slack, surplus or 
residual credit is channelled into the housing market.
Vipond (1969) analyses UK data in this way, although extending the 
explanatory role to include building costs .and incomes; she also uses 
completions as a building activity indicator since she suggests that 
starts reflect future output, not current activity. Vipond 
distinguishes between credit conditions facing builders (bank credit) 
and those facing buyers (mortgage credit), but suggests that the bank 
rate adequately proxies credit conditions in both markets. Although 
building costs and income growth have some effect on the housing market,
■j:he author concludes that credit availability is central and downturns
in the supply of credit will have an effect on completions with a year's
lag. Consequently there is a tendency in the UK for building activity 
1
to be pro-cyclical.
Both studies of short waves mentioned here employ relatively informal 
echniques for estimating cycles and inferring causality. Both suggest 
that the rhythm of residential building is directly determined by 
financial markets and that financial factors appear to dominate other
determinants of demand and supply. Both studies use a volume-based
< ,
approach to building activity - either starts or completions - and
i
consequently assume that housing is either homogeneous or supplied in 
fixed proportions of each heterogeneous grouping. Some models have used 
more formal relationships; work of this kind is reviewed in Fromm 
(1971). Fromm concludes that the explanatory variables used are ad hoc 
and do not derive from economic theory. However, recent developments in 
the theory of investment and the empirical testing of theoretical 
predictions indicate it to be a relatively short step to suggest that 
housing is a form of investment like any other and can be modelled as 
such.
3.3 IffVESTMEFT MODELS
In its simplest form, the theory of investment suggests that the volume 
of investment is a declining function of the "interest rate" because 
fluctuations in the unitary market rate render more or less projects 
profitable, given their own internal rates of return. Analysts of
1 0 9
housing cycles tend to observe inverse relationships between interest 
rates and housebuilding, and simultaneously positive relationships 
between the supply of mortgage credit and housebuilding. However,
I< '
Arcelus and Meltzer state:
"This consensus or near-consensus on the importance of mortgage credit 
appears to rest on nothing more substantial than a blend of conjecture 
a lid casual empiricism" (Arcelus and Meltzer (1973) P. 79)
They suggest that with respect to mortgage rates, previous models show 
a:
"....failure to distinguish between high rates and rising rates, actual 
rates and anticipated rates, market rates and real rates." (P.80)
They point out that rising market interest rates will result in 
consumers deferring the purchase of durables, including housing. In an 
integrated financial market, the effect of market rates on demand and on 
the supply of finance should be almost simultaneous. Arcelus and 
Meltzer also specify a supply function for housing which compares the 
rate of return on new housing (rental price relative to costs) with the 
market rate of interest, which proxies the opportunity cost of investing
i
in:housing. (In addition, they find no evidence that the demand for or 
supply of housing increases with changes in the stock or flow of 
mortgage credit.)
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Arcelus and Metzler's work is more orientated to traditional investment 
theory; construction cycle analysts tend in effect to adopt an 
accelerator theory of housing investment.
Questions surrounding the effect of the supply of mortgage credit with 
respect to housing market activity continue to appear in housing market 
analysis. In the UK, O'Herlihy and Spencer (1972) have formulated a 
'model of Building Society behaviour. They model mortgage lending and 
receipts of funds as functions of the mortgage rate and personal 
disposable income respectively. The mortgage rate is a lagged function 
of the share deposit rate which in turn is determined by the balance 
oetween the supply of and demand for funds reflected in the liquidity 
ratio and reserve ratio. In the UK, mortgage rates have shown 
considerable inflexibility and credit has been rationed by non-price 
means. O'Herlihy and Spencer include dummy variables for strict, mild, 
and zero rationing; these dummies are constructed ex post from the 
financial press and are significant in explaining the "demand" for 
mortgages, (although this is not surprising with ex post constructed 
variables).
The importance of Building Societies in the Ket- Acquisition of Financial 
Assets by the Personal Sector is demonstrated in Table 3.1. This role 
has resulted in a number of attempts to model their behaviour for its 
own sake. The O'Herlihy and Spencer study is a case in point. Hendry 
and Anderson (1977) specify a model which aims at a more theoretical 
statement of UK Building Society behaviour than can be expressed in ex 
post dummy variables. The behaviour of the sector in
Certificates Ordinary 
Bbnds and and
&YE
24.6
Bank Sight 
Deposits
Bank Time 
Deposits
Investment
Accounts
'.5
Building
Society
Deposits
111. 4
T a ta T
215. 8
PERSONAL SECTOR LIABILITIES 1985.- £m
Personal
-  I Tdank
Loans
Creait 
Companies
Public 
= Sector 
Loans 
for 
House
Banking
Sector
Loans
for
House
Purchase Purchase
Building
Society
Loans
for
House
Purchase
Long
Accounts 
and
Creditors Term 
Payable Loans
Other Total'
40. 6 5. 0 20. 9 97. 2 22. 5 . 2 203. 0
* Minor categories have been excluded so that the individual elements 
will sum to less than the total.
Source: Financial Statisitics, HMSQ.
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self is not central to the discussion here although it frequently 
appears in some form or another in the market models which will be 
scussed in the next section.
ZJl MARKET MODELS
Tcj) formulate a market model requires, at the very least, implicit demand 
d supply functions. The general form can be cast as follows:ar
Di-j1 — fi ( Pi--,, Packs, APi-,, APacks, IY, Zi ) (3.1.1)
S* = fa ( Ph, APi-,, C, Za ) (3.1.2)
where Di-,1 is the i*-1"' individual's demand for housing (cast at the 
individual level due to the variety of ways of aggregating), as a 
function of the price of housing (Pi-,), the price of all other goods 
(Pa o q ), the changes in these prices, the individuals' income level (IY) 
and a vector of preference shifters and factors such as finance 
availability (Zt). Si-,, the total supply of housing, is a function of
the price of housing and its price change, of costs (C) and of factors 
such as climate and finance availability (Z2 ). Empirical representation 
of these theoretical determinants requires a number of assumptions and 
these are discussed in the next section.
3-.4.1 Expl anat Qry_va.ri.a bias.
3 t 4.1.1 -£ri^.gs.
The first differences in prices are included to capture the effect of 
expectations. If elasticity of demand with respect to APh is positive , 
then a higher rate of house price inflation results in increased demand 
due to expectations that the boom will continue, either to avoid paying 
more than necessary or to acquire an investment asset. In applying 
this, Whitehead (1974) finds the demand for housing to be speculative 
with respect to house price inflation but precautionary with respect to 
general price inflation. That is, expectations can act in an opposite 
direction to the allocative role of price in the case of housing. 
Expectations are an important, but complex, area and will be discussed 
more fully in Section 3.5,
Price changes apart, the "price of housing" variable can vary 
considerably in application. In the first chapter, it was seen that the 
two basic approaches to house prices are to assume homogeneity and a 
uniform price of housing services, or a series of hedonic indices to 
allow transformation of the value of a heterogeneous dwelling to a 
unidimensional scale. There are, it was seen, conceptual problems in 
applying the latter technique. In the case of the former, published 
price data gives:
1 1 4
E :i. p 1 Qi
P.-. = -----   (3.2.1)
n
where pi is the price and qi the quantity of housing services. If n is 
sufficiently large, aPi~. can be interpreted as showing a change 
in d -j. . the price of housing services. This is assumed the same for all 
properties (the long run equilibrium assumption) and consequently 
(3.2.1) becomes:
pE t q i
Ph = 1— '— . (3.2.2)
n
E :i. q i
P r o v i d e d    remains constant through time, P.-. will be
n
an adequate measure of the price of housing services. Whitehead (1974) 
suggests that in practice "quality" (in a homogeneous market, q can be 
interpreted as this) will increase by about 4% per annum due to new 
supply, demolitions, and improvements to the existing stock. Host 
1 writers abstract from quality change of this kind although recent 
developments in house price index calculation aim to take it into 
account. This issue will be taken up in the conclusion to this chapter.
Two main considerations remain concerning house prices. The first is 
whether to use price series for new or existing dwellings, or some
average of the two; the second is ’whether financial and fiscal elements
in house prices should be incorporated. In the first case, the choice 
of price series depends on the view held of the market. Whitehead 
states:
"One of the most relevant variables in a market for durable goods, where 
new building only accounts for a maximum of 2% of the total available, 
must be the existing stock" (Whitehead P. 53)
Consequently the interactions between the two might suggest that some 
average measure is required. Hellis and Longbottom state:
...attention is focussed on new houses, since it is implicitly assumed 
lat the average price of these is a good indicator of average house 
"ices in general". (Beilis and Longbottom (1981) P.10)
The apparently high substitutability between new and existing houses is 
the reason for supposing that price changes in one sector will be 
reflected in price changes in the other. Different writers disagree, 
however, as to the direction and extent of causality; if indeed 
causality is unidirectional at all. To some extent, the price series 
chosen will also depend on how "demand" is specified. Whitehead, for 
example, uses new house prices as an explanatory variable, and the 
inportance or otherwise of the existing stock is tested by inclusion of 
lagged housing stock term as part of a stock-adjustment model.
Straightforward application of house prices may be misleading. The true 
st of a house includes mortgage interest (if bought with a loan) and 
also affected by tax relief on mortgage interest payments. Whitehead 
crjeates a composite price variable which takes mortgage costs into 
count, but subsequent evidence suggests that too many different 
reactions are bound up in this one variable. The fact that the two
co
is
ac
elements may simultaneously move in different directions has resulted in 
two amendments. The first is simply to separate out these variables in 
a regression while the second is to model the building society sector 
separately in an attempt to account for discrepancies in directions of 
change. A number of models (Treasury (1977), Buckley and Ermisch 
(1982)) also make some adjustment for mortgage interest tax relief. 
Kearl(1979) argues that nominal, not real, mortgage rate should be used 
jsince if there is any degree of capital market disequilibrium, nominal 
mortgage commitments impose cash flaw constraints.
3.4.1.2 Incomes
studies in the USA (Reid (1962) Muth (I960)) suggest that permanent 
income is the appropriate theoretical measure for estimating housing
j
demand. In the UK macroeconometric studies this is often proxied by a 
4-quarter moving average of personal disposable income (Hadjimatheou 
(1976), Mayes (1979)); although Buckley and Ermisch (1982) use a more 
sophisticated stochastic approach. Whitehead used nominal, current 
income on the grounds that Building Societies view this as a basis for 
lending. The corollary to this is that pre-tax income is to be 
preferred, but like other analysts Whitehead uses disposable income, 
ill except Buckley & Ermisch use volume which does not distinguish 
tjetween changes in income per capita and changes in numbers 
Employed,each of which may be different with respect to housing market 
effects.
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Sail (1978) demonstrates that under the permanent income hypothesis, 
optimisation by an individual will result in a household's income 
following a Markov process random walk. By dealing in first differences 
of real permanent incomes, the income element in a demand equation drops 
out and only affects demand in a random fashion. This is the approach 
adopted by Buckley and Ermisch, although they include a term in current 
income on the basis of work by Daly and Hadjimatheou (1981) which 
Suggests that the "efficient" permanent income hypothesis of Hall cannot 
be maintained by UK data.
^.4.1.3 Prices of other goods
This can include the price of rented housing and existing housing stock
prices if new house prices are used as the main price variable.. In
theory, demand for any one good is a function of prices for all goods, 
and this can generally be proxied by the retail price index or the GDP 
Jeflator. An alternative way of including relative price effects is to 
cast all variables in real terms by deflating them; this also applies to 
niominal interest rates. Once again, however, the asset role of housing 
can be responsible for counter-intuitive results. In times of generally 
high inflation, housing (which tends to inflate faster than average) 
becomes a good investment; thus the allocative role of price is 
apparently counteracted because it is dominated by expectations. Under
these circumstances, the key constraint on the market becomes finance. 
Buckley and Ermisch stress the effect of inflation in conjunction with 
the tax treatment of owner-occupation as affecting the equilibrium level 
of house prices. This issue will be returned to in Section 3.5.
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3.4,1,4 Other factor?
Preferences and finance availability will affect any one individuals'
|
demand for housing. Finance availability, as has been seen, is the 
primary determinant of demand in early studies; a scarcity of finance 
ikpased, say, by a general upturn in the rest of the economy will 
necessitate rationing (in the UK environment) although this has now been 
rj-eplaced by variations in the terms of mortgage lending (for. 
example, the loan to income or the loan to value ratio). This may be 
viewed as an alteration in the effective price of housing to the
i
individual, in the case of loan to value variations; it is a pure income 
effect in the case of loan to income variations.
3.4.1.5 Cost;
All of the factors discussed above have been of importance to demand. 
Theoretical considerations suggest that house prices will be of 
relevance to supply as well, on the reasoning that increased prices, 
ceteris paribus, imply increased profitability. Costs can be 
disaggregated into four basic elements : raw material cost, labour cost, 
land cost, and the cost of credit. It has been argued however, that any 
attempt to move up the supply curve will generate land price ' 
increases and hence eradicate profits. If the proportion of costs 
accounted for by land is relatively small, this should be a minor 
effect; but expectation of continued house price increases will mean 
that some or all of the supplier's potential profit is capitalised into 
higher land prices. By contrast, the labour market for housebuilders
119
is still dominated by labour-only subcontracting which means that supply 
is highly elastic. Raw materials are partly sourced from highly 
monopolised industries (glass, bricks) and partly from internationally
i
competitive ones (timber). The land market is highly unstable and
shows considerable geographic variations in behaviour; in practice land
;is not a homogeneous good and substitutability between residential and
!i
other land uses varies. Rather than model the land market, most writers 
jignore it, invoking a Ricardian rent approach such that land prices
become a "residual". Analytical difficulties are compounded by the lack
of suitable data, so that land costs are usually excluded from the 
catch-all "construction costs index". This index includes elements for 
profit so the ratio of prices to building costs is an inadequate 
measure of profits; as the proportion of total profit in the building' '
cost index increases, so does the inadequacy of the measure.
Most building, in the period covered by UK models, was financed by short 
term loans from banks, and the relative costs of such credit is the 
interest rate (e.g the Bank Rate). However, building is a high risk 
activity. Amongst the "other factors" affecting supply are climate and 
the unpredictability of this in conjunction with low capitalisation, 
high gearing, and few opportunities for economies of scale means that 
banks will be more wary of investing in housebuilding firms than 
elsewhere. The corollary to this is that during a credit famine, 
builders are the first to be affected. Consequently finance 
availability rather than cost per se may be the key factor, although the 
two tend to be highly collinear.
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Sx.4, 2 , Dependent, variables
3.4.2.1 Demand
In the general functional form (3.1.1), demand is given per individual, 
this raises a number of questions, similar to those mentioned in Chapter 
One. Under the homogeneous market assumption, the units in which demand 
s denominated are housing services, or expenditure thereon, 
ransformation of this into aggregate demand is achieved by multiplying 
the quantity per individual by the population. This implies that any 
population change will, ceteris paribus, increase the demand for housing 
•services by a constant amount. This does not seem likely given 
heterogeneity of the population; an increase in the number of births 
vfith constant headship rates will not change the quantity of households. 
However it may result in enlarged households requiring more space, and
I
bhe inference is that by a series of adjustments (in mobility) this is 
ajchieved and manifests itself as an increased demand by other displaced 
ouseholds for new houses. This is the "black box" approach to the 
existing stock, and can be contrasted with the simulation models of 
Chapter One (which allocate households to houses) and with the Markov 
ransition model of Vhite in Chapter Two.
related issue is the specification of stock and flow adjustment 
models. By the above calculation, there exists a desired stock for any 
given population. In any one time period, the actual stock will be 
somewhat less than desired if adjustment occurs with a lag. (Griliches
i
(1967) shows that lagged adjustment is consistent wih cost minimisation
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if there are quadratic costs of adjustment as well as costs of
disequilibrium). In the flow adjustment model, desired changes in the
|
flow are not achieved. In each case, the implication for econometric 
sjjecification is that when demand is measured by the actual flow (e.g. 
completions) a lagged stock or lagged completions term should be 
irjciuaed as an explanatory variable. In the stock adjustment case, 
regardless of how large the discrepancy is, it still has an effect on 
behaviour; the discrepancy may be very large if the stock-adjustment 
parameter is low whilst the rate of growth of factors explaining desired 
stock is high. In the flow-adjustment case, the absolute size of the 
stock discrepancy is assumed to be important, and adjustment is more 
myopic. In practice there seems little difference between the two if 
housing units are assumed homogeneous; the distinction becomes vitally 
important if the housing stock is heterogeneous and only some proportion 
of the population moves each time period.
In the NBER-HUDS model discussed in Chapter One, demand is measured as a 
particular number of households which have to be allocated to the 
housing stock; different households have different housing requirements 
and the mix of discrete structures required is "demand". In this model, 
only some households move in any one time period in order to adjust 
their housing consumption; it is this subset of the population who 
"demand". The characteristics of this sub-population will vary through 
time and it therefore seems unlikely that the desired flow into the 
system will vary in a simple, proportionate fashion with aggregate
j
demand determinants. For example, the "baby boom" generation will have 
generated excess demand for the type of houses which are suitable for
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'families with young children, such as suburban properties. The more
|
recent ageing of the UK population is creating demand for sheltered and
!
^retirement homes, which do not need to be located close to urban
j
(centres and will have unusualj, internal characteristics. These are 
examples of long term changes induced by demographic factors, but the 
;mix of houses offered by builders will vary through shorter market 
(cycles as well. (This is discussed extensively in Ball (1984)). One 
•possible way of circumventing this is to use values instead of volumes 
as the dependent variable, as in Artis et al (1975) and Hadjimatheou. 
There are a number of distinct but closely related issues here. The 
first is that, as Buckley and Ermisch state, treating papulation as the 
aggregative variable:
i
"...implicitly assumes a unitary elasticity of demand for housing with
i
respect to population, an assumption that is rejected by the data".
(Buckley and Ermisch (1982) p.276)
The second issue is that even if the non-unitary elasticity of household
i
formation with respect to population is corrected for, there still 
remains a non-unitary elasticity of demand for housing with respect to 
households. The above quote compresses the two into one issue. 
Ermisch's (1981) work discussed in Chapter One suggests that a desire 
for privacy in conjunction with higher incomes will, through time, 
increase the rate of household formation with respect to any given 
population. As detailed above, variations in the proportion of the 
population at a given life cycle stage will alter the elasticity of 
demand for "housing" (q per household) with respect to households.
Use of a value dependent variable rather than a volume one will allow 
variation in a less restrictive fashion; treating values as the correct
I
I
dependent variable will necessitate modelling the extent to which
I
demographic and other changes alter the required housing stack mix. It
j
is possible that some proxy measures could be used; if, for example,
j
there exists a crucial life cycle stage when housing requirements alter 
drastically then the proportion of the population around this stage may
I
cjapture the bulk of such effects. Buckley and Ermisch go some way towar 
rjodelling this effect by using the "demographically induced" (using 
constant headship rates) number of households adjusted for council
i
I
hjouses whilst Hadjimatheou uses endogenous marriages ; the latter study 
mploys a value-based dependent variable. Value-orientated dependent 
variables do not distinguish between volume and price increases; this 
may be undesirable at least from a planner's point of view, and 
consequently there are drawbacks to both approaches. A third approach, 
which employs an inverse demand function (the demand function being 
rearranged so that price becomes the dependent variable) is used by 
Mayes (1979) and by Buckley and Ermisch, and will be discussed in
■  i "
section 3.5.3, which examines empirical results.
This review of the choice of dependent demand variable measure has 
raised some important questions which illustrate the relevance of the 
issues discussed in Chapters One and Two. In Chapter Two, the Markov 
process mobility model postulates constant (on the Markov process 
assumption) transition probabilities which tie the entire housing stock 
together. This in effect, models the "black box" discussed here, 
suggesting that a given system input (e.g. increased incomes) will
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generate a predictable output in the form of excess demands after the 
filtering process has occurred. Consequently, after a period of 
learning, it can be assumed that suppliers provide fixed proportions of 
the required house types until some form of structural change occurs. 
The "Black-Box (existing stock)-as-a-Classical-Markovian-transition- 
mjatrix" assumption is never made explicit in the literature. It is 
implicitly assumed that a single coefficient can capture the variations 
ip. terms of spatial location and housing quality that are constantly
I
occurring in the pattern of "demand".
Chapter One illustrated the heterogeneous nature of demand in the 
context of simulation models, and the fact that "aggregate demand" can 
have a spatial component by virtue of the way in which transport costs 
.ter location decisions. Both categories of model are heavily biased 
towards the treatment of housing as a consumption good with a use value 
only; this is apparent in the houshold-house allocation algorithms. 
Dlscret^ choice models similarly deal in "real",consumption oriented 
factors; the one exception is Struyk (1976) who stresses the asset demand 
for housing as a feature in tenure choice. By contrast all 
macroeconometric models are concerned with the demand for housing as an 
asset, although with varying degrees of importance; consumption features 
are viewed as secondary, proxied by demographic variables.
2-JL.2., 2 Supply
The measurement of supply poses fewer problems than demand. In terms of 
input to the closed system, it is a number of houses, which are more or
less homogeneous. Some supply will come from conversion and improvement 
of the stock. Muth (1971) estimates the long run elasticity of supply 
from this source as only 0.17 and macroeconometric models tend to ignore 
jit (although Buckley, and Ermisch include a term for improvement grants 
;to capture some of this effect). The bulk of supply can be measured by 
starts which become the relevant behavioural variable and feed through 
to the market in a technically determined fashion; it is, however, 
possible to include other "market" variables which might result in 
producers reducing or increasing the mean start-completion lag.
I
jThe main difficulty is knowing the appropriate explanatory variables to 
juse; in the case of demand, it can normally be assumed that for new 
houses the new house price is most relevant. For supply, however, it has 
not been established whether price changes in the existing housing stock 
provoke a supply response or whether price signals within the new 
housing market predominate. If the former, a number of points arise - 
if it is. possible to represent price changes in the existing stock by a 
single price change figure, does there always exist a one-to-one 
correspondence between this figure and the mix of new housing types 
supplied ? In the case of the latter the problem for econometric 
sspecification becomes that of finding the appropriate dynamic 
simultaneous structure. In the period covered by most macro-economic 
models, housing supply is represented as being close to a perfectly 
competitive industry; for example, Whitehead states:
"The general picture is one of a large number of smallAfirms with 
rapidly changing composition grouping together and separating again in
response to changes in demand. The whole structure of the housebuilding 
industry is thus extremely fluid" (Whitehead (1974))
There are theoretical problems involved when attempting to model price 
changes in a perfectly competitive industry where all firms are price 
cakers. It is possible (as a number of writers do) to specify an 
implicit inverse supply function such that price becomes the dependent 
variable, and to suppress modelling of the causal mechanism which 
changes price. This in effect assumes price setting behaviour, as a 
function of other supply determinants and supply itself - consequently 
^upply is undetermined. It will be illuminating, in the next chapter, 
to review econometric evidence on general industrial pricing in the 
context of a detailed examination of house price determination. This is 
especially important in the light of the "new view" of the housebuilding 
industry expounded by Ball (1934) which suggests that the perfectly 
competitive view is inappropriate.
^ 5 BCQHQMBTRIC SPECIFICATION 
a. 5.1 General Issues
The formulations given in (3.1.1) and (3.1.2) are very general, and 
translation of them into practice requires a series of assumptions to be 
made. The simplest would be to assume a linear, (additive) form without 
behavioural lags where price adjusts instantly to clear the market each 
period. This gives the three-equation reduced form model:
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Y = XTT +• V (3.3)
!
where TT = -Br""1 and. V = ^UF“'1 .
H is the matrix of jointly dependent variable coefficients, B is the 
matrix of exogenous and, in the case of lags, predetermined variable 
oefficients, U is the vector of disturbance terms, and 0 is a matrix of 
isturbance term coefficients. In the simplest case:
‘Prices
Y = D:u-, = Completions per capita
. S* - . Starts
(3.4)
Prices are exogenous in Whitehead’s model and she assumes 
identification, (and it is satisfied on rank and order conditions). The 
structural equations are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares; Two 
Stage Least Squares' is used to test for simultaneity (and seems to 
show little evidence of it). Mayes' and Hadjimatheou's models are 
similar with respect to the housing sector but are truer to (3.4) in 
that prices are endogenous. A disproportionate amount of attention has 
focussed on the first of these three equations, the reduced form for 
prices. Specification of this particular equation has became the essence 
of a macroeconomic housing market model throughout recent literature. In 
traditional economic theory, the role of price as a disseminator of 
information is crucial. The assumption embedded in simple models, that 
the market clears each time period, and that prices adjust 
instantaneously to achieve this relies, in practice, on prices being 
very flexible relative to other variables i.e. there exists a perfect 
Walrasian auctioneer. The alternative is to make explicit some form of
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jdisequilibrium adjustment mechanism for prices (recall the quote from 
‘Ingram et al (1972) in Chapter One). Samuelson (1947) sets out the 
details of a non-Valrasian adjustment process, of the discrete-time 
[ form:
APt. = Y (Dt. - St) (3.5)
assuming the adjustment process is linear. If a reduced form for prices 
is used, the inclusion of a lagged price term renders it a 
disequilibrium model, with an estimated coefficient value close to 1 
indicating that some lagged adjustment towards equilibrium is occurring-3 
Mayes interprets the coefficient value differently, stating:
"the high value of the coefficient for lagged prices shows that long 
run effects will be much greater than short run effects" (Mayes (1979))
It is possible to separate out the effects of equilibrium and 
disequilibrium by use of the error - correction mechanism employed by, 
or example, Davidson et al (1978). Here it is assumed that all system 
behaviour can be represented by the long run relationship:
P = K ZT (3.6)
Maintenance of steady state equilbrium in the long run requires that Z 
and P grow at rates g(P) and g(Z) such “that g(P) = r g(Z) and t is the 
long run elasticity of P with respect to Z.
Let the general model be:
i
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log P t = a log Pt— i + 6' + |3o log Zt + Bt log (3.7)
ignoring disturbances for the moment, and assuming a < 1.
4 log Pt. = 6 + £o AlogZt. + (a-1)
(J3o + £i)
log Pt-i  ----------- log Zt.-i
(1-a)
(3.8)
In equilibrium, AlogPt. = AlagZ-t, = 0 and (3.8) becomes
S (J3o + J3i )
: log P = --------- + ----------  log Z (3.9)
(1-a) (1-a)
(3.9) is equivalent to (3.6) when written in logarithmic form, with
(3.10)
6 r$o + J37
j   = an(  ^ T = -------
(1-a) L <l-a) J
In many applications, t is assumed equal to one (since otherwise, 
through time, the ratios between the aggregate quantities would be 
observed to change). Any tendency for the values of log P t. and log Z t, 
to differ from each other will result in the expression in square 
brackets, in (3.8) taking a non-zero value. Since a is assumed to be 
less than one, (a-1) is negative, so any discrepancy between the log Pt 
and log Zt alters Alog Pt in the direction necessary to bring them back 
into equality. In this way it is passible to reconcile long-run and 
short-run estimated parameters. Short-term system dynamics are captured, 
in (a-1); if in practice they have little effect, (a-1) = 0 =) a = 1 as 
estimated by Mayes for levels variables. This reconciles Mayes' quote, 
above, with the work of Artis et al (1975) who found that the speed of 
adjustment is rapid enough to ensure equilibrium each time period; in 
each case (and both are really statements of the same feature) short­
term system dynamics are of relatively little importance compared with 
long term determinants.
This discussion illustrates that, implicit in reduced form equations
I
which model house prices are demand and supply functions and system
i
dynamics. The error-correction presentation draws a distinction between
J
equilibrium and disequilibrium effects; Buckley and Ermisch employ this 
technique, and by stating that in long run equilibrium the stock of 
hjousing is unchanging, their "reduced-form" for prices can be
i
interpreted as an inverse demand function. The same result follows by
treating price as a direct measure of demand using an expenditure based
view of the demand variable.
!
3(5.2 Housing Sector Macroeconomic Theory
1
The nation of a housing sector "theory" is relatively new. Such a 
theory is implicit in most macroeconomic models, but is presented more 
formally by Buckley(1982). In Section 3.4 of this chapter, the cost of 
credit was discussed as an adjunct to the price of housing. An 
alternative approach which recalls investment-based theories of the 
housing market is the capital asset pricing model, where in equilibrium:
Ph = R/r (3.11)
where Fy, is the real price of housing-, E is the rental value of housing- 
services, and r is the real mortgage rate (which is assumed to move in 
perfect step with other costs of capital). Consequently given R, the 
"demand for housing" will be’an inverse function of the ceaJL mortgage 
interest rate; the mortgage rate alters the relative rate of return on 
housing and has a consequent inverse effect on the real price of housing
(which can therefore be taken as an indicator of "demand" especially if 
it is assumed that in the short run. supply is unchanging). It is 
assumed, following the work of Feldstein and Eckstein (1970) that the 
nominal interest rate, i, is the sum of the real rate of interest, r,and
i
the expected rate of inflation, 8; hence i = r + 8 ; capital markets are
I
perfect so that i = nominal mortgage rate = cost of capital. Returns on 
ill other goods are taxed, so that the real return to investment will, 
in equilibrium, equal the exogenous cost of capital, C;
C = (r + 8) (1 - t) - 6 (3. 12)
which is equivalent to the real,after tax, rate of interest facing 
-borrowers for home purchase. Returns to housing and mortgage interest 
posts are tax free for owner occupiers and this is the source of some 
important effects. Buckley casts the housing sector in a manner 
analogous to the IS-LM income determination model. Relation (3.11) 
provides a speculative demand for housing and the size of the housing 
stock provides a positive transactions demand for mortages (due to e.g. 
mobility). The supply of mortgage credit has exogenous and interest- 
sensitive components; the latter is a function of any differential 
between the mortgage saving rate (and housing's cost of capital) and the 
exogenous market determined cost of capital. The demand for mortgage 
credit is an inverse function of the real mortgage rate, and the stock 
demand for housing is a function of real disposable income, net 
household, formation ( after allowing for local authority provision), the 
roal after tax housing borrowing rate, and the real pripe of housing.
Fc)r any given demand for mortgage credit, a particular real mortgage
]narket-clearing interest rate is implied, as is a volume of mortgage 
lending. The interest rate implies an equilibrium real price of housing 
via (3.11) and the volume of mortgage lending implies a particular 
bousing stock (through the transactions demand). This gives a locus of 
points in real house price/housing stock space for any given combination 
of mortgage demand/mortgage supply schedules. Housing market equilibrium 
then involves simultaneous clearing of the interdependent housing and 
mortgage markets. Two conclusions follow*, the first is that the effect 
cjf a change in tax rates on the demand for housing is ambiguous;
i  '  .  .
disposable incomes will fall when taxes rise, but the relative rate of 
rjeturn to housing rises. The interplay between income and substitution 
effects determines the overall result. Secondly, higher anticipated 
inflation increases the demand for (and real equilibrium price of ) 
housing, because of the tax subsidy. A further conclusion is that 
increased production of council houses does not necessarily reduce the 
demand for owner occupation; it reduces the demand for mortgage credit,
which lowers the mortgage rate and the asset demand for housing
r
increases. By similar reasoning, increased supply of mortgages also 
increases the demand for housing, whilst council house sales, via the
i
mortgage market , reduce the overall demand for housing (a "crowding 
out" argument).
|
In practice, the nominal mortgage rate does not follow the capital 
market rate, and this factor has prompted Hadjimatheou's and Mayes' 
analysis of Building Society behaviour using "managerialist" theories.
If, for reasons of policy or political pressure, Buildipg Societies 
cannot adjust their mortgage rates, then they become relatively exposed
in terms of their savings inflow, necessitating the familiar rationing 
process. In the absence of a profit maximisation motive, an alternative 
explanation is required as to why Societies react at all. Hadjimatheou 
suggests that Societies' liquidity ratios feature in managerial 
utility functions, whilst Ghosh and Parkin (1972) suggest that reserves 
or their rate of growth are important. Mayes work is similar in spirit 
to that of Hadjimatheou, although different in detail. The upshot is 
that the mortgage and housing markets may exhibit some "stickiness".
The inclusion of the anticipated inflation rate as a factor which 
affects the asset demand for housing raises the issue of how, in 
practice, it is to be modelled. Essentially there are three generally . 
proposed forms for expectations formation.' naive, adaptive and rational. 
In the most naive model:
P t.“ = P t.— i
=* P t* - Pt-i* = Pt.-i - Pt— 2 
where Pt® is the price expected to prevail at time t.
(3. 13)
Mayes suggests P te = (1 + X) Pt. i which is an amended version of (3.13).
Jnder adaptive expectations:
p.b* - Pt-i* = 6 ( Pt ~ Pt.--.*) (3.14)
'f'his is the form used by Ingram et al, with S determined experimentally,
'inclusion in a structural equation with application of the Koyck 
transformation yields the result, for specification purposes, that a 
lagged dependent variable should be included as a regressor. Whitehead 
ind Hadjimatheou use price change and rate of change respectively to
j
model expectations; this implies an. expectations model which is a hybrid 
of (3.13) and (3.14).
APt* = 6 APt (3.15)
Hadjimatheou finds it to be insignificant but suggests this is due to
the inadequacy of the variable as a proxy for expectations rather than
as evidence against the effect of expectations per se; Whitehead finds 
it to be positive and significant. Friedman's (1968) adaptive 
expectations model is:
PtH-i* - Pt® = 6 ( Pt. - Pt.-!®) (3.16)
which again implies the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. One 
drawback of any adaptive expectations model is its tendency, in a 
generally inflationary environment, to systematically underpredict 
inflation. This feature was first pointed out in Muth (1960, 1961) who
proposed rational expectations instead. Here it is suggested that 
individuals will always make optimal use of the information available to
them; systematic mistakes will not be continued, so that forecast errors
I
between actual and expected series will be random. This is normally 
applied in macroeconomics where some "datum" such as the money supply is 
available to influence expectations. Even if most individuals do not 
mLnitor economic events closely, their advisors (economists, 
politicians, and trade unionists) will, and the system will behave "as 
ii" rational expectations are operating. The lack of direct analogue in 
tie housing sector has meant that rational expectations have not been 
ussed in housing models, although Buckley ana Ermisch1 s permanent income 
variable implicitly uses them. This question will be discussed more 
fully in the next chapter.
!
2^5.3 Empirical Results
A number of empirical results have already been reported but in this 
section a more systematic analysis will be presented. Only models using 
UK/GB data will be analysed, although similar work has been carried out 
in the US e.g. Kearl and Mishkin (1977), Kearl (1978), Jaff'ee and Rosen 
(1979), and Rosen (1979). For reasons of space, models are not 
presented in full.
Whitehead's final demand equation includes a lagged, population deflated 
stock variable, which is unusual considering that the model is supposed 
to be a flow equilibrium. Whitehead includes it to assess the
I "... interaction between the market for existing stock and that for new 
housing" (Whitehead (1974) P.89). Variables are in per capita terms 
and on statistical criteria the equation fits well. The starts-
i
completions relation includes a 3 period lagged starts variable (using 
the Koyck transformation) assuming housebuilding takes at least 6 months 
and a lagged dependent variable is included since this is a flow 
adjustment model.
The supply elasticities (Prices 0.62, Construction Costs - 5.02), imply 
pejrverse results with respect to profits (or considerable diseconomies 
of scale). One possible source of inaccuracy is the construction cost 
index, which ignores productivity changes, and assumes that land prices 
grow at 2% per annum. There is a substantial trend component, and this 
wit;h the nominal values on prices and interest rates might produce 
multicollinearity, and hence coefficient instability.
Artis et al use an investment-oriented approach, and the coefficient on 
the lagged stock term in their model reflects depreciation as well as 
lagged stock adjustment. They also suggest that there will not be a 
technical, one-to-one relationship between starts and investment; so 
their supply function uses investment itself as the dependent variable. 
Thus the first equation is a straightforward equilibrium investment 
stock adjustment model. In the demand functions they use a real 
price/real mortgage rate adjusted for taxes composite variable, and the 
four period change in real house prices to proxy expectations, permanent 
income (a distributed lag) and real local authority rent^ to proxy the 
effects of the other tenures. Their supply function includes building
costs and credit costs separately, the relative price of housing, a time 
trend and a term to reflect tender-approval/construction lags. This 
shows positive autocorrelation; removal of this by means of instrumental 
variables renders the time trend insignificant. Their elasticity on 
costs is, like that of Vhitehead, much larger than on prices.
For the demand equation, the composite price variable performs best, as
does the income measure. The success of local authority rents is reduced 
by removal of autocorrelation. The expectations variable generally 
performs badly. A variety of dummies are employed to reflect rationing 
q\j Building Societies; in general rationing is not a maintained 
jaypathesis. Artis et al also formulate a disequilibrium model, as 
discussed previously. In neither the supply nor the demand formulations 
does the disequilibrium variable (the change in real prices) show 
significance.
Hadjimath-eau's flow equilibrium model employs both investment and starts 
as dependent variables in the supply function. There is some similarity 
with the equilibrium supply equation of Artis et al, but the problem of 
perverse elasticities on prices and costs is solved by using the ratio 
of the two. As discussed above, this has some difficulties in itself 
since published building cost indices include an element for profit. It 
will be an adequate proxy provided the profit element is not too large. 
The supply of starts equation achieves very similar results; it is 
marginally less successful than the investment supply equation in terms
of W- but in practice there is little to choose between ‘the two. The
starts-completions relation is a purely mechanical one, estimated by
instrumental variables. It shows a pattern similar to the coefficients 
estimated by Whitehead when deciding on an equation structure - that is,
that few coefficients on lagged starts variables are particularly large,
\
with some being insignificant, and the most important regressor tends to
be current starts. It is common for high (6,7 or 8 quarter) lags to
I
also be significant and this may reflect a short building cycle rather 
than a technical phenomenon. Hadjimatheou's demand equation is deflated 
by population and is similar to Whitehead’s apart from the exclusion of 
a;lagged stock term and the inclusion of a variable to reflect rationing 
by Building Societies in the face of pressure on liquidity ratios 
In terms of IF and Durban Watson statistics, there is little difference 
between them.
Mayes' model is ostensibly a stock equilibrium model but the stock term 
is dropped. The starts-completions relationship shows variation in the 
patterns of significance on lagged starts variables compared with 
Whitehead and Hadjimatheou, but the overall pattern of one-period and 
six-period lag significance with low explanatory power for intervening 
periods is maintained. A four-period difference is insignificant. The 
supply of starts equation is similar to Hadjimatheou's except that a 
term for total lending, from Building Societies and other financial 
institutions, is included, to capture builder's expectations (who, it is 
supposed, monitor events in capital markets). Mayes' reduced form for 
house prices is not explicitly defined as such; it includes terms for 
public and private completions (theoretically supply variables) and for 
the nominal mortgage rate. There is also a term for gross mortgage 
advances by Building Societies. The lagged dependent variable is
intended to capture expectations although equivalence with a dynamic 
adjustment model has already been discussed.
I
Whitehead, Hadjimatheou and Mayes find little to choose between linear 
and' log-linear specifications. Recent work has tended to use log-linear 
because the elasticities are more tractable. Another point which 
emerges from these models is the difficulty in modelling expectations, 
anjl the observational equivalence, in terms of econometric 
specification, of a variety of theories which suggest the inclusion of 
lagged dependent variables. A further problem which occurs especially 
v/hen using a price reduced form is that all the data tend to be heavily 
trended, particularly nominal values; spurious correlations and 
muiticollinearity will result.
Mellis and Longbottom (1981) estimate a reduced form with first 
differences in logarithms as the dependent variable. The theoretical 
underpinnings of the equation are not clear, but seem to be an amalgam 
of ja stock adjustment model with Mayes' reduced form. There is some 
mixing of logarithmic and level variables, and the coefficients on the 
effects of new private and public supply are constrained to be equal. 
They also present a "steady-state" equation which appears to consist of 
the first equation with lagged terms dropped and supply and demand 
prices assumed unchanging. They also have a coefficient on consumer's 
expenditure deflator of 1.0 which suggests perfect and instantaneous 
(within any one quarter) adjustment of the differentials in prices 
between houses and all other goods.
Bubkley and Ermisch (1983) point out that amongst other things, Mel1 is 
an!d Longbottom's model can, under certain assumptions, imply an income 
elasticity of demand for housing of 4.4, which is much higher than any 
other estimates. They present short-run and long-run price reduced 
forms which use the error correction mechanism of (3.8). This model, 
derived from Buckley and Ermisch (1982), is important for three reasons. 
Firstly, it employs a variant of the capital asset pricing model 
derailed by Buckley (1982); secondly it differentiates between 
equilibrium and disequilibrium, and finally it addresses the questions 
of endogeneity of permanent incomes (since they can include housing 
wellth) the effect of building society variables, and the tax advantage 
tojowner-occupiers.
On the basis of the capital asset pricing model, changes in the 
anticipated rate of inflation (i.e. in nominal interest rates when real 
rates are constant) will change the eauilibrium price of housing as will 
Building Societies' acquisition of assets adjusted by the prevailing 
loan to value ratio. The results show some support for the housing 
market sectoral theory, although it is notable that council house 
production , local authority rents, and household changes do not show a 
strong impact. Improvement grants have a positive impact. A cubed term 
in first differences of logarithms of house prices is intended to 
capture Hendry's (1979) suggestion that expectations of capital gains 
from housing may be disproportionately influenced by very large changes 
in house prices. The levels variables give error-correction or short­
term dynamic behaviour, and they are all significant suggesting that 
short-term mismatches between the subsidy to owner-occupiers and the
1 4 1
p:~ice of housing, between the volume of funds available for loans and 
the price of housing, and between the total number of new households 
relative to council house population, will all have positive impacts on 
prices. The equilibrium effect of household formation is weaker, 
especially under instrumental variable estimation; but instrumental 
variable estimation also shows changes in the coefficients of a number 
of variables, including households on levels form. This suggests that 
house prices and households are simultaneously determined, a point which 
will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Buckley and 
Ermisch's reduced form for prices in long run equilibrium has household 
formation, income growth, the tax advantage to owner-occupiers, and 
funds available for lending by Building Societies. This is interpreted 
by Buckley & Ermisch as a demand function, since supply is assumed 
unimportant in the long-run steady state. As an approximation this is 
acceptable, but seems to render the definition of "steady-state" 
somewhat arbitrary,
The models reviewed so far are the most important, but other examples 
include Duffy (1970), who stresses the role of net Building Society 
advances and general inflation; this is one of the first of the house 
price reduced forms. The London Business School (1979) model is of house 
price changes with real incomes, the nominal mortgage rate, and an 
eight-period moving average on starts as explanatory variables. It is 
probably an adequate reduced form for its purpose, which is as an input 
to an economy wide model. The Awan (1980) model never reached 
completion, but is novel in the use of four period changfes. Most. Most 
writers use seasonal dummies to filter out seasonal effects, which are
especially important in an externally constructed product such as 
hobsing. Buckley and Ermisch use data which are seasonally adjusted, 
and note that this may lead to inconsistent estimates. A further 
hypothesis embedded within a four-period difference model is that it is 
more reasonable to expect agents (especially producers) to base their 
behaviour on "subjectively deseasonalised" variable values; for this 
reason this method of deseasonalising is to be preferred to dummy 
variables.
3.1 CQMCLUS1QMS
I
j
A number of observations can be made at this stage. At the empirical 
level, all of the models discussed here have shown strong autoregression
iI
in the starts and completions data series and this has tended to result 
in problems in the behavioural modelling of these quantities. In 
general, success in modelling starts and completions has not been as
i
marked as that of modelling prices. This is one reason for focussing on 
prices as a dependent variable, but as has been seen, the other is that 
prices are viewed as the sole housing market datum of any importance in 
the long run, and indeed are taken as conceptually equivalent with 
"demand". A related point is that later work shows some confusion over 
the definition of structural versus reduced form equations and this is 
reflected in the difficulty in distinguishing supply and demand (e.g. 
the inclusion of supply variables (public and private completions)) in 
the "demand" equaions presented in Mayes, Mel1is and Longbottom, and 
Buckley and Ermisch. It is possible to argue that the reason for 
this is that all the models reviewed so far only deal with a subsection
of the housing sector; the price of a new houses reflects the behaviour 
of, the new housing market, but this is likely to be closely linked to
the existing sector. As has been seen the existing sector is commonly
1
implicitly viewed as a classical Markovian transition matrix, which is 
not explicitly analysed. It does appear as a lagged stock term, but 
wijth the heavy trend element in this variable it is unlikely to 
accurately reflect new/existing interactions. By invoking an asset 
deinand approach, Buckley and Ermisch suggest that changes within
the existing stock will generate flows into the market and have
!
corresponding effects on new house prices. This is implicit within most 
models, which use as explanatory variables, terms such as net mortgage 
advances, total income change, total improvement grants, etc. But some 
of these changes must impact on the existing stock. Is it always valid 
to suggest that the effect on the new housing market will be identical 
every time ?
Artis et al mention this point with respect to the supply response, 
suggesting that there will not be a one-to-one relationship between 
starts and investment, due to conscious variation of the value to new 
housing unit ratio by builders in the face of altered market conditions.
A rllated point is the adequacy of available price data (when, in 
practice, housing is heterogeneous) as a measure of price changes or as 
an expenditure measure of demand. A crude average of all house prices 
in any one period presupposes that the relative quantites in each house 
type (and value) category are unchanging through time. Crude averages 
have been replaced by "mix adjusted" price indices in later studies.
i
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The details of calculation of these are given in the Department of the 
Environment Paper (1982). The basic problem is to find broadly 
homogeneous groupings of houses and of using the relative proportions of 
such groups within the stock or transacted in some base period to weight 
price changes. The Department of the Environment method uses 156 size, 
age, type, and region cells.
Fleming and Mellie (1981) have surveyed all the house price data 
available, and have concluded that because most of the sources of price 
data only cover a proportion of the market (namely that funded by loan 
institutions) there is a tendency to overstate the "true" house price 
lejvel. This may not, in itself, be a serious source of bias provided 
that the relationship between the observed and unobserved sectors is 
fairly constant and/or that the two are independent. Fleming and Mel1 is 
(1984) suggest that in tackling heterogeneity, the hedonic price 
approach, detailed in Chapter One, be used, as do Wilkinson and Archer 
(1976). This allows much more standardisation although the difficulties 
with this technique, discussed in the first chapter, should be borne in 
mind.
Rosenthal (1984) suggests that hedonic prices should be interpreted as 
minimum error weights. Comparing results from crude averages, mix- 
adjusted indices, hedonic-based indices, and indices weighted by ■ ■ •'
rateable values, he finds that crude averages are biased below the 
adjusted indices, counter to what is expected. In general, however, he
finds the correlation between the series to be very high* even after 
removal of the time trend element; he concludes that
"  little is to be gained from the use of the more sophisticated
approaches to the estimation of national owner-occupied per unit house 
price indices presented here than are already available". Rosenthal 
( l ^ )  P. 281
The issue of heterogeneity highlights a fundamental shortcoming, or at
least assumption which pervades the macroeconomic housing modelling
i
literature. In order to ensure that the theoretical approaches used are
|
valid, it is necessary to assume homogeneity of housing. In stock- 
adjjustment models, such homogeneity extends to the existing stock (where
I
this is measured in terms of existing units) and the flow volumes of 
housing units. Focus on the heterogeneity issue with respect to prices 
alone is, therefore, somewhat restrictive (although in the Buckley and 
Ermisch steady-state case, it is the only variable where this is of 
relevance).
If iheterogeneity is admitted, the theoretical points raised in Chapter
i
One become important. These points concern the existence and stability 
of a  long run housing market equilibrium when stock is heterogeneous.
On the strong assumption that equilibrium conditions are satisfied, (and 
that in effect, the existing stock is a classical Markovian transition 
matrix) a macroeconometric approach will be valid in so far as 
residuals' randomness are satisfied. The question of whether anything 
could be achieved by taking heterogeneity into account then becomes the 
question of whether overall residual variance can be reduced.
Qnjs of the reasons for adopting a homogeneous market asset pricing model 
is the emphasis on financial factors as explanatory variables. The 
implicit suggestion is that housing market activity is dominated by 
financial rather than real variables.
Giyen such dominance, the effects of capital market changes will be 
sijailar in terms of direction and magnitude throughout the country, and 
faster than locationally specific "volume" responses; ultimately, this 
is;the rationale for treating housing markets as one homogeneous entity. 
This issue will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.
Apajrt from the desire, for its own sake, to determine causal factors,
macro-econometric models have also been employed in the analysis of
!
poijicy. This is especially so with respect to financial variables, in 
the case of Building Society and taxation structure reform. It is also 
seen as a valid activity where spatial variables are concerned; for 
example, council house sales (Buckley) and land release (Uellis and
iJ
Longbottom suggest that their model implies that local authorities 
should zone more land for housebuilding). It will be argued that some 
of these issues can only be properly analysed by using an explicitly 
spatial approach. Another reason for doing so is that it introduces an 
additional dimension to analysis. This is desirable because as has been 
seen, a number of housing market theories are observationally equivalent 
as far as tests with time series data are concerned.
In this chapter I have suggested that a major potential drawback of 
macroeconometric models is their limited treatment of interactions
between the new and existing housing stock. It has also been pointed 
out that, in the heterogeneous/homogeneous housing market framework 
presented in Chapter One, macroeconometric models "work" more easily, i 
theoretical terms, if homogeneity is assumed and the asset role of 
housing is stressed. Considering such an apparently unrealistic 
approach, macroeconomic models achieve a surprisingly high degree of 
success, and this must be due at least in part to the battery of 
econometric tests which are now available for specification analysis. 
There can be no dispute that work such as that of Buckley and Ermisch 
represents a parsimonious representation of "broad brush" (short run)
f
equilibrium and its determining factors. The question is whether such 
work contributes to an understanding of the housing market for the 
purposes of planning and policy design. Answering this involves 
examination of the planning process as applied to housing, but a few 
general points can be made here; namely the failure of any researchers 
to find local authority rent levels to be an important explanatory 
variable, and the fact that attempts to incorporate demographic
components, culminating in Buckley and Ermisch*s "household formation"
i
variable have demonstrated their importance and even endogeneity with 
other market indicators. Both results will be seen to be of key 
importance to the discussion of the next chapter.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
The' previous three chapters have reviewed a broad area of theory and 
practice. Urban models stemming from the utility maximisation premise 
have been shown to be classifiable according to, amongst other criteria, 
their view of the housing market in terms of homo- or hetero- geneity.
It has been shown that macroeconometric models largely rest on the 
former assumption, homogeneity, and that they model only a portion of 
thej housing market, . namely that for new housing. The market for 
existing housing is generally ignored and is implicitly assumed to 
exhibit regularities of behaviour of the kind which feature in the 
Markov models discussed in Chapter Two. Tests for homogeneity have been 
applied extensively at the urban level and this work has been reviewed 
in Chapter One, with mixed conclusions.
This chapter begins the development of a regional housing market model, 
drawing on the insights provided by the analysis of the preceding 
chapters. It will be argued here that the behaviour of the housing 
market can be classified in three dimensions: time, space, and quality,
hese, the spatial aspect is the most important for a regional model, 
all three interact. It will be shown that analysis of the role of 
e and its interaction with time in the housing market will require 
examination of household search processes. It then becomes equally 
important to treat the mobility decision as interdependent with the
all market. This leads to a discussion of house price determination 
generally, in the markets for new and existing houses. The notion of a 
market evolving through time with imperfect information requires a more
Of
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obabilistic definition of equilibrium than that used in models
aijecussea so iar
L :HE RATIONALE FOR a REGIONAL KQDEL
re are two distinct potential outputs of a regional model and these 
ar<£ dependent on the purpose of the model. From the point of view of 
local authorities, the ability to make regional forecasts of housing 
market variables (especially demand) is desirable for the purposes of 
planning. From the causal modelling point of view, a regional model
permits examination of a particular aspect of heterogeneity; space.
i
Paelinck and lijkamp have defined "regional economics" as follows:
"Regional economics is concerned with an explicit consideration of 
spaltial elements in general (theoretical) economics: it studies the 
spatial dispersion and spatial coherence of activities from an economic 
point of view"
(Paelinck and lijkamp (1977))
On this definition, "regional" and "spatial" models are conceptually 
equivalent. The treatment of space in urban housing models varies, but 
it primarily appears as a source of transport costs (constant and/or 
income related). In simulation models the treatment is similar. 
Although these models address heterogeneity by using disrete zones, 
interactions between such zones are ignored.
In the entropy model, distance is of the Euclidean form, although it is 
adjusted by transport cost rates and is thus equivalent to urban model
"space*'. In the gravity model, distance is directly Euclidean although
<
the intervening opportunities model allows for different definitions of 
space. The Markov model treats interactions between spatial units 
(however defined, i.e. social and housing quality "space" as well as 
geographic) as constant, provided the initial classifications are 
internally homogenous.
|
Macroeconometric models have no explicit spatial element. In part this 
ari|es from the logically prior (and unproven) assumption of housing 
market homogeneity, but in practice these models employ two distinct 
sets of variables. Tax and interest rates and financial flows are 
aspatial variables (that is, a fully accurate description of such 
variables does not require a spatial co-ordinate). In contrast, house
completions and stock, house prices, demographic variables, local
i
authority rents, and incomes or income changes, ail posess a spatial 
component. Bennett (1979) terms models which ignore this kind of 
spatial component "lumped systems". Assessing the extent to which a 
spatial system can be approximated by a "lumped system" requires 
detailed examination of the manifestation of space per se in the housing 
market.
4 .3  SPACE AMD THE HOUSING MARKET
4.311 Housing Market Dimensions
The "commodity hierarchy" model of Sweeney (1974) consists of two
!
related hypotheses. The first is that housing heterogeneity can be 
adequately represented by classifying housing into a series of distinct, 
internally homogeneous groups; the second is that the relationships 
between these groups in terms of consumer substitutability can be 
represented by a quality hierarchy This framework has been 
subsequently restated by Gerber (1985) to permit more general 
substitutability between groups. It will be argued here that a full 
description of' the housing market requires analysis in three dimensions: 
space, time, and house quality. This last dimension is further 
decomposable such that houses are represented by points in 
characteristics space, but for the moment it will be supposed that such 
representations can be simplified, without loss of generality, into 
groupings of the kind proposed by Sweeney and Gerber .
The time dimension is analysed in considerable detail in 
macroeconometric models where the (static) long run solution is derived 
in conjunction with short term disequilibrium dynamics. More generally, 
all jmacroeconometric models use time series data and hence focus on 
intertemporal behaviour. "Costs of Adjustment" are usually invoked to 
justify dynamic approaches, in the same way that costs of movement 
"create" space in purely spatial models.
nature of housing markets stems from a confusion of the quality 
dimension with the spatial. It is common for urban analysts to refer to 
"submarkets" although the definition of these varies. The USER-HUBS 
model draws a distinction between spatial zones and submarkets 
associated with particular house types. In contrast, Goodman (1981) 
uses a purely spatial definition by employing the Cliff, Haggett, and 
Qrd (1975) criteria, which only groups contiguous zones. It will be 
remembered that a further criterion is that of simplicity - that a 
definition which results in fewer submarkets is to be preferred to one 
which results in a proliferation. A macroeconometric model in effect 
assumes that one zone is an adequate assumption for the housing market; 
in conjunction with the Harkov assumption about the existing stock, the 
analysis then reduces to the temporal sphere.
Urban models do incorporate all these dimensions but in varying 
proportions; land use models, for example, generally use a long run 
solution. Simulation models use a "medium run" temporal perspective. 
What" is apparent in urban models is that it is difficult to disentangle
I
house type "submarket" effects from spatial submarket effects on 
observed housing market behaviour at the urban level of analysis. 
Grouping by spatial units alone tends to inadequately describe housing 
submarket interdependencies, whilst grouping by house type alone can 
disguise the role of space. It will be argued that in order to examine 
spatial effects in isolation, it will be necessary to operate at a much 
higher level of aggregation of spatial units than is implied by urban 
models. At this higher level of aggregation spatial interaction will be
argued to arise not just from distance effects but also from the joint 
activities of search and information transmission. Search behaviour 
will be hypothesised to be the main source of spatial links within the
i
housing market especially at the regional level. The gravity model has 
bee:n shown to represent a parsimonious method of modelling spatial 
interaction, and is one which can be applied to commodities as well as 
inc.ividuals. As a commodity housing is peculiar since demand adjustment 
usually takes the form of consumer mobility rather than commodity 
mobility. It is a locationally specific good both in production and 
consumption, which means that migration and mobility are not always 
obdervationaliy separable. It is common to define migration as movement 
in response to a change of work place, particularly inter-regional
i
changes: mobility is usually viewed as a housing market adjustment in
response to, say, life cycle changes. Graves and Linneman (1979) have
argued that ownership of a house involves the simultaneous consumption 
of locationally specific "non-traded goods". Such goods (environment, 
amenities) may prompt housing consumption adjustment over considerable 
distances and may be treated by the household as more important than job
choice. There is a direct analogue here with-Wilson's. (1970) four types
of locational behaviour. Linneman and Graves (1982) provide a taxonomy 
of these kinds of mobility and location behaviour.
It follows that the distinctions between mobility and migration are 
unclear. Both are the outcome of adjustment to housing consumption 
disequilibrium, but as was seen in Chapter One, the search process is 
logically prior to mobility. The actual move is only one of a potential 
number of outcomes and the use of observations of mobility behaviour as
evidence of desire means invoking the revealed preference assumption.
in practice, any actual move is "shadowed" by a series of "dummy" moves
in it he form of search patterns.
4, .v. 2 bearcn r'rocess
Som^ research has been conducted on the role of information in 
influencing search patterns (e.g. MacLennan and Wood (1982)) but less 
attention has been focussed on the role of search patterns as 
disseminators of information. Search models were initially developed a 
additions to macroeconomic theory and focussed on the labour market.
i
The (intention was to explain sluggishness in labour market adjustment 
and more generally to model uncertainty with its attendant
disequilibrium macroeconomic solutions. It has been pointed out that
\
search involves the acquisition of information and hence the process is 
anathema to a neoclassical framework of perfect information. Beginning 
;ig ler
individual level it is possible to incorporate imperfect information 
without compromising the principles of utility maximisation, and it is 
worthwhile examining models incorporating this perspective in more 
detail. The central hypothesis.is that information acquisition incurs 
costs, so that the acquiring economic agent has to decide at what stage 
it is optimum to stop searching. It is generally assumed that the 
individual faces a series of opportunities, such as job offers or 
housing vacancies, and must decide after each one whether to accept or 
to clntinue searching. The individual seeks to maximise the net gain
with Sti  (1961), however, it has been suggested that at the
from isuch a process and this involves assessing whether the expected
gain associated with the next offer outweighs the additional search
■ I.
costs, conditional upon satisfaction of some reservation value for the 
net gain.
It can be shown (e.g. Hey (1981)) that the reservation price is an
i
increasing function of search costs, and consequently search will cease 
earlier as search becomes more expensive. It can also be shown that the 
opiimal reservation price is just equal to the expected net cost 
(purchase price plus search costs). If the searcher comes upon an ■ 
observed price equal to this optimal reservation price he will be 
indifferent between continuing or stopping his search.
There are two forms of search, active and passive, and these can be 
examined in a static or dynamic framework. The essential features of 
any search model are the shape of the utility function of the searcher 
and the expected distribution function of the set of prospects. It is 
clear that problems arise when the searcher's subjective perception of 
this distribution is at variance with the actual distribution. In order 
to incorporate this, search models which include learning have been
i .
developed. One such model, detailed in Hey, includes an updating scheme 
for: the probability of an event's occurrence, such that if the process 
is allowed to continue for a sufficiently large number of time periods, 
the actual and expected distributions will coincide. In the housing 
market, the problem for most households is the infrequency with which 
they transact compared with housing market professionals and 
housebuilders. The models which incorporate learning do not usually 
give explicit predictions about the intensity of search because the
ange of possible subjective distributions is so large; nevertheless, 
sjDine general observations are appropriate. Firstly, the marginal 
opportunity cost of an individual's time will be a crucial determinant 
of the intensity of search even in an adaptive situation. Secondly, the 
cost of acquiring information will include a monotonically increasing 
spatial component so that long-distance migrants will have higher 
optimal reservation prices. Thirdly, the initial information set will 
be more complete for prospective purchases that are associated with the 
household’s peer group; hence there will be a subset of all passible 
moves about which the household has more perfect knowledge.
Huff (1982) has analysed the residential search process in a spatial 
context, where the household searches over house vacancies offered for 
sale in a series of discrete spatial areas. Given that it is possible 
to represent housing as a heterogeneous good composed of attributes,
Huff employs a "minimum requirements" decision rule of the form 
deleloped by Tversky (1972) in the Elimination by Aspects Model. '1 Huff 
defines the subset of vacancies, n, as those which cannot be rejected
wi hout direct investigation on the part of the household. He then
states:
"If the spatial distribution of vacancies in the choice set, n, does
!
not correspond to the spatial distribution of a similar number of 
vacancies randomly sampled from the set of all existing vacancies then 
the decision to investigate only those vacancies which are members of n
wil 1 necessarily result in a spatially biased search pattern".
(Huff (1982), P.116)
uff analyses the spatial search process in a Markovian framework such 
that the probability of searching in a given area is a function of the
I
location of the last vacancy seen by the household, and of the relative 
concentration of nossible vacancies.
It follows that the spatial search process will, like any other, involve 
comparison of the reservation price with the expected cost of continued 
search, and that the way to minimise this cost is to concentrate the 
field of active search. This principle, applied by Huff to two- 
dimensional Euclidean space, is equally applicable to any form of space, 
including that which separates housing market strata.
i '
The spatial relationship between the household's current location and
their area of search will depend on their motive for moving; job-related
moves will result in search in the environs of the new employment
location, whereas a housing-related move such as a birth in the family
will result in search in the same area as the current housing situation.
The differences in scale between the move distances of the two groups 
! : * 
will vary with the spatial distribution of the housing stock varieties
j ’  '
compared with employment locations. In general, the housing adjustment 
move will be shorter.
The primary purpose of search models is as an amended micro-behavioural 
foundation for macroeconomic theory, where the economy may not be in 
Walrasian equilibrium. Such aggregation to investigate the 
macroeconomic effects of micro search behaviour is a relatively 
neglected area in residential search analysis, but it is one which is
v i t a l  i f  the  re g io n a l ( i . e .  s p a t ia l )  n a tu re  o f th e  housing m arket is  to
be explored. It was seen m  m e  first iwo cnapxers that models w m c h  
i  *
i
deal with the simultaneous behaviour of a large number of individuals 
often contain implicit views of search. For example, the NBER-HUDS model 
assumes perfect information whilst the intervening opportunities model 
implies a radiating search pattern. The way in which search is 
conducted can also vary considerably, and within the context of the
I *
housing market, it can consist of any activity from perusal of the local 
newspaper to physically visiting a property. This latter form will
j
i
convey information to sellers and their agents about demand, and hence 
provides a link between the current location of a household and some or 
all of that household’s potential new locations.
It was seen in Chapter One that the intersection between the aspiration 
and awareness sets provides the search space, and Huff’s analytical 
categories distinguish between those properties which are effectively 
searched without being physically visited, and those which must be 
physically inspected. This subset of the search space is the
l
information about demand available to suppliers of housing.
Within two-dimensional Euclidean space, it is possible to equate the 
search space with a physical area, at least within any one stratum of 
the housing market. Such a restricted form of search space will be 
termed a "search field". This set of vacancies, within which physical 
inspection occurs, need not be continuous.
EiaH£E .4.1 SEARCH AMD MIGRATION FIELDS
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At the aggregate level, mobility or migration decisions can be 
represented by "migration fields"; that is, by arrows representing the 
direction of migration from the point of origin. Figure 4.1.gives 
hypothetical search and migration fields for three individuals, A,B, and 
C. The determinants of any particular search field may be tempered by 
uncertainty and ignorance or may be the result of a rational economic 
calculus. Behavioural geographers (Galledge ana Bushton (1975)) have 
employed the notion of "mental maps" and have demonstrated that 
perceptions of space can vary considerably across individuals. It is 
problematic, however, to translate such a behaviourally based method of 
determination into a neoclassical economic framework.
Hagerstrand (1954) suggests that individuals possess "private 
information fields" and that these can be proxied by migration fields. 
The reasoning is that, in rural areas, individuals will rely on personal 
contacts to furnish information about job opportunities or residential 
vacancies, and migration flows will reflect this. He finds evidence to 
suggest that migration fields (and, by implication, private information 
fields) are stable over long periods of time, with a direct analogue 
with the jftarkov stationarity assumption. The introduction of search 
projcesses suggests that the particular migration field chosen is only 
one
as
possible outcome; ceteris paribus, it can be viewed in the aggregate 
the expected outcome. Information possessed will place a restriction 
on possible migration fields, although as has already been seen, 
Maciennan and Villiams (1979) have argued that the awareness set, and 
consequently the search space, may alter as search progresses; hence the 
learning effect already referred to may be operating.
Two features are central to the search-based view of the modern housing 
market. The first such feature is the duality of the market, given tha 
both buyers and sellers are searching for one another, with each facing 
an uncertain environment and hence the need to acquire information abou 
the other side of the market. The second feature is that as owner 
occupiers, the majority of transacting households are acting 
simultaneously as buyers and sellers, albeit in different areas or 
housing market strata.
4.3.3 Owner Occupier Search Processes
It follows'that the existing owner-occupier has a series of directly 
relevant choice variables, namely his reservation price as a buyer, his 
reservation price as a seller, and the relative timing of the two 
transactions. To illustrate this latter point, consider Table 4.1.
I
TABLE 4.1 OWNER OCCUPIER TRANSACTION TIMING STRATEGIES
j
1 i COST I BENEFIT !
+
i
STHATEGY
------- +-
1
{1} I 
1
Storage 
Psychic Cost 
Foregone Cheaper Buy
1
1
1
I (B)aoo 
MaxCm(s))
I Bridging Loan 1 I <S)aco
12) 1 
1
Foregone Higher Sell 1
1
MinC-m(p))
-— +—
Tile two strategies in Table 4.1 represent:
<1> Sell own house, and only attempt purchase when sale 
complete.
{2> Buy desired house, and only attempt to sell own property 
when purchase complete.
Th4 expressions 1(B) and I (S) refer to the owner-occupier' s knowledge of
I
the distribution of buyers and sellers respectively. The financial 
sector implications of these two strategies are not symmetric, given
i ’
i  .
tne posible need for bridging loan finance; it follows that such a
j
choice may not, in practice, exist. Following either strategy will
l
maximise the owner-occupier1s knowledge of one of these distributions,: 
in jthe absence of perfect knowledge the distributions will be of a 
subset of all buyers and sellers, and this subset may not be a 
representative sample. This tendency towards perfect knowledge on the 
part of the owner-occupier will be offset by the large number of 
potential buyers who will judge quality not by price (as in the Veblen 
effect) but by the length of time that a property is on the market.
Thi^ further constraint will only affect sellers; its counterpart in 
buyers is the gradual increase in the psychic costs of search and the 
possibly bounded nature of rationality, which precludes effective 
decision making over a large number of alternatives. Further to this, 
the distribution of buyers and sellers will be changing, possibly 
randomly, through time. It follows that the household can never 
completely eliminate uncertainty in either of its roles.
Vhich strategy is to be preferred will depend upon the relative costs of
storage, bridging loans, and the likely direction of movement of house
prices in the immediate future. If there is chronically strong demand
and rising prices, strategy <2) is probably to be preferred to strategy
{!>, since the probability of maximising expected profit from the sale 
i
is higher than the probability of minimising expected loss on purchase. 
Storage costs will be more or less fixed, but bridging loan costs will 
be'a function of the interest rate and house price. In general, for a 
given spatial area, as the number of buyers and sellers increases, the
rat!e of acquisition of knowledge about both sides of the market will
also rise. It follows that the market actor can pursue the strategy of
i
initiating both sides of the transaction simultaneously when in a 
generally buoyant market, particularly an urban area; Similarly the 
relatively constant mobility rates for all household types will mean 
that a house transaction is easier to accomplish in the lower strata of 
the housing market, where the overall market size is larger. This will 
vary, however, according to the supply/demand balance.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that transaction timing can be 
reduced to one dimension, namely the cost of the difference between the 
times of the two halves of the market transaction. Consider-the 
following utility function:
U=U(m(s),k (p),C(td),q) (4.1)
where:
where ? r is the household's reservation price and the expression is 
positive or negative depending on whether the household is selling or 
purchasing. For an existing owner occupier trading up who has already 
sold his own property, the maximum reservation price that he can bid is 
given by:
Pr:f:(p) = C?is - Pie d + i ) "  + tino t nit,] (4.4.1)
where:
j  Pis = price received on sale
1
\ P 1 e (1+i)v~l = mortgage originally transacted
tmo = proportion of mortgage paid off after t
periods
nm-t. = new mortgage amount (ex mortgage interest)
Obviously the household may choose to add savings (a function of income, 
length of working life completed, and wealth), but wealth stock 
equilibrium will be assumed here. For the individual who has already 
purchased his new house, the minimum reservation price that he can set 
for his old house is given as:
r P*(s) = [PieOl+i)" - tmo + C (bl) 1 (4.4.2)
where C(bl) is the cost of any bridging loan (i.e. C(bl) = Psl-b <l+i)ta, 
where P^b is the price of the new dwelling). It should be clear that
not all of the elements in these expressions will vary proportionately 
for all housing market actors. In particular, n will be shorter as the 
mortgagee ages, whilst i may vary considerably over the lifetime of a
i
mortgage. The mortgage given will be partly a function of the
i
individual's income and partly of the quality of the house being bid
j  "  '
for: its relationship to both of these will depend on the competition 
for [credit generally. Variations in these Building Society rules across 
the three dimensions of the housing market will be responsible for local 
fluctuations in market conditions. This will be especially evident in 
;ase of spatial or strata-based differences, which will result in 
the Ipossibility of local housing market failure or overheating. The
f
household's search and reservation bid price strategy is intended to 
locate and secure a property which minimises -m(p). Apart from choice 
of advertising medium, the household is passive as a seller and sets the 
reservation offer price to maximise m(s).
It is possible for individual's search fields to overlap even though
their migration fields display divergent directions. Vacancies located
in the intersection of two or more search fields will experience more
intensive search than those elsewhere, such that in any given time
period, they will be visited by more searching households and are more 
i '
likely to be sold. It follows that the information set of sellers 
located within such intersections will differ from those located 
elsewhere to the extent that such sellers rely upon the number of 
searchers as a guide to the magnitude and spatial location of demand. 
Throiigh a variety of processes, the final transacted price will be
\higher, tar any given vacancy, as the number of search fields that
i
include it increases. These processes are:
I (1) Prospective purchasers are made aware of the existence of 
j competition and submit higher offers than would otherwise be the
case.
(2) Housing market professionals are aware of the spatial pattern of 
demand and advise the seller to set a higher offer (i.e.
reservation) price.
It should be noted that there is no suggestion that the areas where 
search fields intersect have any differential worth. They are 
differently priced only because of the pattern of search fields. For 
any such .effect to persist, it is necessary that the search fields 
represent the market long run positions, and this will be determined by 
the relationship between the sources of mobility and search fields.
This in turn raises the issue of the mode of determination of search 
fields and their stability. . . .
4. .3. 4 The Determination of Search Fields
Thel search field of any given market actor will be determined by two 
factors: his preferences and his information set. The two will not be 
independent if the information set is incomplete. The cost of 
additional information will be a function of the distance separating 
origin and potential destination, but this function will not necessarily
nionotonically positive, although it should at least approximate such 
a iorm. The information set will also be affected by the frequency of 
transaction of the market actor, hence there will be an asymmetry of 
information between households contemplating a one-off move and 
specialist market agents; this is the reason for the use of such 
specialists in the majority of cases. It follows that when migration 
Ids have stabilised, the search fields will tend to coincide, in 
regate, with them. It is only when there is a necessity for 
ation fields to alter that search fields will adjust at different 
ds for different individuals. The catalyst for change will be that
agg
mig
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■properties on a selling agent's books will attract a higher price than 
was thought appropriate for a given area, due to the efforts of 
"pioneer" searchers. The information will gradually filter through to 
other agents and hence to subsequent market actors. It follows that the 
processes operating are (1), above, followed by (2) until equilibrium is 
restored. It is by no means clear that the time taken from the tension 
emerging in the pattern of migration fields to the full re-adjustment- of
search fields is short, and it will almost certainly be greater than the
i
time taken for one typical housing market transaction to be completed. 
Evidence is lacking, but the period may even be longer than the average
frequency of the underlying changes; consequently equilibrium may never
i
be achieved. In most of the models reviewed so far, it is assumed that 
the employment locations are given and fixed, and that search has
II
sufficient time to adjust; in the simulation models discussed in the 
firs); chapter, it is assumed that the effect of demand on prices is the
same for all houses of a given type and is instantaneously transmitted
to all sellers of such houses. In contrast, it is suggested here that
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in the transition to a new equilibrium it will be necessary for sellers 
to rely upon the numbers of searching households as a guide to the 
magnitude of demand, and that the rate at which this process occurs may 
be Sufficiently slow that a mismatch between migration fields and search 
fields is a general feature of the housing market. Depending upon the
speed of adjustment relative to the transaction time, (and the latter
i
will vary with a number of local and global parameters) there is a 
possibility of false trading given spatial search patterns of the form
described by Huff. loannides (1975) has analysed the dynamic search
i
process .for a dual market, where both buyers and sellers experience
I
uncertainty. He demonstrates that for successful exchange to occur, 
buyer's and seller's reservation prices must coincide and the market 
tenc.s towards a stochastic version of exchange equilibrium. This is 
valid provided no structural change occurs in the spatial configuration 
of the searching households; any change in this configuration alters the 
pattern of search costs and hence of effective house prices. A further 
complication arises if the housing market professionals base their own 
expectations of price levels an past transacted prices; any price 
discrepancies will tend to persist. These propositions are based on the 
fact! that housing is peculiar in three ways: it is a spatial good, it is 
infrequently transacted, and it is problematic to assess its quality.
All of these features are responsible for the existence of housing 
market agents who attempt to neutralise these features; such an attempt 
will be imperfect to some degree. Quantification of this degree will 
determine which of the two views of the housing market, stochastically 
perfect or chronically imperfect, is correct. The implication is that 
equilibrium may not exist per se, but only as a state towards which the
Tfl
rket tends. The role of the housing market professional is akin to 
at of the entrepreneur in the literature of the Austrian school.
It
ho
will consequently be necessary to examine in more detail the process 
housing price determination and adjustment, both for new and existing
jses, and this will be discussed in the next section. Two empiricalI
co:nments are appropriate at this stage. The first is that it is not
possible to determine, from migration fields alone, whether search
fields overlap. The second is that whilst most macroeconometric models
usi house price reduced forms, they contain no explicit mechanism for
altering prices; it is assumed that excess demand and supply are
immediately apparent and prices are adjusted accordingly. This
observation leads to the core proposition of this thesis: the 
! * *
macroeconomic effect on housing market activity of any given
macroeconomic stimulus depends on the relative spatial configuration of
iI
the| stimuli' s points of initial impact. In effect, this proposition is 
always true but its relevance is doubtful for highly aspatial systems. 
As the spatial element of the system being modelled increases, so does
the
4.4
importance of the proposition.
HOUSE PRICE DETERMINATION
4.4 I .The. Existing JIqus^-Market
In the UK (including, now, in Scotland) the dominant form of tenure is 
ownesr occupation. The primary source of second-hand houses offered for 
sale; is households who are simultaneously attempting to purchase another
property, either new or second hand. The price asked or the selling 
household's reservation price will usually be based upon a surveyor's
valuation; the price offered for a property will also bear some
! * "
relationship to this. Galt(1982) suggests that the price asked by an
owner-occupier will be a function of the prices of new houses, the 
.ces of other second hand houses, the orice of the house which the
i
isehoid intends to purchase, the valuation given by a housing' market 
professional, and the mortgage outstanding, as well as "other" demand
i
■tors. He also points out that the price offered for a given property 
1 reflect the individual's desire for it. It follows that it is in- 
interest of the seller to let it be known to all prospective
p n
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purchasers that there are other interested parties. It is also in the 
interest of the prospective purchasers to know of such interest, so that 
they can bid accordingly. It follows that the Scottish sealed bid 
system, where closing dates for offers are set and once accepted are 
legally binding, is an effective way of appropriating consumer’s 
surplus; this can be contrasted with the English system where 
"gazumping" is common. It is possible for consumer's surplus to be 
appropriated in the English system but it will be a more imperfect 
method of achieving this. The Scottish system resembles a multi-person 
game, with a payoff matrix as shown in Table 4.2. Given the constraint 
on the time of the seller's move in the English system, "gazumping" is 
far 'from.certain whereas in the Scottish system there is only, usually, 
one chance to bid; hence there is more certainty of each bidder
I
optimizing. In general, the more individuals there, are competing, the 
higher will be the eventual successful bid.
TABLE 4 .2  OWNER OCCUPIES BIDDING STRATEGIES
Household A
Others 
Bid High
Bid Hiffh Bid Low
Lose House 
Incur Extra Search Costs 
Save Excess Over Bid
Others 
Bid Low
Win House 
Lose Extra Bid
In the last section, the search effect on prices was analysed, whilst 
the process described here refers to the households who actually submit 
formal offers. Provided the information sets of searchers are complete, 
the sealed bid procedure should ensure an efficient allocation of houses 
to demanders. It has already been suggested that in the long run, the 
notional price distribution arising because of the search effect and the 
actual price distribution should coincide. It is likely that as the 
number of transactions per unit of area decreases, the divergence 
between the notional (asking) prices and the actual transacted prices, 
will increase. Hence the variance of outcomes increases as the density 
of agents decreases, and the urban areas will be the most efficient 
markets. The corollary to these propositions is that in equilibrium, 
the selling agent's valuation (V) and the transacted price (P) should 
coincide. Galt (1982) has drawn a distinction between (P - V) > 0  due 
to a particular individual's desire for a property and one which 
reflects a general scarcity premium.'
Ignoring structural considerations, a housing market professional will, 
in valuing a property, look at the transacted prices relative to
valuations of comparable properties in the same area. For example: 
"There are also examples of houses going well over the top, (sic) such
j
as an example in Edinburgh, valued at £33,000, and going for £41,000" 
RJCS News, 3 U'"' April 19S2
The valuer has to assess whether a transacted price greater than or less 
than the consensus valuation is due to random fluctuations (i.e. a 
particular individual's preference), or a general change in the pattern 
of| demand; the foregoing discussion suggests that prediction errors by-
valuers will be lower-in urban areas than elsewhere. The valuer will
I
alko have to distinguish between upturns which are spatially specific 
and broadly-based upturns in demand due to, say, a downturn in the' 
mortgage rate.
The role of the housing market professional is therefore that of an 
imperfect Walrasian auctioneer. Valuations are, however, usually based 
upon the ex post transaction prices of "comparable" properties, rather 
than on beliefs about future housing market activity based on mortgage 
rate changes, inflow of funds to Building Societies and other proxy 
meajsures which are used to capture expectations in macroeconometric 
models. It would appear that the mechanism whereby excess demand feeds 
thrjough to house price changes has two components; the first is 
successful bids in excess of valuations, the second is a revision of 
valuations on this basis. Whilst this process is fairly straightforward 
in the case of excess demand, the corollary is that in a falling market 
prices will be offered below valuations. It seems that there will be 
resistance to this by sellers, such that either the house will stay on
the market longer than normal, or the households will decide not to move 
at jail in the short term; hence local turnover will be reduced until the
supply/demand balance has been restored. There are two reasons for this.
i
thd first being that the marginal cost of privacy rises and that of 
overcrowding fails as the sale price decreases, the second being that
i
households do not face the same constraints operating on firms; it is
I
feasible for them not to sell at all without incurring fixed costs, 
other than the psychic ones mentioned above. it also implies that in a 
failing market, the optimum strategy is to sell the existing property 
first.
Hua (1972) suggests that prices will be set by individual sellers so as 
to maximise expected return. Any given price influences the expected 
selling time, so the expected return has to be discounted by the time 
lag, Cubbin (1974) also finds a positive relationship between price and 
selling time, although Galt (1982) draws attention to the Veblen role of 
Dries as an indicator of aualitv in a market where such knowledge is
i i.
costly tot obtain. In practice, either the asking price or the selling 
time may be viewed as a quality indicator; hence for the selling
hou: ahold, there is a fine balance to be achieved between asking a price
that is too high and one that is too low.
It follows that the first sign of a spatially or sectorally falling 
market will be increased selling times, fewer houses on the market, and 
reduced mobility. The situation when the entire market is falling will 
be more complex, depending on the differential rates of depreciation in
each strata, which may make mobility more attractive to some households.
For| falling house prices to reduce mobility generally, it is necessary 
for. the upper strata to depreciate more slowly; it is to be expected
that mobility rates will adjust in all strata such as to eliminate such
)
differences.
FIGURE 4.2 HYSTERESIS LOOP PRICE ADJUSTMENT
B r i c e
Excess
Demand
This implies that the pattern of house price adjustment will follow a
hysteresis loop, with the possibility of a discontinuity, as shown in 
Figure 4.2. This form is first suggested in Blank and Winnick (1953) 
with vacancies as the excess demand indicator. It is possible, albeit 
problematic, for it to be statistically estimated. It has already been 
seen in Chapter Three that price equations contain implicit assumptions 
about price adjustment processes; the linear or log-linear 
specifications chosen suggest that the embedded adjustment mechanism is 
also linear or log-linear. If hysteresis effects do operate, it follows 
that the standard adjustment mechanisms are inadequate in that they 
.assume that the effects of excess supply and demand on the market are 
symmetric. As will be seen, however, it is possible for hysteresis-type 
adjustments to occur within a linear framework
The problems of judging the state of the market when transactions are 
relatively infrequent has already been stated. There is a further
implication that when the absolute level of vacancies is very low, it
1
will take longer for excess demand to become apparent. In the limiting 
case, the only way in which concrete demand will be manifest is through
i
increased purchases of speculatively built houses, and it will be|
appropriate to turn to the supply and pricing of new houses.
4.4.2 The Housebuilding Industry
The standard view of the housebuilding industry is that of a perfectly 
competitive structure, and over the sample period of most 
macroeconometric models this is an adequate assumption. Ball (1984) has 
argued that 1973 was a watershed year for the industry with a number of
important changes occurring. The general downturn in house prices,
I
which had been built up in a speculative process, resulted in a wave of 
bankruptcies with a consequent centralization and concentration of the 
renalning firms. As a result, housing is no longer used as a residual 
activity engaged in by construction firms when their main markets are 
sla.ck; another reason for this is: "It is not possible to expand output
I
rapidly in private housebuilding; the most obvious limitation being the 
acquisition of a land bank" (Bail, p.49)
The tendency is for large construction firms to set up semi-autonomous
housebuilding subsidiaries.. Ball states: "The whole essence of
! .
speculation is to profit by spatting opportunities which have not 
already been discounted and incorporated by the market into price."
i
(smarts minus completions) are the indicator of commitments of new
capital, and that the rate of net starts will be determined by the
I
profitability of housebuilding, which will be heavily influenced by the 
land cost of a particular site. This implies that non-profit 
constraints, such as land release, do not affect building rates unless
i °
they indirectly reduce profitability. 'The modern housebuilder holds a
substantial land bank, which acts as a hedge against land price
increases. The fact that demand increases are capitalized into landA
price increases means that ideal sites may not be profitable, and hence 
the] builder will have to extract profit from apparently sub-optimal 
sites, through skilful marketing. Builders will also engage in counter­
cyclical land dealing to minimise the impact of land prices.
i
i • *
The;speculative nature of the industry means that the central problem 
for housebuilding firms is the management of a portfolio of risky 
assets. The risk associated with such assets is defined over the three 
housing market dimensions described previously, such that it can arise 
from temporal, spatial or stratum fluctuations in demand. The need to 
maintain flexibility means that the golden rule is to minimise the 
working capital committed to any given plot of land, and consequently 
sales rates, not prices, are the key concern. Small downturns in rates 
can have a significant impact on profitability.
The need for flexibility has been facilitated by the technological 
advance represented by timber frame construction. The locationally 
specific nature of housing is such that factory type production runs are
impassible, which precludes economies of scale. with prefabricated 
timber frame housing, internal plumbing and wiring can be installed 
before the brick wails are constructed, which permits minimisation of
I
idl<4 time for members of any one trade. This is further helped by 
vertical as apposed to horizontal building; construction follows a
quasi-production line process, with trades moving from one house to the 
next. The result is that in technical terms, a house can built "from
slab" in six to eight weeks. This has important implications for
I  /
macroeconometric models which use distributed lags on starts of up to
i
six Iquarters to explain building rates.
Most of the industries which supply housebuilders are highly monopolised 
with the result that cost increases are passed on. In an attempt to 
circumvent this, builders will clear extensive areas and lay the slabs 
well in advance of production, which has the advantage of reducing 
response time to demand upturns, by letting the labour force (generally 
employed via labour-only sub-contracting) know that more work is 
available for future contracts, which minimises re-hiring costs. These 
practices further undermine an aggregate starts-completions 
relationship.
At the margin therefore, housebuilders can respond very rapidly to 
increases in demand and it is the firm's speed of response rather than 
its pricing strategy which determines its overall profitability. Rapid 
response reduces the costs incurred (general building costs and interest
costs on borrowings tied up in land and buildings) and also reduces
opportunity costs arising when particular house types or spatial sectors
1 Q f\i i l l ;
show strong demand. It follows that pricing will not necessarily follow 
the perfectly competitive model.
4.;4.3 The Price of New Houses
Most empirical work on industrial pricing has suggested that firms use 
some variant of the average cost pricing rule detailed in Hall and Hitch
I
(1939), although Smyth (1967) suggests that some firms accept the market 
determined price and use their desired profit margin to set a target 
unit cost; this will tend to prevail in near-perfectly competitive 
markets. In the former case, the only way in which prices can respond 
to increased demand is if derived demand in the input goods industries 
creates bottlenecks and hence pushes up costs. This requires input 
producers to follow a different pricing strategy, relying on order book 
length as an indicator of excess demand. This description is valid for 
the housebuilding industry where input producers are monopolists or 
members of an oligarchy, whilst housebuilders have a more competitive 
structure. Hay and Morris (1979) have suggested that pricing behaviour
by producers can be classified according to a continuum from purely
pri
supply-based to purely-demand based. They argue that supply-based
2ing will predominate for new products, with demand-based pricing for
subsequent price changes. For the housebuilder, locational specificity 
means that each site is a new product.
Macroeconometric housing models effectively assume demand-based price 
setting; if prices were set on a cost-plus margin basis, then the model
j
of Whitehead (1974), which has new house prices and building costs
entered as separate regressors, will show near-perfecti - ■ '-1 1
II
multicoilinearity, whilst those of Mayes (1979) and Kad.j imatheou (1976), 
which use the ratio between the two, would find little variation in the 
series. In practice there is some variation, so that a purely cost- 
based pricing strategy is unlikely.
I
\
The literature on industrial pricing is extensive. Econometric work 
(e.g. Eckstein and Fromm (1963), Brownlie (1965), McFetridge (1973), and 
Ripley and Segal (1973)) has attempted to distinguish between supply and
demand based determinants. The indicators of demand include the ratio
1i
of Unfilled orders to average sales volume, the ratio of inventory to 
sales, an inventory change dummy and the degree of capacity utilisation. 
In one ingenious model, McCalium (1970) uses present and future period 
labour market excess demand on the reasoning that this will lag behind 
product market excess demand; hence the current value proxies cost 
increases whilst the future value proxies demand increases. These 
models have achieved mixed results with the main conclusion being that 
demand influences are difficult to identify. The reason for this is 
that a variety of non-price responses are possible in the short run, 
primarily in the form of changes in the length of order books and 
changes in inventories. These act as buffers against demand 
fluctuations and so reduce costs. Price changes may also be disguised 
by product changes or marketing techniques, such as discounts.
It follows that the pricing and marketing strategy will vary for 
different markets and products, and in the housing market three features 
are (critical: The spatial dimension creates extreme product
heterogeneity (supply based pricing), the level of demand is highly 
uncertain in ail three housing market dimensions, and the cost of 
holding inventories is prohibitively high. These latter two factors
I *
will tend to militate against aggressive supply based pricing. There 
is, 1 further, the large existing stock whose price is outwith the control
of firms.
I
This combination of factors implies that the optimum pricing strategy is 
one!which aims for a fixed minimum price-cost margin, with the response
to ixcess demand or supply being variation in the package marketed (i.e..
}
manipulation of costs); the firm has to choose between longer delivery 
times or higher prices, each of which has attendant risks of alienating 
potential customers. Ball (1984) has suggested that housebuilding firms 
will shift the emphasis of their production depending on the state of 
the market, moving into higher market strata in booms and lower in 
slumps, with consequent effects on pricing. In booms, the higher market 
strata will offer higher margins, partly because the apparent quality of 
the dwelling can be altered at little additional cost. Ball states: 
"Whajt is important are features that create an image for a dwelling and 
so fix the subsector in which it will sell. There need be no relation 
between the production costs of these image features and the additional 
prices at which the houses are sold. Some, in fact, cost less than the 
lower market alternative." (Ball, p.141)
Ball also suggests that marketability is little influenced by plot size 
(within obvious limits). Therefore the goal of profit maximisation is 
served by maximising sales per time period and dwellings per unit of
rid. Higher prices in upmarket sectors are therefore part of the 
marketing package. To an extent, the institutionalised relationship 
between major builders and Building Societies allows the builder to ease 
thje impact of prices on the consumer by varying credit terras. Pricing 
will be constrained by the need to ride out demand downturns; in such 
circumstances, explicit price cuts are unlikely and will instead be 
represented by inducements, such as furniture, at a negligible cost to 
thfe builder. This strategy minimises the "regret" felt by previous 
customers, particularly those on the same site. The more common 
technique is that suggested by Karris (1978), where low prices are used 
as a means of inducing "pioneers" into the new product market (i.e. the 
new housing development). Subsequent movers-in may be charged higher 
prices once the new development has been accepted.
4.4.4 I n t e r a c t i o n s  Between The Kew And Existing Markets
The foregoing discussion suggests that the prices of new houses may be 
an inadequate guide to short term market pressure. The existence of a 
large stock of secondhand housing will act as a regulator on new house
prices. This does, however, have to be reconciled with Ball's evidence
i
that since 1973, new house prices have led those of existing properties. 
Buckley and Ermisch (1983) argue that new supply will occur provided the 
prices of existing dwellings are above building costs. This view has 
two corollaries; firstly that the prices of the existing stock leads new 
house prices, and secondly that a fall in the average level of existing 
house prices below the new building cost level will result in new supply
fall ing to zero. Clearly these writer's views are diametrically
opposed, although each draws on sound evidence. In practice the 
question of which series leads and which lags probably varies across the 
space and market strata, depending on the similarity of the new and 
existing house types in each. It is possible to argue that the relative 
increase in concentration in the housebuilding industry after 1973 
implies the coexistence of two different types of price setting. The 
numerous small builders, with output of about ten dwellings per annum, 
will have to be aware of the overall market state when pricing their 
product,and market prices are outwith their control. The few large 
bui|lders will have a view to long term profit maximisation and pricing( -i -
i -i ■
will be only one element of their marketing strategy. Indeed, Ball has 
argued that the factors which influence housing market activity in 
general need not lead to house price changes at ail; whether they do or 
not will depend on their impact on housing market interlinkages. Ball 
also points tG the flow of funds into and out of the system; for 
example, a given injection of funds into the system may facilitate a 
large number of transactions but will only affect prices if funds leak 
elsewhere, as in the case of a purchase of a new property. Hot all of 
the funds leaving the system will necessarily re-enter. Also, if a 
household is trading down to a lower market stratum, the re-injection of 
funds will not necessarily be as large as the withdrawal.
4,5 CQHCLUSIQHS
In Chapter Two, the analysis of the vacancy model showed that it. 
effectively inverts the market process, such that the creation of
vacancies drives the market. What has been shown in this chapter is
I
that depending on market conditions, it can be optimal for households to 
only buy when they have sold their existing dwelling, or vice versa and 
consequently the key determinant of housing market activity may be the 
numtier of first time buyers willing and able to initiate chains of 
moves, or the number of new properties made available for sale by
i
housebuilders. The following table summarises these propositions:
TABliE 4.3 MARKET DETERMIHAHTS
MARKET TYPE
Seller 
in ii 
moving
4. I-to 0
Pi > P.] 
Pi < Pj
STRATEGY KEY DETERMIHAHT
a >
<2>
new houses in j
new households in i
demonstrates the inadequacy of the vacancy model in a.marketThis
environment.
i
The next chapter formalises the notions of spatial market- segregation, 
temporal lags, and volume based (as opposed to price based) behaviour
into a regional model
CHAPTER FIVE 
A REGIONAL MODEL (II) 
THE FORMAL STRUCTURE
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5. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters have reviewed the existing literature on housing 
market models, which have been seen to differ in aggregation level,
methodology and underlying assumptions. It has also been shown that 
space is important to housing markets because of gross price (transport 
cost) and search effects. As the UBER-HUDS model has demonstrated, 
there does not appear to be an easy solution to capturing the complexity 
of urban market phenomena; that model represents the state-of-the-art in 
modelling a metropolitan area. By contrast, the Buckley and Ermisch 
model is the state-of-the-art for macroeconometric housing models. In 
constructing a regional model, the form used will borrow from each of 
these approaches, but this leaves the question of the point of 
departure: "top-down" or "bottom-up". On the premise that simplicity is 
always to be preferred to complexity, the macro approach will be taken 
as the benchmark.
5.2 FUNCTIONAL FORM OF THE MODEL
I
The general form to be used is:
Qd-t. - fd ( Pt. , Z\ t ) (5. 1)
Qist - f® ( Pt. , Z^ t. ) (5.2)
AP t--*-1 — f x: ( Qdt. , Qsit. ) (5.3)
An aisernative xorui is to w r m e (5.1) and (5.2) as:
QcH;. “ t.;-J ( P t- . 2 I t, , Qis- ( 5 . 1 . 1 )
Q'~i t — t«» ( C t- » A St.. i (5.2.1)
Thi$ reflects tiie possibility of quantity rationing not reflected in 
pride; this latter form only really becomes relevant unon further 
disaggregation.
As demonstrated in Chapter Three, a macro model might estimate (5.1) and 
(5.2) with a technical link between the two. For the model used here,
this
. CtS L
technical link is eschewed on the grounds that, as argued in the 
chapter, the modern building industry suffers from few such
technical lags. Some macro models estimate a version of (5.3). which 
removes the need for structural estimation. Although general functional 
forms are given here, the usual specification is linear or log-linear, 
and obviously other forms such as semi-log are possible. In order to 
fix ideas, the model will be analysed in linear form, although the 
results hold for log-linear equations. To yield the regional model, the 
thre^ structural market equations are re-written in matrix form:
Qd-t — AP t- ■+• Z11. Mi (5.4)
t t, — BP t, f - (5.5)
AP-t-M - —f [ Q®t. — Qdt. ] (5.6)
where ;Qdt and Qst are n*'l vectors of quantities demanded and supplied, 
respectively, at the prevailing n*l price vector, Ft... A and g are n+n 
matrices of slope coefficients (elasticities in the log-linear model). 
Z-ijt. and Z:st are n*k vectors of exogenous variables a n d T  is an n*n 
matrix of market adjustment speeds. hh and H-s are k*i vectors of
i
exogenous variable coefficients -
I
5.2.1 The A Matrix
l
, I '
The matrix A cantures the way in which demand substitution occurs in
1
response to price changes; hence if utility functions are well-behaved 
and housing is a normal good, it will follow that:
aii )• 0
a u  ( 0  V i * j
It should be noted that unlike a linear expenditure system, where 
Slutsky symmetry is imposed, it will generally be the case that:
ai.i ^ a.i i
This means that if the product categories can be used as the
basic units of analysis, then the effect of an increase in the price of 
product i on demand for j is not necessarily the same as the effect of 
an increase in the price of product j on the demand ford. This might
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occur if, for example, there exist a number of substitutes for j of 
which only one is i, whilst j is the only substitute for i.
This inequality only holds when the goods in question are consumed in 
discrete quantities and consumption of one category implies non- 
consumption of the other, as is the case with housing markets. In 
particular, it holds when the products are distinguished by their 
spatial location and the a* j coefficients reflect, in part, distances. 
These n elements represent spatial areas and the a±j reflect not.
only distance but also similarity (and hence substitutability) of house 
types. In the absence of a Walrasian auctioneer, numbers demanding must 
be interpreted as the number of households searching.
5.2 j 2 The B Matrix
The bi± and b u  elements capture the substitution in production of 
houses in different areas in response to price changes throughout the 
system. Whilst this applies primarily to housebuilders, it also 
includes existing owner-occupiers who may be prompted to move because 
local house prices provide a profitable opportunity to "trade up" to a 
preferred house type. This latter process will imply links between 
areas which offer such similar products. For housebuilders, spatial 
subsititutability will depend on the amount of land currently 'available 
and on local authority policies on planning permission, as well as on 
housebuilders' own views of market structure.
It follows that these coefficients will take the form:
bi i ? 0
btj S O
This latter, the cross-elasticity in a loglinear formulation, is 
ambiguous as to sign since rising prices in one area may signal 
potential demand in similar areas elsewhere. For this study it will be 
assumed that builders do not attempt to second guess the market in this 
way. It is arguable, in the light of the discussion in the last 
chapter, that builders will show little supply response to price; hence 
these coefficients primarily capture the behaviour of existing owner- 
occupiers who can only supply one area at a time.
i
5.21.3 The r Matrix
This matrix is of crucial importance to the operation of the regional 
housing system. It reflects the way in which prices respond to market 
conditions, and in particular the behaviour of housing market 
professionals acting as Walrasian auctioneers. It assumes that the 
housing market professional can correctly assess the degree of excess 
demand and supply mismatch prevailing in his own area or product line, 
and adj'usts price recommendations and valuations as appropriate. If T 
is indeed diagonal, this is equivalent to suggesting that each area or 
product group has its own speed of adjustment independent of other 
areas. This will be invalid if any valuers look at other areas as a
basis for valuing their own, and to some extent this must occur if price 
changes are to be diffused throughout a region; effectively it is a 
sufficient but not a necessary condition for such diffusion. In the 
Artis et al (1975) model discussed in Chapter Three it was assumed that 
there is one y parameter for the entire national housing market. Given 
the absence of one co-ordinator, this is a restrictive assumption 
especially when applied to such a large spatial area containing a 
variety of house types. As the spatial area reduces, or the homogeneity 
of house types increases, the suitability of a single y parameter is ' 
increased.
5.3 MARKET DYNAMICS
The equation system (5.4) - (5.6) can be solved by writing:
= -rt BPt, + Zst.fc + AP„ - Zi t.Mi 3 
=) Pt-M = - r e  (B+A)Pt + ZatMa - ZTtM -1 3 + IP* (5.7)
In equilibrium:
(B+A)-1 [Z1t.M-f - Zat-Ma] = P (5.8)
which exists non-trivially iff (B+A)- '1 exists. 1
(5.7) is a system of simultaneous difference equations with solution : 
Pt/.= P + C I - T (B+A) 3 C Po - P3 (5.9)
To simplify matters consider the polar case where B = [ 03 and there is a
single V parameter. The elements of the A matrix represent the deterrent
effect of price changes on the two components of demand, new households 
and relocating households.
It will be seen that for stability it- is necessary that:
iaj.,1 > Ii£j iaijl for all j (5.10)
That is, if the price of i rises, at least some households are dissuaded 
from demanding at all, and only a subset■spatially substitute their 
demand. This in turn implies that no perfect substitutes for j exist. 
Consequently the dissuaded households decide not to change their 
residence, and either do not form a new household or else do not move 
from their existing owner-occupied house.
This model has a direct analogue with that of Alonso (1981). In the 
Alonso theory of movements, the actual number of in-movers to any area 
compared with the potential number is given by:
Cj**
  (5.11)
Cj
A actual in-movers
.3   =
A potential in-movers
where j3j is the elasticity of inmavers to j with respect to congestion 
at j. A similar notion in the model presented here is given by:
AQdj APj ajj
j3j = ---------------  = -------   (5.12)
APj A(Qdj-Qsj) "(ajj-bjj)
Hence Alonso's model subsumes the market process in the single 
parameter, £j .
The model presented here has some important implications for the Blank 
and Winnick (1957) model, the Artis et al (1975) model, and for 
macroeconometric models in general. The implications for 
macroeconometric models are central to this thesis, but the other two 
considerations are closely related. As already discussed, Blank and 
Winnick (1957) suggested that housing market adjustment fallows a 
hysteresis loop. The reasoning is that rents only adjust to excess ' 
demand or supply with a lag, after a corresponding fall or rise in the 
vacancy rate.
In a simple one product, one region model, the market difference 
equation solution is given as:
Ft = C 1 - V (b+a) 1 l- CP,, - P] + P (5.13)
In order for a difference equation with this solution to yield the 
pattern in price/excess demand space shown in Figure 5. 1, it is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition that:2
2
* = --- <5. 14)
b+a
The pattern is not a hysteresis loop with the sharp points of Blank and 
Winnick, but will tend to be circular.
The skewed appearance would result if price adjustments were only 
carried-out infrequently (e.g. estate agent valuations) such that 
alternates in value between t and 0. A number of other well known cases 
are possible and are set out in Figure 5.2
FIGURE 5.1 CYCLICAL MARKET ADJUSTMENT.
Prices 
or Price 
Changes
x*o
Excess Demand 
(Vacancy Changes)
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IGURE 5.2 DYNAMIC PRICE BEHAVIOUR
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Source: Chiang (1974)
The Blank and Vinnick model is thus one of a family which can be 
classified according to the value of X relative to a and b. It is 
curious that of the three parameters which together describe the nature 
of the housing market, the greatest research effort has been devoted to 
evaluating a, with less attention focused on b, and only two models 
(Fair and Jafee (1972) and Artis et al (1975)) attempting to measure X . 
These two models contain an error in construction; both correctly take 
the upper value of X to be infinity, and both calculate the speed of 
adjustment by calculating the parameter — 1/Y , arguing that as it tends 
towards zero, X tends towards infinity and hence prices adjust faster. 
Both models extrapolate from here, however, to suggest that a value of 
1/X not significantly different from zero (i.e. a value of X tending to 
infinity) implies that equilibrium is attained within the time period. 
The correct test of this hypothesis requires i/(b+a) - x . Values 
of X which are greater than or equal to 2 / (b+a) imply some degree of
instability and oscillation; as X increases relative to 2 / (b+a), ■ 
the implication is that equilibrium is not attained, due to explosive
oscillation. This problem arises because it is the value of X relative
to 1/b+a which is important, not the absolute value of K. It follows
that even if the Artis et al results are correct, their interpretation
(that the UK housing market adjusts to clear the market within one
quarter) is not.
The two models mentioned above assume a uniform X , but if speeds of 
adjustment vary across markets, then stability conditions became more 
complex. It is necessary for the matrix C I - T(B+A) ]T  to tend towards 
zero as t tends towards infinity; if the eigenvalues of this matrix lie
within the unit circle then the system will be stable. This will in
general be the case if the matrix T (B.+A) has a dominant diagonal, such
that:
Id.,.,! > Ei^j I di. j I for all .j
where di., is an element of the matrix T (B+A). In this case, T (B+A) is a 
form of Metzler matrix (Takayama (1985,p.366,note 3)>.
It can also be shown that macroeconometric models in general place 
important restrictions on the multi-product or multi-region model 
described here. To illustrate this, consider the n*l vector AZ as 
representative of the distribution of some source of additive exogenous 
change. Let i be an n*l vector of units. It follows that the total 
exogenous change in the system is irAZ. The average house price 
prevailing after the exogenous change (assuming homogenous structures) 
is iTP/n. A macroeconometric model is spatially invariant iff iTP/n is 
the same for all AZ conditional upon iTAZ being unchanged.
As a specific example, consider the employment vector:. : -
Zi = EG(I - G)-1f (5.15)
where f is a vector of final demand changes, 8 is labour intensity, G is
a matrix of input-output coefficients, and E is the matrix of relative 
proportions of persons employed in each area. In the absence of formal
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housing submarket linkages it is still possible for apparent links to 
exist due to a high correlation of G and E.
As will be seen, the property of spatial invariance with respect to 
exogenous change places a number of restrictions on the (B+A) matrix. 
These restrictions are one of the following:3
1) (B+A) is diagonal and 0 :i.i = 0jj for all i,j, where 
.1
bii+aii
2> (B+A) is such that all of the following are simultaneously true:
i) 9 i i = 0 j j ;
ii) 0 1,i = 0 ji = Si+kj + i conditional on i+k * j+1 , i t j for all k , 1 ;
iii) 0 ij * 0 it;
iv) 0 x i, 0 1 ,j > 0
3) (B+A) is a block diagonal form of 2), above.
In these latter cases, each diagonal element or block is a submarket and 
is linked to all other submarkets by identical parameters. Each of 
these conditions ensures that the average price will be spatially 
invariant with respect to any given exogenous change. In the case of 1) 
and 2 ) it also ensures that the equilibrium price vector, if it exists, 
will be spatially invariant. If it is not possible to choose n so as to 
diagonalise or block diagonalise the matrix, then there are no 
independent submarkets and the off-diagonal elements represent submarket 
linkages.
2 0 0
5 .4  TRANSLATION TQ PRACTICE: THE ' W MATRIX
The submarket linkages represented by the off-diagonal elements of (B+A)
may arise for a number of reasons such as:
1) Proximity of i and j
2) Similarity between i and j in terms of house type
3) Similarity between i and j in terms of employment structure
4) Some other form of socio-economic similarity between i and j
5) Some combination of l)-4).
Provided the nature of the linkages is known, or can be hypothesised, 
then under some restrictive assumptions it is possible to represent 
(B+A) by a matrix of weights, W, which is determined by the spatial 
structure of the system. In the weights matrix representation, it is 
assumed that:
a^j = awij for all i*j, l± w.u  = 1 (5.16.1)
If housing is homogeneous, w :). .1 represents friction of distance between 
discrete spatial areas, whilst a represents the slope coefficient on 
prices or the price elasticity of demand, depending on whether a linear
or log-linear formulation is used. It is possible for the weights to be 
highly flexible in construction; they- can for example correct for 
heterogeneity between spatial units using the gravity formulation 
reviewed in Chapter Two. A key problem in applying a weights matrix 
simplification is not the social heterogeneity of spatial units per se, 
but rather their topological heterogeneity. This is not a problem when 
using temporal data, which relate to regular intervals and hence 
different orders of lag are comparable. When considering a spatial 
system it is not always feasible to distinguish between two orders of 
spatial lag; Figure 5.3 gives an example.
Here it is not clear whether areas 1 and 3 are first order or second 
order lagged; they are, effectively, both. The solution to this problem 
proposed by Blommestein (1985) is to represent higher order lags by 
powering the V matrix and setting its diagonals to zero. Hence the a u  
coefficients would be related as:
Provided that the initial ¥ matrix represents first order contiguities, 
this approach yields the appropriate higher order weights. It does, 
however, incorporate two crucial and related assumptions about the
distance increases, any effect diminishes so that the closest areas are 
the most important. The second assumption is that the spatial process 
is continuous, acting across the plane without any discontinuity. This 
means that areas which are first and second order lagged have their
a tj = aw.t.j
a u - i  = a Zi w u  Wji
(5.16.2)
spatial process which is operating. The first assumption is that as
EIGUR£_5, 3 IRREGULAR SPATIAL UNITS
Source: Bennett (1979)
effects double counted to some.extent. This is inappropriate if some 
effects at higher orders of lags are direct or nonexistent, rather than 
gradually declining. This is particularly a problem if contiguous 
districts display extreme heterogeneity since such districts are 
unlikely to interact, but appropriately specified weights should correct 
for such heterogeneity. In practical applications, the effect of 
differing weights is often outweighed by the simple presence or absence 
of contiguity. This is, however, an econometric point and will be 
discussed later. It is passible to use the ¥ matrix to test a number of 
hypotheses simply by varying its structure and this is a separate class 
of hypotheses to those which take the spatial structure as given and 
assess the significance of different members of the regressor set. In 
practice, these hypothesis tests are not independent. A distinction 
will be made here between general and specific spatial hypotheses; one 
applying to spatial structure, the other to particular regressors. The 
latter will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, whilst attention 
here will focus on general effects, and three areas are of interest:
1) The magnitude of spatial effects (the order of the spatial process)
2) The extent to which housing is homogeneous, and the degree of 
congruence between such homogeneity and the homogeneity of spatial 
areas
3) The division of the housing market into independent or quasi­
independent spatial submarkets, and the relationship between this and 
the heterogeneity problem.
5.4..1 The Magnitude of Spatial Effects
In the last chapter, it was suggested that four types of searchers 
operate in the housing market: active (newly formed households), passive 
(housebuilders or absentee owners), and those who are both (existing 
owner occupiers who wish to move). It is the spatial search fields of 
these market actors which will determine the magnitude of spatial 
effects. Housebuilders are most likely to take a national perspective, 
although there will be a major difference between local and national 
companies. Despite the existence of such a perspective, many builders 
will face land zoning or land bank constraints on their cross price 
elasticity of supply. In the short run, therefore, B is likely to be 
diagonal or block diagonal depending on the units chosen.
Hew households and existing owner occupiers will demonstrate 
considerable variety in their search field sizes depending on the 
reasons for their move; thus for an existing owner occupier who is 
changing jobs to a new location active search will occur around the new 
location and passive search at the old, providing a farm of spatial 
interaction between the two locations. In order to classify the 
different scales of spatial activity depending on each market actor and 
their motives, the taxonomy in Table 5 .1 is proposed.
It follows from this that each market actor will have a different scale 
of operation between and within areas depending on the opportunity cost 
of search, which in turn implies a separate A matrix for *each set of 
market actors based on variation in both of the constituent elements of
TABLE 5 ,1  SPATIAL BEHAVIOUR OF MARKET ACTORS
Determinants 
of Spatial 
Behaviour
Form of 
Spatial 
Interaction
New Households Proximity 
to existing 
employment
Low price
Contiguous 
- within 
travel-to- 
work area
Local Movers 
(Housing 
Related)
Proximity 
to existing 
employment
Suitable for 
trading up
Contiguous 
- within 
travel-to- 
work area
Non-local
Movers
(Employment
Related)
Proximity to 
new employment
Similar house ?
Similar SEG 
profile
Housebuilders Land availability 
Size of firm 
Intended market
Depends on 
market and 
size of firm
the right hand side of (5.16.1). At any given destination, the density 
of housing will, ceteris paribus, determine opportunities for 
substitution. Separation between job locations will vary depending on 
the occupation of the householder, assuming that the move does not 
coincide with a radical change in occupational status. In general, the 
higher up the occupational scale, the higher the spatial scale of job 
related moves. This is severely affected by the status of particular 
labour markets and by the macroeconomic environment prevailing.
Figure 5.4 (from Bennett(1979)) shows the variety of spatial processes 
which can exist. Spatial processes may be time-like or space-like; the 
more unidirectional the process, the more time-like (hierarchy, 
unilateral) whilst space-like fallow contiguity or multidirectional 
patterns. Between these polar cases are barrier processes and network 
or bilateral processes. It seems likely that all of these processes are 
operating in the housing market simultaneously which is one of the main 
reasons for its formidable complexity, as evidenced by the variety of 
approaches adapted in the models reviewed in the first three chapters. 
Rosenthal (1984b) investigates the hypothesis that the behaviour of 
house prices in Great Britain follows a unilateral process with London 
and the South East as the only source generating dissemination of price 
behaviour as a wave throughout the British planning regions. He uses 
time series data on prices and employs spectral analysis to assess the 
gain, phase, and coherence properties of the time series for each 
region. The results do not support a unilateral process on such a macro 
scale. From the point of view of this thesis, the important result is 
that Scotland appears to be distinct from the rest of Britain in terms
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of phase and coherence'1', suggesting that Scotland's housing market is 
largely independent of the rest of Britain. Some of the reasons for 
this will be discussed in'the next chapter. The Rosenthal study does 
not offer any explanation for why a unilateral contiguity process is 
expected rather than any other. In the light of the discussion of 
valuation practices in the last chapter, it might be supposed that the 
South East being the area of highest per capita income acts as a house 
price leader and provides a benchmark for other surveyors and valuers. 
This in turn implies that information dissemination is also a unilateral 
process. It is possible that a wave can be set up by very high demand 
for housing in the London area; this would be associated with the 
financial community, raising prices to the point where those earning 
incomes which are low by London standards but high relative to other 
parts of the country substitute commuting time for housing costs, thus 
bidding up prices elsewhere. Such a scenario links housing markets in 
Britain indirectly with those of other countries through a hierarchy 
process. It seems likely that hierarchy processes will particularly be 
associated with employment based housing market activity, especially to 
the extent that the economic influences on the spatial location of 
companies are strong. This is the counterpart to the employment change 
matrices described earlier in the chapter.
It is possible that the South East represents a "growth pole" which sets 
up a diffusing wave of economic activity with the housing market 
responding passively to changes in employment and real incomes. It will 
tend to be the case that large spatial units cannot distinguish between
hierarchy and unilateral processes or indeed between any of the 
processes shown in Figure 5.4
In the last chapter,it was suggested that workplace dominance will link 
most housing market activity to employment nodes; hence any stimulus to 
the economy will generate housing market activity as a hierarchy spatial 
process albeit with an additional random component. It follows that 
different local economic stimuli will be occurring simultaneously 
depending on the form of macroeconomic stimulus applied. Search 
activity associated with relocation will provide links between affected 
nodes and transport costs will mean that location decisions are 
constrained by transport networks. In general therefore, the diffusion 
of housing market activity will approximate a hierarchy process at the 
regional level, and an imperfect network process at the local level. 
Barrier processes will operate on coastlines and against rivers and 
mountains, to the extent that these topographical features also hinder 
transport network development.
All of these processes can be approximated by a contiguity process, 
particularly if lags of greater than first order are used. The 
approximation will be more valid the greater the size of spatial units 
used relative to the spatial scale of the hierarchy and network 
processes, and the more that the boundaries of spatial units correspond 
to economic units or to physical barriers. The contiguity process is 
particularly amenable to the weights matrix formulation, which will be 
used extensively in the empirical section of this study.'
5.4.2 Housing -Homogeneity
In Chapter One, it was seen that the homogeneity or heterogeneity of 
housing could be addressed according to the existence of single "units 
of housing service" or multiple characteristics. The characteristics 
approach can be represented by an n*k binary matrix C of house types by 
characteristics. A specific house consists of varying proportions of 
each characteristic. The hedonic price approach assumes that there 
exists a vector of characteristic prices, v, which yields house prices 
through multiplication by the appropriate quantities of each 
characteristic. Such an approach assumes that a single v exists due to 
arbitrage across house types. This requires the existence of suitable 
opportunities for trading up to occur, but as has been demonstrated in 
the last chapter, the structure of households compared with the 
structure of available housing may obstruct the necessary arbitrage. 
Maclennan (1985) uses factor analysis to split the housing stock into 
internally homogeneous product groups, and examines variation in 
characteristic prices within product groups when there exists more than 
one spatial location for such a product group. Clustering to create 
internally homogeneous areas is inevitable, given peer group effects and 
historical evolution. This will in addition be responsible for the 
segmentation of particular annuli into smaller areas as the pattern of 
urban development and economic activity changes through time. At the 
highly local scale, builders will prefer to have identical house types 
within one development, in part to capture economies of scale discussed 
in Chapter Four. The congruence between homogeneous house types and the 
market homogeneity of spatial areas rests upon the force of arbitrage to
smooth, the apparent discontinuities which exist between the prices of 
different house types and create, instead, a unified market.
5.4.3 Spatial Submarkets
5.4.3.1 Horizontal Classification
Heterogeneity and vertically fragmented markets imply that there exist a 
number of strata which are independent unless interaction occurs in the 
form of a household move from one strata to another. Hence there is a 
low degree of inter-house type interaction, but a high degrree of 
spatial interaction. The validity of this classification can be 
investigated by comparing the explanatory power of employment related 
variables with that of housing related.
SLA. 3^ .2 Vertical Classification
Employment centres are surrounded by various house types which together 
provide a network capable of supporting a housing "career". Hence there 
is a high degree of inter-house type interaction, and a low degree of 
spatial interaction. The validity of this classification can be tested 
by examining the significance of spatial lags, provided that the 
spatial units used are sufficiently large.
In practice the relevant split in importance between inter-house type 
effects and spatial interaction will depend on the zonal* boundaries 
chosen; this effect is analogous to the process of attempting to
diagonalise the (B+A) matrix. To illustrate this, consider an arbitrary 
number of spatial areas, nl, with arbitrarily chosen boundaries. Let 
the specific set chosen be designated Sl=(si...snl>. The problem of 
diagonalising the (B+A) matrix consists of finding a set S*, such that 
each and every element of S* is an independent submarket. In practice 
the choice of sets is constrained by the data available; for example, 
census enumeration areas which can be built up into fewer, larger 
spatial units. Maclennan's. approach employs the weak assumption that 
for any given product group, the minimum spatial market size is greater 
than the census enumeration area size. Consider the case where each 
spatial unit corresponds with an internally homogeneous product group. 
The number of submarkets will be greater than, less than, or equal to 
this number, and each relation yields a particular form for the W 
matrix. Let S be the set of submarkets with elements representing 
spatial areas and let P be the set of product groups with elements 
representing spatial areas. The three cases are as follows:
1) S > P ; limiting case : W = [ 03 =) Mo interaction.
2) S < P ; limiting case : V = 0 1 ... 1
1 0  1 . . . 1 
: 1 0  1 . 1 
1 , . 1 0 1
.1. . . . 1 0
Perfect interaction 
across space and 
product groups
A subset of 2) is the macroeconometric assumption which uses the true 
vertical classification; interaction is high across spatially 
contiguous areas even with different product groups, but low across non­
contiguous areas.
3) b = P ; limiting case: V structure determined by spatial 
contiguity of product groups (Horizontal classification).
It is possible, however, that the data used are so constrained that in), 
the set of observations is such that In) > P , {n> > S . <n> : P
In) < b , in).= P and (n> = '3 . are all possible. Given such
constraints, it is only possible to test a subset of hypotheses about 
spatial structure, by making assumptions about P relative to S . 
Consider case 3), 3 = P = in*}. It is possible to test:
-Cn'G > in) (spatial model)
in*) ( in) (aspatial model) (5.17)
by comparing spatial and non aspatial models. Such a comparison would 
need to assume correct regression specification and test for lags alone. 
It is possible, however, to investigate hypotheses about S relative to P 
by experimenting with different regressors or splitting dependent 
variables into groups. This results in the now familiar problem of 
which step comes first - choice of lags or of regressors ? Without any 
obvious rule, experimentation must be broad based whilst conclusions are 
tentative.
5 ,5  SPECIFICATION. METHODOLOGY AND TECHNIQUE
*
Thus far, three related specification problems have emerged. These are:
1) Interdependence of V choice with other aspects of specification
2) Interdependence of lag length choice with other aspects of 
specification
3) Linearity against non-linearity.
The first problem arose in the discussion of specific spatial 
hypotheses, the second concerns general spatial hypotheses. As has been 
seen, however, constraints on data availability render these hypotheses 
interdependent. A fourth problem is the possibility of simultaneity of 
determination if, in response to data constraints or absence of 
knowledge about S relative to P, the model uses a number of dependent 
variables. Table 5.2 summarises the questions of specification, where 
bi-directional arrows indicate that no order of priority can be assigned 
to the choice of each aspect of' specification.
5_,.5, 1 Spatial Lags
Blommestein (1985) has utilised the general-to-specific methodology of 
Sargan (1964) and Hendry and Mizon (1978) and applied it to spatial 
specification questions.
2 1 b
TABLE 5 .2  SPECIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS
CHOICE OF REGRESSORS
Specific regressor:
Spatially lagged
Dependent variables
Jointly dependent 
variables
LINEARITY/ NOR- LI REAR ITY
Linear/log-linear
Box-Cox
Inherently
non-linear
SPATIAL DYNAMICS
Number of lags
Dependence on form 
of spatial process
STRUCTURE OF V
Weights construction
Ron-zero elements
Normalization 
contains implicit 
assumptions about 
the form of 
spatial process
This method involves estimating a model with as many lags as degrees of 
freedom will allow:
Y  =  X jB !  +  V X .B S  +  W2X.B3 + . . . + V n X . B r , - ! (5.13)
Likelihood-ratios are used to sequentiallly test the hypotheses pn = 0
j3,-> = 3vv- I = 0 .3 0 .
This is the Universally Most Powerful (UMP) technique. In applications, 
the nresent author has found the technique to be too powerful with strong 
collinearity between the V iXbj. terms precluding any meaningful 
interpretation. It seems that in practice, spatial lags of order 
greater than 2 cannot be used. A formulation of the type given in 
(5.18) contains a spatial first-difference model as a special case, if 
lagged dependent variables are included as a regressor. If dependent 
and independent variable lags can be represented by lag polynomials A(L) 
and B(L), then if:
has a common factor polynomial y (L), autocorrelation of the system's • 
disturbances represents a simplication. This is the general spatial lag 
version of the specific time series case discussed in Chapter Three.
The advantage in using a formulation such as (5.19) is that, provided
A(L)Y = B(L)X + U (5.19)
and
A (L)-1 B (L) (5.20)
the equation is specified correctly (sufficient lags and regressors , 
suitable linearity/non-linearity) OLS or 2SLS can be used without 
inconsistency. The fundamental but linked problem with spatial data is 
one of simultaneity of determination between data points, rather than 
between variables. This bidirectional autocorrelation can be detected 
by a variety of means (Cliff and Ord (1981)) either informally (e.g. 
visual) or formal (the Moran I-statistic or Geary C-statistic). 
Distribution theory for these statistics is complex, since the 
distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis is not
necessarily normal. Blommestein suggests informal use of the I-statistic 
to compare specifications as a compromise. The relevant I-statistic for
regression residuals is given by: (vd^re k is the number of regressors
and e is an n*l vector of residuals)
eTWe n-k
I = -----   (5.21)
eTe k- 1
If there is no first-order spatial autocorrelation then eTWe will tend 
towards zero. It follows that in comparing specifications, larger 
absolute values for I indicate autocorrelation. A family of such values 
is possible, by powering ¥, although it should be noted that the 
efficacy of this statistic depends on the validity of the W matrix used. 
Formal hypothesis tests can be conducted by evaluating
I - E(I)
Z = --------- (5.22. 1)
<r (I)
This necessitates calculation of the variance of I, which is given as:
2C tr(A)12n^
O'(I) = ------------------
So2 (n-k)(n-k+2 )
Si + 2tr(A2) - tr(B) - --------
n - k
(5.22.2)
A = <XTX)-! XTZ where Z = £(Vt¥T )X (5.22.3)
— ( X ' ) " \ ' ' •{, \ '■*/ “T V ' ) 1 ■ ■ X y0 22. *r )
o i — X L i . ( w -I. ,5 + w -j :i. } ■ ■ (0 . 22. 5)
So = I j j (Wij) (5.22.6)
Evaluation of this for each regression is computationally expensive, and 
its use in (5.22.1) assumes that I is distributed normally.In practice
e r¥e
I * = ------------------------  (5. 23)
e T'e
as a guide to the spatial patterns amongst the residuals. In 
experiments with this ratio, approximately 85% of all resultant values
are in the range C-2,t21. Other aspects of specification such as
goodness of fit and regressor choice can be tested by comparisons of 
statistics and Breutsch - Pagan (1979) tests for heteroskedasticity.
5.5.2 Choice of Regressors
This topic will be discussed more fully in chapter Six, but some general 
principles can be mentioned here, A regressor may be present in an 
equation in spatially lagged or unlagged form, or both, as appropriate. 
For example, factors which affect mobility decisions will be present in 
unlagged form as causal elements in turnover rates, whilst in-migration 
rates will be determined by mobility decisions outside the area of 
interest. There is a case, therefore, for including only specific lags
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of this type. In the general-to-specific methodology all regressors are 
lagged. In practice this can give rise to considerable difficulties of 
interpretation (for example, the role of spatially lagged local 
authority rents on owner-occupiers leaving the area; in theory this 
effect should be insignificant, but this depends on the degree of 
correlation between jointly dependent variables).
Jointly dependent variables can, within limitations imposed by data 
availability, be chosen so as to approximate submarkets and, in 
consequence, more closely identify spatial effects. This involves 
splitting ‘'demand” and “supply” for any one area into sub-groups with 
the hypothesis of homogeneity between groups being maintained if 
suitable results are obtained in estimations of the j.d.v. coefficient 
matrix.
5.5.3 Structure of V
The W matrix represents the basic spatial structure of the system, and 
most commonly consists of non-zero elements where first order contiguity 
exists. These non-zero elements may be used to account for inter-zonal 
differences, by giving them a gravity-type formulation:
w.t.i = Si^oSj^i Ct < 0 (5.24)
The restriction
EjWij = 1 (5.25)
is usually imposed to guarantee stationarity. It does, however, imply 
that the spatial process is "apportioned" from each contiguous district 
so that if the effect from one district is strong, the effect from other 
districts is weakened. This is not readily justifiable, and there is a 
case for using unnormalisd weights, especially when using a 
straightforward contiguity relationship. Normalised weights deal only 
with the relative importance of each contiguous district to its 
neighbour and ignore absolute effects. Normalised weights provide 
greater standardisation of coefficient -magnitudes.
The cij,:x:2, Si^o and Sj,:x i terms may take any form, since weights are 
subsequently normalised; the problem is to determine oto, oh , as, and in 
use within a regression framework these would have to be determined 
experimentally
5.5.4 Linearity and non-linearity
The polar cases for linear and quasi-linear models are;
Linear: Yi = J3o + Xi + Xsij3s + ... + Xnij3k + Un (5.26)
U i ^ K O . r d n )
Log-linear: Yi = 0oXtt*iX2 i*3 ...Xk i*kUA (5.27)
Ui/VLN(0,o'aI„)
A family of models between these extremes can be generated using the
Box-Cox ('1962) transf or mat i on:
(5.29)
This can in practice, lead to problems with different X values for each 
equation (in a multi-equation model) or for sub-samples of the data set.
Fone of these problems is as severe, however, as the choice when spatial 
lags are involved. Whilst it is possible to write, for example,
there is no a priori reason for doing so. In particular, if the 
underlying model and weights are specified multiplicatively, why should 
normalised linearly constructed weights be entered linearly ?
It is equally possible to take the expression
as the appropriate lagged value, which implies a linear spatial process 
interacting multiplicatively with adjoining districts.
In the absence of any clear decision rule, the lag form given in (5.29) 
will be used for the log-1 inear-model, since that formulation implies 
that the W*.* are indices and components of the composite* coefficient, 
Wij0K. This is the power to which the variable is raised in the
(Kaciennan (1985))
logYi = logjSo + JStlogXii + Y-iE.jWi.ilogXi j + ... tlogUi (5.29)
log I jWx.jXi j (5.30)
multiplicative model. This is more consistent and easier to interpret 
than (5.30)
5.5.5 Regression Strategy
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the regression strategy to be 
used will contain some a priori constraints. After some experimentation 
it is clear that there are few differences between some of the gravity 
specification ¥ matrices (i.e. between those which approximate social 
space), whilst there can be considerable differences in the performance 
of ¥ matrices where only the number of non-zero elements is varied. In 
practice the ¥ matrix to be used consists of:
wi.i = 1/di.j2 (5.31)
where d*j is the Euclidean distance between the approximate district 
centroids. This formulation corrects for the irregular shape of 
districts whilst incorporating a very simple friction of distance effect 
such that the degree of spatial interaction varies inversely with the 
square of the inter-district distance. It is assumed a priori that 
there is only one ¥ matrix applicable to all the sub-groups of movers, 
but in a sense this is not restrictive because there does not exist a 
single correct ¥ matrix; use of the same form for all equations 
provides comparability. It follows that correction is being made for 
Euclidean rather than social space, but in experimentation it has been 
found that unusual results are possible when a social space formulation 
is used. This is because the regressors to be used fall into three
categories; there are demographic variables which broadly correspond 
with the forces prompting housing related moves, there are socio­
economic variables which equate with employment related moves, and there 
are market determined variables which influence the short term patterns 
of such moves. All these variables display some degree of collinearity, 
and given the discussion previously on the fundamental 
interconnectedness of the entire housing market, such that a pure 
vertical or horizontal classification is inadequate, it is likely that 
attempts to replicate social space will introduce distortions.
The V matrix to be used will consist of first order contiguity only 
since strong collinearity between regressors of higher than first order- 
lagged renders them ambiguous. Given the average district size compared 
with average move distances, this is not restrictive in most cases 
except for suburbs which lie on each side of a city; such areas are 
assumed to be unconnected with one another but in practice may show 
interdependence. This loss of information is almost certainly 
outweighed by the simplicity of the formulation as applied to most 
areas.
There are four possible types of regression:
1) Exogenous Unlagged Regressors: This will determine the basic 
importance of the three categories of regressors mentioned above: 
demographic, socio-economic, and market influences.
/2) Endogenous Unlagged Regressors: This will determine the likely- 
dynamic operation of the housing market, comparing volume influences 
with market pressure indicators.
average size of spatial submarkets is large compared with the size of 
spatial data units, conditional upon limited congruence between the 
boundaries of each. This is an imperfect test, since it can only allow 
qualitative statements and only gives an indication of the average 
position. A detailed study of spatial submarkets would require spatial 
versions of Chow tests with a very large number of permutations; 
equivalent, in effect, to diagonalising the A matrix. This is 
computationally beyond the scope of this study.
4) Endogenous Lagged Regressors: This is the most general model, and 
corrects for spurious exogenous lag significance arising from strong 
dependence on the volumes of moves originating or terminating elsewhere.
If the model detailed previously is rewritten as:
3) Exogenous Lagged Regressors: Lag significance indicates that the
Qd i ~ f d (AP, Z1 ) (5.32)
Q, i f s (AP , Zs:) (5.33)
AP = Y (Qd - Qs) (5.34)
=* Qdi = fd( K (Qd - Q®), Z,) (5.35)
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Q«i = f«( t (Qc " Q«) , Z=>) (5.36)
where Q,;1i and Q,31. are the demand and supplies of the i c-sub-group, then 
it is passible to directly relate elements of demand and supply with all 
other elements of demand and supply. In the empirical work of Chapter 
Seven, only the "opposite side" of the market will be included to avoid 
excessive muiticollinearity.
5.^.„CQICLU.SIQK
This chapter has presented and analysed a framework for a regional 
housing model and suggested how such a framework can be applied in 
practice. It has been shown that although the underlying specification 
is based on demand and supply volumes as functions of price levels, with 
individual relationships between each district, it is passible to make 
assumptions which reduce the spatial specification problem to that of a 
weights matrix. As specified, it is possible to substitute out prices 
altogether and deal, instead with a volume based model. This results in 
a loss of information as to price elasticities, but permits construction 
of a regional model with existing data. The limitations, mainly 
imposed by the available data or by computational expense, have also 
been described, as have the interpretations which can be placed on 
results. The next chapter will detail the regressors and dependent 
variables to be used and provide some of the background for the study 
area.
CHAPTER SIX 
HE SAMPLE DATA AMD VARIABLES
6 .1  INTRODUCTION
The first three chapters have demonstrated that there are a wide variety 
of approaches to modelling the housing market. To some extent, the 
differences arise because of specific local variations in housing market 
structures, either in terms of race or tenure. It would be intuitively 
unacceptable to pool data from U.S. and U.K. sources, but most U.K. 
macroeconometric models include Scottish data for the purposes of 
equation estimation. The validity of this practice is debatable when 
the Scottish institutional framework demonstrates marked differences 
from that of the rest of the U.K..
The purpose of this chapter is to detail such differences, and to 
evaluate the sources of data which are available for the purposes of 
constructing a spatial econometric model.
6.1 .THE. SCOTTISH ECQKQMY- AND. HQUSI3STG MARKET
Until 1707, Scotland was a separate nation. It retained its independent 
religious, educational and legal systems, and the latter continues to 
exert an influence on the housing market in the form of the sealed bid 
process. Its banks have some degree of autonomy from their English 
counterparts, although only one, the Bank of Scotland, is truly 
independent. These banks can issue their own notes but this is a 
symbolic rather than a real difference, since each note issued must be 
backed by an English equivalent. Hence Scotland's monetary system is 
effectively integrated with the rest of the U.K.
Geographically. Scotland has three distinct areas: the Southern Uplands, 
the Highlands and Islands, and the Central Lowlands. Only two railway 
lines and three main roads connect it with England, and the Cheviot 
Hills provide a physical barrier between the two. It has a population of 
about five million, but over half of these are concentrated in the 
Strathclyde administrative region (see Figure 6.1). Topography and 
geological accident have combined to make the Central Lowlands the main 
initial centre of industry, with coal and iron reserves located there. 
More recently the discovery of Uorth Sea Oil has had a major impact 
throughout the Highlands, although Grampian Region has been the main 
beneficiary of oil-related employment changes. Oil production 
continues but the slowdown in exploration and drilling has had 
corresponding impacts on areas with platform construction yards. These 
changes are documented in Lythe and Majmudar(19S2).
Other factors have contributed to a shift in economic activity towards 
Eastern Scotland, reflecting a U.K. trend. in the .
face of competition from other countries, especially Japan, traditional 
shipbuilding and related industries around Clydeside and in the West 
generally have declined; this has been reinforced by rationalisation of 
the steel industry which has closed a number of traditional Scottish 
steelworks (e.g.Dalziel).
The activities of the Scottish Development Agency have contributed 
towards persuading multinationals to locate in Scotland, with an 
emphasis on microprocessor technology. The focus of this has been 
"Silicon Glen" around Glenrothes, again in the East. Entry to the EEC
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has further reinforced the Eastward shift of economic activity and the 
importance of Edinburgh as a financial centre has been boosted in the 
aftermath of financial deregulation.
There are, then, structural changes occuring in Scotland's economy; but 
whether Scotland's economy is in decline is more debatable. Lythe and 
Majmudar point out that the majority of Scottish "foreign" trade is with 
the U.K., linking it closely to the economic performance of the rest of 
the country. They argue that any sustained recovery will benefit 
Scotland more than most U.K. regions due to specialisation in 
microelectronics and bio-engineering.
Scotland’s separate legal system immediately sets Scottish housing apart 
from the rest of the U.K., and this is reinforced by its different 
tenure structure. Gibb and Maclennan (1935) trace the evolution of this 
tenure structure to the Scottish political scene in the early decades of 
this century; they also note that Scottish local authorities have tended 
to show a preference for low rents, making owner-occupation less 
attractive. This has been compounded by rivalry between private 
builders and local authorities over land appropriation. In addition, 
design mistakes and design obsolescence have had an adverse impact on 
public sector housing, leading Gibb and Maclennan to state: "Tenants may 
like the concept of subsidised council housing, [but] many do not like 
their council houses and the estates they live in." (Gibb and Maclennan 
(1985),p.283)) This has contributed to the growing popularity of owner- 
occupation as an alternative tenure. The Housing Support Grant system, 
introduced in 1978, was intended to supplement the Rate Support Grant
and was explicitly linked to the specific housing committments of 
individual Local Authorities. However, it rapidly became an instrument 
of central government control, with corresponding increases in local 
authority rent levels and decreases in local authority building rates.
It has already been shown in Chapter Three that in an asset-pricing 
model, inflation makes owner-occupation an attractive proposition, and 
this process has been responsible for a siseable element of U.K. private 
housing demand. Gibb and Maclennan suggest that in Scotland, tenure 
change is particularly associated with new household formation. They 
also state that in contrast to the rest of the U.K., Scottish council 
housing
"...contains a relatively large proportion of 'higher* socio­
economic groups. The Scottish council sector is far from being 
'residualised'..." (ibid.,p.235)
The net result of a relatively recent move to owner-occupation has been 
to put pressure on the lower end of the market, effectively raising the 
relative price of housing services. This parallels the Urban Institute 
model simulation of an arbitrary cut-off point for structure "quality", 
which generates a similar pattern. In Scotland, the effect is more 
likely to arise from an inadequately structured private sector stock. 
Cullingworth (1966) argues that Scottish privately owned housing 
contains a gap in the trading-up chain which generates excessive price 
pressure at the low end of the market; consequently housing market 
careers become impacted. This quality gap is most likely to consist of
FTCtUKE 6.2 HYPOTHETICAL PRICE STRUCTURE CURVE FOR SCQTLMD.
Price
>
House Type
Existing price-structure curve
Long run impact of newbuilc.
TABLE 6 .1  SCOTTISH. AND U.K. PRIVATE HOUSE ..COMPLETIONS
YEAR SCOTLAND U. K. %
1971 11614 196313 5. 9
1972 1 i 8oo 200755 5.9
1973 12215 191080 6. 4
1974 11239 145177 7.7
1975 10371 154528 6.7
1976 13704 155229 8. 8
1977 12132 143344 8. 5
1978 14443 151730 9. 5
1979 15069 136454 11.0
1980 12187 130132 ■ 9.4
'1981 11021 116381 9.5
'1982 11532 123781 9. 3
1983 13067 142979 9. 1
1984 13992 158420 8.8
1985 14151 153650 9.2
Source: Housing and Construction Statistics
semi-detached and small detached houses. The existence of such a gap, 
coupled with the move to owner-occupation means that the building 
industry has found Scotland a profitable area in recent years, compared 
with the building slump, mirroring recession, elsewhere in the U.K. (see 
Table 6.1). The long run impact of newbuild on the "price-structure 
curve" is shown in Figure 6.2
6.3 THE SAMPLE DATA
The data used in this study consist of 56 cross-sectional observations 
on a variety of socio-economic and housing-related variables. These ar 
taken from the 1981 Census of Population and from a variety of 
Government and Local Authority publications, and generally represent 
100% enumeration. The 56 data points correspond to the Scottish 
Districts shown in Figure 6.1, and it is these units which make up the 
larger Administrative Regions. The average size of each district is
100,000 people (about 30,000 households) although this is much higher i 
the four cities Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen. Some of the 
data used is in first-difference form i.e. changes over the period 1980 
81 for each cross-sectional unit, although this information is not 
available for all variables.
6 .4  THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The model has seven jointly dependent variables, representing demand and 
supply for each spatial unit. These are:
Demand: 111 In-migrant households from a district within 
the same region.
115 In-migrant households from a district outside 
the region.
HHFR Hewly-formed households; constructed from Census data
this variable measures new households who also leave the 
district, (and is consequently a form of "negative" 
demand but should at least proxy the behaviour of all 
new household formation. )
Supply: OUT Households leaving a district who move to another 
district within the same region 
QUTF Households leaving a district who move to a district 
outside the region.
RCM Newly built houses
TVS Turnover; that is, households who relocate within the 
same district and who simultaneously demand and supply 
houses in that district.
A number of remarks about these variables are necessary.. Of the above, 
IH(IH,OUT,OUTN, and TVR are taken from the Census and are classified by
current tenure, so that not all those designated as owner-occupiers will 
have been in this tenure prior to relocating. If this were not the 
case, it would be possible to write vacancy changes as
a V A C = O U T t Q m TtRCM-11-1 M-HHFRtDTH+S ALES-PURCHASES (6. 1)
where DTH is the number of owner occupiers whose death results in the 
sale of their house, and where SALES and PURCHASES are included 
separately to allow for transactions involving second homes.The Census 
classification means that this expression is amended to read
In this formulation, QUT'i represents only out-migrant households whose 
relocation results in the sale of their house, and a VAC:+: represents the 
other elements of (6.1). Hence
The first two elements of this expression are the Census definitions. 
This means that Census data will overstate the magnitude of vacancy 
changes unless adjusted for classification difference, which is achieved 
by subtracting the third element of the left hand side. Similarly, the 
IN* and I I F ; values from Census data will include new households whose 
relocation has not left a vacancy elsewhere. It follows that with 
appropriate assumptions about DTH, SALES, PURCHASES, and^RCM, and with 
suitable exogenous data on vacancy changes, it is possible to estimate
AVAC=OUT i ±AVAC:t: (6. 2)
0UT*+QUT3P-0UTt =OUTtOUTH (6.3)
the magnitude of OUTi , which is the out mi grating counterpart to HHFR. 
Consequently any equation which models in- and out-migration will tend 
to include the effect of the exogenous variables on new households, but 
the characteristics of the "pure" household formation equation, OUTi, 
should give some indication of the differences between the two 
subgroups.
Second home transactions have been ignored in this study. Other than 
in the Highlands and Islands, they do not constitute a significant 
part of the housing market. (Table 6.2) Deaths are included by 
multiplying the number of deaths recorded in the district by that 
district's average propensity for living alone (i.e. by the proportion 
of Type 1 Minimal Household Units). This requires the assumption that 
death rates are constant across tenure.
Exogenous data on vacancy rates is available from local authority rating 
returns, but this refers to domestic rateable units rather than 
transactable houses; this data is, therefore, adjusted by the district's 
tenure split and by its ratio of rateable units to separate houses.
This procedure requires the assumption that this ratio is constant
across tenures; this assumption is probably valid in most districts but
is somewhat heroic in cities with multiple occupancy and high rise 
dwellings. In the absence of any alternative adjustment, this method 
will be used but its shortcomings should be borne in mind.
By splitting demand and supply as far as available data will allow, it 
is possible to attempt to model the spatial interaction of each level of
the housing market hierarchy separately. A common "house price"
S co tlan d  0 . 68
Borders 1.70
Central 0.25
Dumfries and Galloway 0. 01
Fife 0.70
Grampian 0.63
Highland 2.70
Lothian 0.29
Strathclyde 0.53
Tavside 0.69
Islands 2.30
Source: 1981 Census, Housing and Household Report
variable is used in the form of a VAC; at first sight, this appears to 
deny the existence of independent hierarchy levels. In fact it is a 
necessary simplification given that the Census classifications preclude 
complete separation of these markets, and because this separation will 
not necessarily coincide with that of the market. The "within 
region/outside region" classification provides a crude split between 
local and non-local movers, which in turn will approximate those who 
move because of employment relocation and those who move for house- 
related reasons. Bach will respond to different exogenous stimuli, or 
respond to the same stimulus differently. Hence the point at issue in 
using this separation is whether the enhanced predictive power that it 
offers more than outweighs coefficient bias due to inadequate 
classification.
In using this data for the jointly dependent variables it is tacitly 
assumed that sufficient inventory exists for excess demand or supply to 
be realised and reflected in vacancy rate changes. Using vacancy rates 
as proxies for house prices assumes the linear or loglinear price 
adjustment mechanism discussed in previous chapters. All the variables 
relating to flows of households are deflated by the total number of 
owner-occupied houses to adjust for district size and tenure 
differences.
6 . 5  THE IHDEPEHDENT VARIABLES
6.5.1 Local Authority Rents (LAR)
This variable measures the average annual unrebated local authority rent 
level prevailing in the district and proxies the cost of public sector 
housing services. It is to be expected that, ceteris paribus, a higher 
local authority rent level will push households into owner-occupation, 
either directly or through the medium of council house sales. 
Unfortunately the data on such sales is incomplete.
6.5.2 Rateable Value CRV)
Rateable value has frequently been used as a measue of housing quality, 
but a number of criticisms have been levelled at this practice, 
particularly for English data, due to anomalies and slow updating. In 
Scotland, rateable value is reassessed regularly and structural changes
to dwellings should be registered with the Regional Assessor within one
year of execution. Despite its shortcomings, average rateable value is 
a fairly accurate indicator of the quality of housing in a district and 
will serve the purpose of correcting for any quality-based effects which 
might obscure the spatial behaviour of interest here.
6.5.3 North Sea Oil Dummy (OIL)
This dummy variable adjusts for any exceptional effects consequent upon 
the oil-related housing market boom in and around Aberdeen. It takes
the form of a 1 for the Aberdeen district and the two surrounding 
districts, and a 0 elsewhere. In particular, this variable captures the 
extent to which the inventory model of price adjustment is inadequate 
when vacancy rates are already squeezed and prices are the only means of 
reflecting demand pressure. This intercept adjustment is the simplest 
way in which the oil boom might affect the housing market, but other 
means are obviously possible, such as estimation of separate equations 
for the areas affected by the oil boom. Data limitations preclude the 
latter in this study.
6.5.4 Urban-Rura1 Du mmv (URD)
This dummy variable takes a value between 5 (highly urban) and 1 (highly 
rural) and is based on a Scottish Office study'1 which conducts a factor 
analysis of the '1981 Census Data on a number of variables including the 
structure of the economic base and the population density. It is 
included because it captures some of the search effects, discussed in 
Chapter Four, which may be inadequately captured by the other variables. 
It also provides a proxy for employment location.
6.5.5 Birth Rate (BRTH)
In accordance with the discussion in Chapter Two, births in the family 
are one of the two key "life events" which generate mobility. The 
conclusion of work previously reviewed is that only unexpected events 
will cause mobility, although in an imperfect capital market inability 
to perfectly adjust housing consumption to future requirements may arise
because of income constraints. Given that most households plan ahead, 
but that some will adjust with a lag, the birth rate variable is a 
three-year moving average centred on 1981, with equal weight given to 
each year. Rather than constrain the coefficients in this way, it might 
be desirable to enter each year separately but this generates 
unnecessary complexity when spatial lags are introduced.
6.5.6 Household Formation Potential (MHU)
This variable derives from Ermisch's (1985) work on Minimal Household 
Units and is constructed from Census analyses of households, which give 
information about the number of adults and dependents within complex 
household units. It is possible to calculate an approximate ratio of 
potential to actual households, and obviously the higher is this ratio, 
the greater, ceteris paribus, is the potential demand for additional 
houses, especially if the potential households have only recently become 
adults and are not constrained in some other way (e.g.incapacity). This 
also has implications for the number of households searching even if 
they do not "demand".
6.5.7 Average Income Level (SEG)
Accurate data on per capita wealth and earnings is not collected for 
individual districts and some form of proxy is required. The approach 
used in this study is to take a weighted average of the proportions of 
households in each socio-economic grouping to provide % an index of 
earnings. The weights used are the average weekly wages of males in
that group, before tax and overtime. The latter is used because 
Building Societies will take this measure (or annual equivalent) as 
relevant in determining eligibility for mortgage finance, although 
mortgage interest tax relief will distort effective incomes to some 
extent. It is not possible to adjust for this with published data.
This variable also ignores wealth, either inherited or accumulated in 
the form of unrealised appreciation in the value of the household's 
dwelling. By focusing, on male earnings there will be a slight 
distortion, and the SEG classification conceals large within-group 
earnings differences. Despite these problems it is the best measure 
available and seems to serve as an adequate proxy in practice.
6.5.8 The Unemployment. Rate (U)
Employment classifications based upon the most recent occupation are 
meaningless without some indication of employment status, but systematic 
unemployment statistics with SEG breakdowns are only provided 
periodically and use employment office areas rather than districts. The 
unemployment data used here is from the Census and will include those 
individuals who choose not to work. It will be a misleading variable in 
areas where most unemployment is concentrated in public sector housing 
estates, since the impact on the private housing market will be limited. 
It will also obscure the effect of current owner-occupiers who have 
become unemployed and sell their house in order to realise their capital 
gain. Lastly it does not distinguish current owners from those who 
merely live with a current owner. Some of the other complexities of 
interpretation in using this variable are discussed below.
6.5.9 Composite Potential Demand.Variable (HHSEG)
It is conceivable that neither the SEG nor the MHU variables will be 
capable of influencing housing market activity in isolation; rather it 
is only when both are high that demand will be strong. The reason for 
this is that whilst a high number of potential households is a necessary 
condition for volume-based housing demand, it may signify the existence 
of a constraint on household formation, such as low per capita income. 
Similarly, high per capita income will not lead to a flow of demand for 
housing units if the residents are satisfied with their existing 
location and if few potential households exist. The HKSEG variable 
takes the product of the two as the most likely form of interaction.
6.5.10 Land Ava i1abi1i t v (LAMP)
This variable measures the ratio of' land without planning permission, 
held by housebuilders, to land held with planning permission. The 
discussion in Chapter Four concluded that for the modern speculative 
housebuilding industry, the land portfolio can be crucial to 
profitability, and this includes land with planning permission to allow 
a flexible response to demand changes. Local Authority land release 
policies then become the key factor in determining the supply elasticity 
of the housing market.
6, 5-t.-ll_.Rate o f Vacancy Change (DV)
The construction of this variable has already been detailed, but its use 
as an exogenous regressor requires some justification. It is intended 
to proxy price changes to give some indication of price elasticities of 
demand and supply. The use of changes, rather than levels, arises 
because the year-on-year vacancy rate level data shows high 
collinearity, probably because a large proportion of the stock of 
vacancies are inadequate as dwellings, being semi-derelict, and hence 
are not transacted. It is the marginal vacancies which are of interest. 
This specification is not, then, strictly in accord with the analytical 
demand and supply functional forms given in the last chapter, but should 
serve as an approximation for the price level.
The second qualification concerns the inventory formulation which 
assumes that the existing stock of vacancies consists of adequate 
substitutes for the dwellings in the market. This will be valid if 
there are sufficient vacancies being redeveloped or due to come on to 
the market as the result of the death of the occupant. If the useful 
elements of the stock of vacancies are used up due to sustained and 
excessive demand, such as during the oil boom, this formulation will be 
invalid. The oil dummy attempts to capture this structural change.
The third qualification concerns the excess demand-price adjustment 
mechanism generally. As has already been discussed, this assumes that 
Walrasian auctioneers, or some form of automatic bidding process, will 
compare the relative volumes of demand and supply and adjust prices
accordingly. As employed here, the implicit basic market period is one 
year which is four times as long as in macroeconometric models. Since 
the data spans May 19S0 to May 1981, there will be some lack of 
comparability between supply and demand figures. Informal conversation 
with estate agents suggests that there are two, and possibly three, 
market periods within any one year; between these there is considerable 
overlap. The first period is in spring, when housing market activity 
begins to surge; the second is in late summer, so as to execute mobility 
plans before school terms begin; and the third relates particularly to 
new houses, just after Christmas, when households seeking a morale boost 
contemplate "trading in" their existing house for a new model. This 
anecdotal evidence suggests three overlapping waves of activity, where 
those households who bought but were unable to sell in one wave will 
find a buyer in the later upturn. Consequently these annual cycles are 
probably not independent and the yearly approximation is valid. From a 
pricing viewpoint, the rate of vacancy change ("price change") 
prevailing at the year-end is a proxy for the average rate through the 
year and used by housing market participants as a input to decision 
making. Thus the market is assumed to clear within one year, with 
prices and vacancy rates adjusting during this period. As used, there 
will be a lagged element in the vacancy rate variable.
The last qualification relates to the relative time frames and 
consequent danger of spurious correlations. This is potentially the 
most serious criticism, since it relates to the speed of adjustment 
within the market. As detailed above, the model used here assumes that 
a) the inventory model and b) the price adjustment formulation are
valid. This latter is embodied in most demand elasticity studies and its 
failure can result in perverse coefficient estimates. As embodied here, 
the assumption of annual adjustment is not as strong as that of 
quarterly adjustment contained in the Artis et al (1975) model. In 
general, standard demand and supply equations presuppose that volumes 
and prices do not overshoot. In practice, relative adjustment speeds 
may vary, with slow volume adjustment and hence price allocation taking 
time to operate and the short term behaviour of the market may show 
considerable price volatility. It follows that the use of vacancy rates 
circumvents this problem by avoiding empirical price data altogether, 
but spurious correlations are still possible if one element of vacancy 
change dominates the overall total; this will produce perverse 
coefficient signs. As a more concrete example, if in-migrating 
households are treated as an element of demand then the expected price 
effect is negative and the coefficient on vacancy change will be 
positive. If the in-migration class used dominates the sources of 
vacancy change, then the actual coefficient may be negative (since in­
migrants reduce vacancies). Either of the effects mentioned here can be 
responsible for counter-intuitive results, with no apparent method of 
distinguishing between the two. Some idea of the degree of dominance of 
any one element of the vacancy change variable can be gained from the 
following regression:
DV=-2.26IH + 0. 12I M  + 0.910UT - 2.870UTI + 0. 07RCM 
(-2.91) (1,06) (0.73) (-2.14) (0.13)
R-= 0.18 -
where HHFR is excluded in order to avoid perfect collinearity. This
suggests that local in-migrants and non-local out-migrants dominate
vacancy changes (although the overall level of explanatory power is low, 
perhaps because demolitions are a major source of vacancy change). This 
is not unreasonable given that housebuilders will not pay rates on new 
houses, and are unlikely to hold large stocks of empty dwellings for 
long. Long distance movers will be more constrained by the need to find 
a new dwelling and may face delays in the sale of their own house. On a 
similar argument, however, the dominance of local over non-local in­
migrants is surprising.
It is passible that the flows of households will not have adjusted to 
price changes, in which case coefficient signs will be incorrect. This 
would arise in the event that households are locationally price- 
insensitive generally; they are not deterred spatially by higher prices, 
but instead purchase a house lower down the "quality hierarchy" in the 
same broad spatial area. This would imply that spatial location has a
low elasticity of substitution with other elements of housing
characteristics. In the model used here, where space is assumed to be
the major housing market dimension, any insensitivity of volumes to
price movements implies that V outweighs a and b in the short run. It 
follows that use of vacancy rates has its own empirical drawback in that 
it tests for the joint significance of the values of ‘tf, a, and b. This 
does mean that by examining the coefficient sign obtained for DV in 
estimation, it is possible to decide which of these parameters is 
dominating and consequently to make inferences about the dynamic 
behaviour of the -market. For example, i f y  is greater than 1 / (b+a), 
then prices are highly responsive to changes in excess demand, but 
supply and demand are relatively unresponsive to changes in price. As
through time, but such oscillation will be damped, stable, or explosive 
depending on the magnitude of V relative to 1 / Cb+a) and 2 / (b+a).
The problems discussed so far generally refer to the inadequacy of the 
temporal sampling frame, but the spatial sampling frame may also be a 
source of error. For example, the number of potential households in 
contiguous districts is a factor determining one element of demand in 
those districts. For an out-migrant household,- strong demand is 
beneficial in that it increases the probability of successful search for 
sellers, but it decreases the probability of successful search for a new 
property in surrounding districts. Different levels of the hierarchy 
may be affected in each area, but the passible ambiguities remain.
g.6..E X P S C m .-R5SIIL.TS
In order that these considerations can be seen in more detail, and to 
set the scene for the empirical results of the next chapter, the 
expected signs given in Table 6.3 will be used as a basis for 
discussion.
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TABLE 6 .3  EXPECTED RESULTS
I I  I M  i OUT OTJTI RCM HKFR TVR 
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BETHL + + +
MHU +
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DV + + ?
DVL - - + + . . + + . ?.
LAID t
LAIDL
HHSEG +
HHSEGL +
I. B. L suffix indicates a spatial lag
6 . 6 , 1  Local A u th o r ity  Rents
The effect of local authority rents on each variable will depend on the 
profile of the households in the public sector. If they have a high 
level of household income, either due to a large family or sufficiently 
well-paid employment, then the level of rents compared with mortgage 
payments becomes operational as an input to decision-making. This will 
be more important in Scotland, where the public sector has a more 
diffuse socio-economic profile. Given that there will be an owner 
occupation risk premium which will vary for each household, it is not 
possible to quantify the threshold level of rent and mortgage payments 
at which households will be indifferent as to tenure; hence the variable 
is entered separately.
In general, the impact of local authority rents is thought to be direct, 
either pushing out out-movers (in the unlagged case) or generating in- 
migration to adjoining districts in the spatial form. There is assumed 
to be no effect on newbuila and the impact on turnover is to increase 
within-district movers. As has already been stated, the bulk of the 
rent level effect will probably be to increase owner-occupation through 
council house purchase, rather than through market transactions, so that 
it is possible that as constructed, no effect will be detected.
2 _Ihe,-Qil, Dummy
The oil dummy is intended to represent the unusual market environment 
prevailing as a result of the oil boom. This will have a number of
effects; employment-related movers who are entering the oil industry 
may receive some assistance with housing cost, so that the net effect 
will be positive on non-local in-movers (due to the distinct lack of 
such opportunities elsewhere in Scotland) and negative on non-local out- 
movers. It is assumed that housing related movers will be displaced, 
hence there will be negative and positive impacts on local in- and out- 
movers respectively. It is likely that there will be a positive effect 
on new housebuilding, but this will be tempered by the availability of 
land, its cost, and the likelihood of obtaining planning permission. 
Newly-formed households are likely to be displaced, whilst the effect on 
turnover is unclear; either moves are increased as existing owners 
realise windfall profits, or decreased due to the increased difficulty 
of successfully purchasing a property in the next strata. This will 
depend on the balance of housing market pressure across the various 
market strata.
The effect of the oil dummy lagged is more ambiguous, since the spatial 
impact of the oil boom itself is unclear and probably does not have 
strong spatial effects at this kind of distance; rather a diffuse 
impact is felt throughout the Highlands. Consequently no a priori 
expectation is imposed on this variable.
6.6.3 Urban-Rural. Socio-Economic, and Rateable Value Variables
The RV, SEG and URD variables can be dealt with as a single group, 
since, as will be seen in the next chapter, they are strongly collinear. 
Within the context of the model set out in the last two chapters, the
essence of an urban area is its high density of dwellings, with a 
corresponding impact on search strategies. It follows that the more 
urban is any given area, the greater the intensity of housing market 
activity associated with any particular level of owner-occupation. It 
fallows that the expected effect is universally positive, with the 
exception of new housebuilding and new household formation. In the case 
of the first, there will be a shortage of suitable sites due to the high 
demand for land, particularly commercial property. This is a similar 
effect to that of the LAUD variable discussed below, but reflects a 
different aspect of the impact of land availability. In the case of the 
latter, it is assumed that whilst the urban areas will be more crowded, 
which stimulates household formation, the generally higher level of 
market activity will increase price levels, which will reduce household 
formation. The overall effect on new households is unclear, since the 
price effect of the urban area may extend a greater distance than the 
search space of the newly forming households.
The urban-rural dummy, therefore, demonstrates two problems. The first 
relates to the way in which this dummy serves as a proxy for too many 
conflicting effects, but also represents a separate influence (i.e. 
density). The second problem is more pervasive and relates to the 
spatial nature of the model; namely that each regressor will have a 
spatial effect which may not be adequately represented by its proxy; 
this results in difficulty in determining the a priori expected sign for 
a variable; This is illustrated in the lag of the urban^rural dummy, 
where the expectation is again universally positive, this time including 
the newbuild and new household variables; in each case, the elements of
the city which might give rise to ambiguous signs are assumed to be more 
than outweighed by the original effect. Hence it is assumed that an 
adequate supply of land is available in the suburban areas, and that 
there are sufficient latent households with sufficient income for their 
aspirations to be realised, either moving further away from, or closer 
in to, the city.
The SEG and rateable value variables will almost certainly serve as 
proxies for one another, given that housing rateable values are a 
function of size and amenities, which is also positively correlated with 
price. Further to this, there is a concentration of professional and 
middle class households in cities and suburbs, so the reason for the 
collinearity between these two variables and the urban-rural dummy 
should be clear. It will also be likely, however, that the spatial 
distribution of these variables will show subtle differences, as shown 
in Figure 6.3.
Whilst the urban-rural dummy is expected to be associated with a 
generally higher level of housing market activity, it is assumed that 
higher rateable values will have a dampening effect on housing-related 
migrants. Although negative signs appear on the lag of the out-mover 
variables, this is only because there is a positive sign expected for 
the in-mover regressors; it is equally possible that the presence of 
higher rateable values in an adjoining district will increase the rate 
of out-migration and reduce the rate of in-migration, due to the 
presence of a substitute. This is another example of the ambiguity 
inherent in the use of spatial variables, where there is no a priori
HRS SQCIQ ECONOMIC GROUPINGS AID URBAN DENSITY
Incidence
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guidance as to whether a "contagion" or substitution effect will 
operate. In the first case the impact of an exogenous variable, such as 
prices, across the boundaries of a spatial unit will be smooth. In the 
latter case, the spatial limits to the direct impact of an exogenous 
variable approximate the boundaries of the spatial unit. On the 
assumption of the contagion dominating, the newbuild effect of lagged 
rateable values will be positive, to the extent that housebuilders use . 
the image of surrounding areas to fix the strata of their own product.
The impact on turnover is assumed to be negative given that those 
already in the area will be reluctant to move. Although a negative sign 
is given for the lag, this will again depend on the 
contagion/substitution effects.
The signs given for socio-economic status are identical to those given 
for rateable values, but it is assumed that there is no direct lagged 
effect, other than a peer effect equivalent to the contagion process 
assumed to operate through rateable values.
6,6,4 Demographic Variables
The birth rate, MHU, and HHSEG variables can be treated as a related 
group since all are demographic. All these variables are expected to 
increase mobility because all increase overcrowding and hence the demand 
for housing, although this will only apply to effective demand, hence 
the use of the HHSEG variable. The expected signs are identical for all 
three variables and their lags, with a positive impact on out-migrants 
and a positive lagged effect on in-migrants. There is no impact
expected for newbuild although housebuilding firms may show a 
speculative response to perceived high demographic demand; any such link 
is probably too tenuous to be acted upon as a guide to short-term 
investment decisions. The effect on turnover is expected to be 
positive, since trading up will be stimulated by all of these 
regressors.
6.6.5 The Unemployment Variable
The unemployment variable is assumed to operate as a mirror image to 
rateable values but the emphasis will be on non-local movers. If an 
area is depressed it will tend to push out all households and fail to 
attract replacements. It is possible that speculative builders will 
take the depression of an area as a sign that properties will not sell, 
but factors such as land release will also be important. The 
relationship between unemployment and turnover is not clear, since some 
trading down will occur but may be frustrated by lack of demand for the 
sellers' houses.
£lJu3. . Ihs -Land V.ar iable
The last variable is the ratio of land held without planning permission 
to land held with planning permission; whilst this is a crude measure of 
builder's perceptions of the attractions of an area, it is subject to 
some inaccuracies if, for example, there is a high proportion of land 
held without planning permission because expected demand^has failed to 
materialise It follows that this variable is effectively a "snapshot"
of the two elements of a stock. These elements will be changing through 
time as builders attempt to acquire land in desirable areas and reduce 
their holdings of land in undesirable areas. Its use in this model 
assumes that there have been no major recent alterations to builders' 
desired land portfolio as a result of structural shifts in demand. For 
a housing market as relatively stable as that of Scotland this 
assumption is probably robust. This variable is expected to have a 
positive impact.
6.7 CQICLUSIQHS
A number of the expected results which have been discussed here show 
some ambiguity because there is a pure effect, and one which is 
dependent upon the availability of demand or supply. Hence the model 
was also run with endogenous variables. A related consideration is the 
expected sign of the vacancy change variable. It has already been 
demonstrated that the sign achieved for this variable will, within a 
broad variety of specifications for the underlying model, yield 
qualitative information about the relative magnitudes of V, a and b for 
each of the dependent variables. The expected signs given here are 
based on the assumption that the demand and supply elasticities dominate 
the vacancy rate-dependent variable relationship. This ambiguity arises 
from the lack of suitable price data, although the qualitative 
information is intrinsically useful.
It is possible to gain some idea of the nature of the relationship 
between vacancy rates and house prices in the Scottish case during the
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period of this study by examining aggregate data (the criticisms of 
Chapter Three notwithstanding). In Figure 6.4, vacancy changes and real 
house price changes (adjusted by the GDP deflator) are shown for the 
whole of Scotland over the period 1975-1982; this demonstrates that 
perverse movements are possible and that prices tend to overshoot, 
although the small sample means that this is only indicative.
It also shows that in the period of this study, the bulk of the Scottish 
housing market was in a position of excess supply. However, this was 
not uniformly spread as can be seen from Figure 6.5 which shows the 
vacancy change status of Scottish districts for the period 1980-81. 
Whilst negative changes predominate, there are some notable exceptions. 
This reinforces the view that for a spatial commodity such as housing, 
aggregate data can be inadequate.
The expected signs for lagged vacancy changes are based on the 
assumption that the substitution effect dominates the contagion process, 
in contrast with the view taken for rateable values, above. This is 
based on the assumption that no perception process is involved and that 
consequently prices communicate information about the state of the 
market swiftly and accurately. It is possible for the reverse to be the 
case, but this would be another form of imperfect price-setting 
behaviour by housing market professionals, with respect to the spatial 
boundaries of a market rather than to its excess supply/excess demand 
status.
FIGURE 6.5 VACANCY CHANGES BY DISTRICT FOR SCOTLAND. 1960-61
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It is expected that vacancy rate changes will be positively associated 
with in-migrants, and negatively associated with the out-migrant and 
supply variables. Given the substitution effect, the signs for lagged 
vacancy changes are reversed. The signs for turnover are undetermined, 
because they depend on the structure of the existing market. If there 
are a large number of households attempting to sell their properties and 
trade up when excess demand exists at higher levels in the market 
hierarchy, then the net impact of the excess demand will be to depress 
turnover; with the position reversed, it will be facilitated.
This chapter has indicated some of the qualifications which have to be 
made when applying the spatial model to imperfect data. These caveats 
will be returned to on a number of occasions in the next chapter, which 
reports on regressions and other statistical analyses which have been 
applied to this data set.
CHAPTER SEVER 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
?■ .:L.INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present estimated forms for structural 
supply and demand equations of the Scottish housing market. These are 
based on the theoretical model discussed in Chapters Four and Five, and 
on the variables described in Chapter Six. The latter chapter also 
showed how the specific variables to be used reflect the four issues 
addressed in this thesis. The results reported here will indicate which 
of the spatial effects dominate for each class of movers and at what 
scale, and what the impact, if any, is of the public sector on the owner 
occupier market. Assessing the system dynamic behaviour is more 
problematic, because the high degree of collinearity between some of the 
independent variables, and with some of the dependent variables. The 
magnitude of these effects can be more clearly assessed by transforming 
the exogenous regressors into principal components and comparing the 
coefficients with those of equations which include endogenous variables.
The chapter is structured as follows. A preliminary section discusses 
an independent regressor correlations matrix, to give some indication of 
the reliability of coefficient estimates and of the likely extent of any 
collinearity problems. The subsequent sections discuss results for the 
seven dependent variables in turn. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
regressions can be of four types, depending upon the inclusion or 
exclusion of endogenous variables and spatial lags respectively. Each 
section is then split into two subsections, the first reporting results 
for aspatial regressions,the second for spatial. Principal components 
estimates are reported based on equations with principal components
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only, and on equations which include endogenous variables' All 
equations are estimated in linear and log-linear form. In each reported 
set of equations, the following statistics are given:
R3 The ratio of explained to unexplained variation in the
dependent variable, in each case adjusted for degrees of 
freedom.
I* The adjusted Koran spatial autocorrelation statistic,, 
defined in equation 5.23
BP The Breutsch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity; this involves 
regressing the residuals on the regressors and indicates if 
there are grounds for higher disturbance variance being 
associated with any particular regressor or regressor 
combination. It is either present (H) or absent (-).
Throughout this chapter, t-statistics are given in brackets.
7,2 REGRESSOR CORRELATIONS
The discussion in this section is based on Table 7.1 which gives simple 
correlation coefficients between the exogenous regressor data series.
As can be seen, the SEG, RV and URD variables are strongly 
intercorrelated which has implications for the income and quality based 
coefficient estimates. It should not be a problem if the equation R2 is 
greater than the largest regressor correlation. This result suggests
. O H
TABLE 7.1 REGR ESSOR CORRELATIONS
LAR OIL URD RV SEG U BRTH MHU DV LAID HHSEG
LAR 1
OIL -0. 16 1
URD -0.33 0. 03 i
RV -0. 11 0. 07 0. 57 1
SEG 0. 02 0. 09 0. 40 0.72 1
U 0. 16 -•0. 16 -0. 45 -0.49 -0.23 1
BRTH -0. 08 0. 17 -0. 13 -0.03 -0.02 -0. 03
MHU 0. 01 -•0. IS 0. 13 0.13 -0.07 0.25 0. 13 1
DV 0.23 --0.27 -0. 28 -0. 24 -0. '16 0. 15 -0. 10 0. 16 1
LAID -0. 02 0. 12 -0. 03 0.01 0.12 0.20 -0. 02 0. 12 0.15 1
HHSEG -0.02 --0. 17 0. 18 -0.11 0.19 0. 15 0. 17 0. 97 0.12 0.15
that higher income groups have adjusted to the available housing stock 
and that this result is detected at the regional data level. This is 
also associated with the degree of urbanisation which serves as a proxy 
for the concentration of higher income employment and more extensive 
amenities; the latter arising from the agglomerative force of 
consumption on service sectors. The matrix also demonstrates that the 
unemployment rate is negatively correlated with these variables; this is 
in contrast to expectations and may reflect a difference between 
registered and actual (i.e. nan-economically active males) unemployment 
being highest in rural areas. This is corroborated by the much lower 
correlation between MHU and the three "urban" variables; in terms of the 
Ermisch household formation model it is economic for average household 
sizes to be greater in rural areas (perhaps from lower marginal costs of
additional household members due to lower land costs, and lower marginal 
utility of privacy). It follows that casual labour can be more 
prevalent without inducing a high degree of residential stress. The 
main feature of this table is the way in which the urban-rural dummy has 
some form of significant correlation with most variables, which suggests 
that it is a key aspect of this study.
7.3,1 ASP AT IAL LOCAL Ilf-KQVERS EQUATION
The exogenous regressor equation results are given in Table 7.2. 
^Splanatory power is significantly increased by the inclusion 
of the endogenous variables OUT, QUTU, RCM, and TVR. The oil dummy is 
only significant in one equation and this falls with the addition of the 
endogenous regressors which arises, in part, from the collinearity 
between OUT and OIL. There are valid reasons for this relationship 
which will be discussed in more detail for the OUT equation.
The results also demonstrate the RV-SEG collinearity and the SV 
coefficient seems to be unstable particularly on inclusion of the 
endogenous variables. This indicates that movement throughout the 
region (in and out migration) has a definite spatial pattern, predicated 
on housing-related factors. The generally significantly positive 
coefficient suggests that housing-related movers are attracted to high 
quality housing. Further evidence of this appears in the other 
equations.
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TABLE 7 ._2_ASPATIAL LOCAL IN-MOVERS EOUAT ION (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(LOGS) (LOGS) (LOGS)
C -0.077 -0. 03 -0. 02 -56. 5 -4.3 -6. 05
(-1.76) (-3.3) (-2.8) (-1.63 ) (-1.05) (-2.88)
OIL 0. 011 0. 003 0.48 0. 04
(2.42) Cl. 06) (0.58) (0.14)
URD 0.0006 -0.0006 0. 44 -0. 34
(0.54) (0.58) (0.91) (-0.67)
RV 0 . 00003 0.00011 0.00007 -2. 35 -0. 43 0.65
(3.2) (5.87) (7.17) (-2.78) (-0.57) (3.23)
ocG 0.0006 14.5
(0.97) (1.99)
u 0. 022 -0.0067 -0. 16 -0. 36
(0.12) (-0.038) (-0.64) (-1.35)
BRTH 0.91 0.56 2. 31 -0. 04
(3.04) (2.60) (1.80) (-0.81)
MHU 0. 017 5.3
(2.23) (3.5)
DV 0. 001 0.17
(0.15) (0. 18)
OUT 0.6 1. 02
(7.6) (22.4)
OUTN -0. 15 -0. 44
(-1.4) (-0.27)
ROM 0. 01 -0. 26
(0.26) (-0.28)
TVR -0.2 -0.68
(-3.1) (-2.97)
R2 0,48 0. 48 0. 81 0. 09 0. 18 0. 92
rt. 0. 11 -5.99 0. 04 0.25 0.81 -1.37
BP _ — _ _
The MHU and BRTH variables, both indicative of the age profile of an 
area (but also of lower per capita income in the case of MHU) show 
positive and significant coefficients in the linear form. In so far as 
peer effects on location operate, this result is to be expected, since 
young families relocating for housing-related reasons will tend to 
cluster with similar types of household. It is counterintuitive as far 
as potential competition is concerned since complex households and 
births will generate demand for additional housing; these competing 
influences can be seen in the fact that inclusion of the turnover 
variable results in a significantly negative, coefficient and reduces the 
significance of 3RTH, so that attractant and repellant forces both 
operate.
The endogenous variable results show a one-for-one relationship between 
OUT and IN (logarithmic coefficient value of 1.02) and a substantial 
negative impact from TVR which suggests that most within-district movers 
are competing with local in-movers. Each group may be first time 
buyers, or they may be existing owners trading up. This does imply an 
element of excess demand in these groups' markets.
The DV, URD, and U variables are always insignificant. As has been 
indicated previously, URD is strongly collinear with SEG and RV and 
hence URD is redundant in this equation. The insignificance of U will 
also result from collinearity with URD although some of this can be 
attributed to the oil dummy, whose inclusion reverses the sign of the U 
variable. It follows that the attractant force of low unemployment on 
local movers is weak. It is likely that housing-related movers will
already be located in areas of employment levels similar to those of 
their destination anyway. The DV variable suggests that the response to 
short term market pressures is also weak, in keeping with the model set 
out in Chapters Four and Five where for an existing owner occupier, 
price differentials are more important than generally rising prices.
The logarithmic equations tend to have superior goodness of fit with 
some differences in patterns of coefficient significance. Overall, 
then, there appear to be non-linearities although the I-statistics show 
no consistent pattern as to the preferred equation; in the limiting 
case, this would imply spatial autocorrelation of the residuals when 
logs are used as opposed to the linear form, or vice-versa, depending on 
the equation. There is no evidence of heteroskedasticity.
7 , 3 . 2  S P A T I A L  L O C A L  I N - M O V E R S .  E Q U A T I O N
The spatial equations, given in Table 7.3, show improved I-statistics 
and increased explanatory power, although for the equations which 
include the endogenous variables the differences are negligible. 
Coefficient significance falls generally with URD, U, and DV remaining 
insignificant. The lagged regressors are more significant than some of 
their unlagged counterparts, such as DVL (intermittently and with an 
unstable coefficient depending on the presence of endogenous variables) 
URDL and UL, which have positive and negative impacts respectively. The 
first result demonstrates a preference for the suburbs and this is 
reinforced by the dependence of the spatially lagged coefficient 
significance on the exclusion of the RV variable. The latter may
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reflect the fact that areas of high unemployment will be a source of 
fewer housing-related, moves, an effect which was not detected in the 
aspatial equations.
Tne endogenous regressors again lower the oil dummy significance (Table 
v.4) ou t . the laggec. variables tend to reduce the significance of tne 
endogenous variables themselves. This arises in part from the joint 
causality of lagged exogenous and unlagged endogenous variables.
As such, there are direct and indirect effects on the variable of 
interest, and these may be conflicting or reinforcing. This kind of 
collinearity is one reason for excluding lagged endogenous regressors 
even though such an inclusion is econometricaliy more correct, within 
the Sargan-Hendry methodology.
Local Authority rent levels are not significant which strengthens the 
view that the bulk of local movers are existing owners or their 
offspring.
The logarithmic equations again show superior fit whilst the I- 
statistics show no obviously preferred spatial fit. There is no 
evidence of heteroskedasticity.
The conclusions which can be drawn from these results are that the local 
in-movers variable is a reasonable proxy for housing-related moves. 
Spatial influences are apparent in the choice of area with a
T A B L E 7 . 3  S P A T I A L  L O C A L  I N - M O V E R S  E Q U A T I O N  ( D ( O L S )
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
( L O G S ) ( L O G S ) ( L O G S )
C - 0 .  0 3 - 0 .  0 3 - 0 .  0 3 - 1 . 9 - 3 . 4 - 2 . 3
( - 2 . 7 ) ( - 3 . 6 ) ( - 3 . 3 ) ( - 0 . 5 ) ( - 0 . 9 3 ) ( 0 . 6 8 )
O I L 0 .  0 0 6 1 . 1 1
( 0 . 8 1 ) ( 2 . 1 6 )
L A R L - 0 . 0 0 0 0 3 - 0 . 6 8
( - 0 . 8 3 ) ( - 0 . 9 1 )
U R D - 0 . 0 0 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 5 - 0 .  1 4 - 0 .  1 1 - 0 .  1 3
( - 0 . 1 7 ) ( 0 . 0 7 ) ( - 0 . 4 4 ) ( - 0 . 5 ) ( - 0 . 4 7 ) ( - 0 . 4 8 )
U R D L 0 .  0 0 3 0 .  0 0 0 2 0 .  0 2 3 0 .  7 4 0 . 9 8 0 . 8
( 1 . 5 7 ) ( 0 . 0 7 ) ( 1 .  1 ) ( 1 . 7 6 ) ( 2 . 2 4 ) ( 2 . 2 )
R V 0 . 0 0 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 0 0 7 1 . 2 1 . 2 3 1 .  4
( 3 . 1 2 ) ( 3 . 2 3 ) ( 3 . 4 8 ) ( 2 . 3 ) ( 2 . 5 9 ) ( 2 . 8 )
R V L 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 . 8
( 0 . 4 1 ) ( - 1 . 3 )
U 0 .  0 4 0 .  0 9 - 0 .  1 2 0 . 0 0 0 6
( 0 . 2 4 ) ( 0 . 5 6 ) ( - 0 . 8 6 ) ( 0 . 0 0 4 )
U L - 0 .  7 1 - 0 .  9 1 - 0 .  1 3 - 0 . 4 4
( - 1 . 9 7 ) ( - 2 . 0 6 ) ( - 0 . 5 ) ( - 1 . 8 8 )
B R T H 0 . 7 5 0 .  9 0 0 . 9  7 0 . 8 3 0 .  6 4 1 . 2
( 2 . 4 8 ) ( 3 .  1 ) ( 3 . 1 ) ( 1 . 1 2 ) ( 0 . 9 4 ) ( 1 . 8 4 )
B R T H L - 0 . 2 8 - 1 .  4 6 - 0 .  1 4 1 .  1 4 1 . 9 3 1 . 2
( - 0 . 6 6 ) ( - 2 . 7 ) ( - 0 . 5 1 ) ( 1 . 5 3 ) ( 5 . 6 3 ) ( 1 . 6 3 )
M H U L 0 .  0 1 2 0 .  0 4 1 .  2 6 1 . 3 7
( 0 . 8 ) ( 2 . 6 ) ( 0 . 8 ) ( 0 . 9 4 )
D V - 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 1 1 - 0 . 0 0 1 3 - 0 . 3 8 0 .  0 7 - 0 .  0 9
( - 0 . 3 9 ) ( 0 . 1 6 ) ( - 0 . 1 8 ) ( - 0 . 7 5 ) ( 0 . 1 5 ) ( - 0 . 1 3 )
D V L 0 . 0 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 7 1 . 3 2 .  2 1 . 6 7
( 0 . 0 5 ) ( - 0 . 2 6 ) ( 0 . 4 2 ) ( 0 . 9 5 ) ( 1 . 8 ) ( 1 . 3 5 )
R * 0 . 5 1 0 . 6 2 0 . 5 3 0 . 7 7 0 . 8 0 0 . 7 8
p : 0 . 2 8 0 . 3 1 - 1 .  4 9 0 .  1 2 0 .  1 8 0 .  2
B P _ — — _ _
T A B L E  '7 . 4  S P A T I  AT.  L O C A L I N - M O V E R S  E O U A - T I O N  ( I D ( O L S )
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
( L O G S ) ( L O G S ) ( L O G S )
C - 0 .  0 2 - 0 .  0 2 - 0 .  0 2 3 .  2 7 3 . 8 - 6 . 6
( - 1 . 9 7 ) ( - 3 . 4 ) ( - 3 . 3 ) ( 1 . 3 ) ( 1 . 5 ) ( - 3 . 0 )
I N L 0 . 6 - 0 .  0 4 - 0 .  1 0 . 3 4 0 .  2 9 - 0 .  0 9
( 2 . 9 ) ( - 0 . 3 ) ( - 0 . 8 ) ( 1 . 6 2 ) ( 1 . 3 ) ( - 0 . 5 7 )
O I L 0 .  0 1 0 .  0 0 5 0 .  0 0 2 ' 1 . 3 4 1 .  0 4 0 .  1 3
( 1 . 7 5 ) ( 1 . 0 4 ) ( 0 . 4 4 ) ( 2 . 4 ) ( 1 . 7 ) ( 0 . 4 7 )
U R D - 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 .  0 1
( - 0 . 8 6 ) ( 0 . 3 5 )
U R D L 0 .  0 0 5 1 . 6 1 . 3
( 3 . 3 4 ) ( 4 . 3 ) ( 3 .  1 )
U 0 .  0 0 2 0 .  2 0 .  1 - 0 .  0 4 - 0 .  0 2 0 .  1 4
( 0 . 1 3 ) ( 1 . 5 7 ) ( 1 . 5 ) ( - 0 . 3 2 ) ( - 0 . 1 6 ) ( 1 . 7 3 )
U L - 0 .  0 7 - 0 .  0 3 - 0 . 3 0 .  0 6 0 .  0 1 - 0 . 2 5
( - 0 . 2 ) ( - 0 . 1 6 )  ( - 1 . 2 4 ) ( 0 . 2 6 ) ( 0 . 0 6 ) ( - 1 . 6 )
B R T H 0 .  7 5 , 0 . 7 5 0 . 7 0 .  9 6 1 .  1 0 .  6 7
( 2 . 3 6 ) ( 3 . 0 ) ( 2 . 9 ) ( 1 . 4 4 ) ( 1 . 6 ) ( 1 . 3 8 )
B R T H L - 0 . 2 4 - 0 . 3 7 - 1 . 0 1 . 5 2 1 .  1 4 0 .  1 2
( - 0 . 7 7 ) ( - 1 . 3 9 ) ( - 2 . 4 ) ( 4 . 9 ) ( 2 . 6 8 ) ( 0 . 2 1 )
D V - 0 . 0 0 4 - 0 .  0 7
( - 0 . 5 ) ( - 0 . 1 4 )
D V L 0 .  0 2 - 0 .  0 1 - 0 .  0 2 2 .  7 5 2 .  2 4 - 1 .  3 1
( 0 . 7 ) ( - 1 . 1 ) ( - 1 . 5 ) ( 2 . 1 2 ) ( 1 . 6 7 ) ( - 1 . 6 )
O U T 0 . 5 2 0 .  4 5 0 .  6 4 0 .  7 3
( 4 . 9 ) ( 4 . 2 ) ( 6 . 8 ) ( 7 . 1 2 )
Q U T N - 0 . 3 6 - 0 .  3 6 - 0 . 5 1 - 0 .  5 3
( - 2 . 8 ) ( - 2 . 9 ) ( - 2 . 8 ) ( - 2 . 9 )
R O M - 0 .  0 4 - 0 .  0 2 - 0 . 2 - 0 .  1 8
( - 0 . 6 5 ) ( - 0 . 4 ) ( - 1 . 7 4 ) ( - 1 . 6 6 )
H H S E G L 0 . 0 0 0 2 0 .  0 3
( 1 . 9 5 ) ( 1 . 8 4 )
j p 0 . 5 3 0 . 7 8 0 . 8 0 0 . 7 7 0 .  7 7 0 . 9 :
p 0 .  1 1 0 .  1 9  ' 0 . 2 6 0 .  0 8 - 0 .  0 4 0 . 1 .
B P _ _ __ _ _
particularly strong effect .for movement from the cities to the suburbs, 
where local movers compete with those trading up (and presumably local, 
newly formed households) in the destination area. Local in-movers are 
heavily dependent on a supply of second-hand houses from local out- 
movers, rather than from non-local out-movers or new houses. These 
results are not inconsistent with the theoretical model which predicts a 
relationship between the distance of the move and the house price bid. 
For this result to be valid, it must be the case that the local in­
movers are unsuccessfully competing with non-local in-movers and this is 
confirmed in later equations.
Local in-movers are attracted to high quality housing in neighbourhoods 
with young families (i.e. with high birth rates) and are not moving to 
escape unemployment. Any market pressure effect yields counter 
intuitive coefficients, which suggests that Y > 1/b+a, The importance of 
spatial variables means that the number of submarkets is fewer than the 
number of districts with a minimum average distance for housing market 
interaction being 15 miles. Lastly, districts interact multiplicatively 
as do own district variables.
Z,.4.1.ASPATiAL_.m-LQCAL IN-MQVSRS EQUATION
The results for this group of movers are given in Table 7.5. The URD 
variable is negative and significant, except for the linear endogenous 
form. The logarithmic coefficient rises from -0.61 to -0.49 when the
TABLE.
C
URD
SEG
OIL
DV
OUT
OUTS'
RCM
TVR
R~-
x*
L_5 AoFATIAL SOS-LOCAL IS-MOVERS EQUATION- (01.80
(1)
0. 005 
(0.17) 
-0.004 
(-4.4) 
). 0001 
(0.62) 
0. 006 
(1.31) 
-0 . 01 
-2 . 21 )
(2)
0. 015 
(4.64) 
- 0.001 
(-1.44)
0. 79 
(2.27) 
-0.5 
(-0.92) 
-0. 33 
(-3.77) 
0. 46 
(3.7) 
0. 18 
(2.94) 
-0. 04 
(-0.47)
(3) 
(LOGS) 
- 12.6 
(-1 .1) 
-0. 61 
(-4.35) 
1.78 
(0.77) 
0. 14 
(0.47) 
-0. 81 
(-2 .2)
(4) 
(LOGS) 
-1.5 
(-2.1) 
-0. 49 
(-4.66)
0. 27 
(1.35) 
-0. 29 
(-1.19) 
-0. 19 
(-6.2) 
0. 55 
(4. 6) 
0. 23 
(3.23) 
- 0. 02 
(-0.11)
0.29 0. 60 0. 27 0. 71
0. 18 0 . 02 -0. 03 -1. 04
BP
SEG variable is excluded and the endogenous included, so that the 
pattern of non-local moves has an urban-rural bias and depends, to some 
extent, on the other endogenous variables. The positive significance of 
the oil-dummy rises on inclusion of the endogenous variables as does the 
overall equation fit. The DV variable is negative and significant in 
both the linear and logarithmic forms but becomes insignificant on 
inclusion of the endogenous regressors. The negative coefficient 
implies that V is high relative to 1/b+a as with the local in-movers 
equation, although the only endogenous variable with a significantly 
negative coefficient is OUT, so that.it is not possible to separate out 
the effects of repulsion of potential in-movers due to unsuitable 
housing (for reasons of size or quality) and sluggish price adjustment 
to excess supply.
The pattern of' significance on the endogenous variables implies that 
local outmovers have a moderately (in elasticity terms) negative effect 
on non-local in-movers, whilst non-local out-movers and newbuild have, 
respectively, strongly and moderately positive effects. This is not 
inconsistent with employment-related long distance movers reducing 
search costs by either purchasing new properties or those sold by other 
long distance movers. In keeping with the theoretical model, these 
latter households will offer any given quality of property at a 
proportionately lower asking price. As has already been demonstrated, 
however, all the dependent variables have an urban-rural bias so it is 
difficult to distinguish between the spurious and systematic effects;
Equation 4 of Table 7.5 shows URD maintaining its significance ficance 
despite the presence of the supply availability variables. The turnover
variable is negative but insignificant which suggests that intra­
district movers and employment-related movers rarely compete. Overall, 
the logarithmic endogenous equation has superior goodness of fit so non- 
linearities appear to be present; this may indicate the presence of 
structural breaks or spatial trend surfaces, either of which could occur 
if the non-local in-movers category actually contains at least two 
distinct categories of relocator. This will be investigated further 
later' in this chapter. There is no evidence of heteroskedasticity.
7.4.2 SPATIAL. IQS'-LOCAL Iff-MOVERS
The results for this group of movers when spatial variables are included 
are given in Table 7.6. The overall goodhess-of-fit ox the spatial 
equations yields little improvement over the aspatial but spatial 
autocorrelation is reduced in most cases. Two factors account for this; 
one is the increased ability of the long-distance mover to be successful 
in search, hence the reduced spatial search area; the other is that, 
being non-local, first order lag influences will not usually be 
generating moves; both processes will tend to reduce spatial 
interaction. There is no evidence of heteroskedasticity.
The negative significance of the URD variable rises when spatial lags 
are included, and URDL itself has a strong negative effect. The obvious 
implication is that non-local in-movers have a strong aversion to urban 
locations; this is in addition to the assumed attractive force of low 
unemployment. However, the unemployment variable is insignificant and
TABLE 7.6 SPAT IAL NOJST-LOCAL IN-MOVERS ECUATION (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(LOGS) (LOGS) (LOGS)
C 0. 01 0. 015 0. 02 -1.57 -7.56 -3.94
(4.3) (3.15) (11.5) (-2.2) (-5.36) (-3.52)
U 0. 17 -0.017
(1.11) (-0.15)
UL 0.28 -0. 16
(1.35) (-0.96)
DV -0.008 -0. 53
(-1.16) (-1.66)
DVL'l -0. 01
ooi -0. 05 -1. '12 -3. 0 -2.52
(-1.3) (-3.0) (-3.49) (-1.76) (-3.88) (-3.2)
OIL 0. 01 0. 007 0. 006 0. 22 -0. 49 0. '16
(2.25) (1.57) (1.59) (1.14) (-1.48) (0.59)
URD -0.002 -0.0036 -0.004 -0. 37 -0. 67 -0. 54
(-2.47) (-3.75) (-4.89) (-3.35) (-4.16) (-4.7)
URDL -0.003 -0.0009 -0.25 -0. 75
(-3.6) (-0.48) (-1.9) (-3.14)
RV 0.00001 0. 66
(0.68) (2.09)
RVL 0.00002 -0.04
(0.90) (-0.25)
OUT -0.54 -0. 19
(-5.86) (-6.21)
OUTN 0.39 0.55
(3.6) (4.6)
RCM 0. 18 0. 19
(3.3) (2.4)
TVR -0. 08 0.00007
(-1.0) (0.0004)
R;2 0.70 0.4 0,37 0.47 0.50 0.72
!* 0.13 -0.26 0.31 0.37 0.64 -0. 19
BP — — * _ _
the coefficient is unstable; this is probably due to collinearity with 
the urban-rural dummy.
The DVL variable is significant in the exogenous equations but this 
falls on inclusion of the endogenous variables as regressors, so that 
any apparent vacancy (i.e. price or market pressure) effects are 
probably operating on non-local in-movers indirectly, through the effect 
on out-movers. A reverse effect operates via URDL, since its 
significance rises when the dependent variables are included. This 
reinforces the view that non-local in-movers have a distinct nan-urban 
location preference whilst URDL is having a positive effect on QUTN or 
RCM. The negative coefficient on DVL is, once more, perverse and implies 
price overshooting.
The endogenous variable coefficients tend to be highly stable, with the 
exception of turnover. The pattern of significance is identical to the 
aspatial model. It seems clear, therefore, that non-local in-movers are 
dependent on a supply of housing from non-local out-movers and 
housebuilders, whilst local out-movers have a negative impact. This 
latter may arise from opposing responses to some common third factor, 
such as the urban-rural dummy or local in-movers with whom non-local in­
movers compete.
The oil dummy is positively significant in the linear equation when the 
dependent variables are present which underlines the employment-driven 
nature of long distance mobility. Rateable values are insignificant but 
collinearity with URD is strong.
'The logarithmic fit is again superior to the linear form, and this 
indicates the possible presence of two classes of movers creating 
apparent non-linearity. There appears to be one employment-related 
element of the non-local in-movers, particularly due to the oil boom, 
and one element who are anti-urban but otherwise undirected in their 
relocation behaviour; possibly households with a retiring head.
There are important differences between local and non-local in-movers, 
most obviously the degree of aversion to urban location, but also the 
employment and housing related motives for mobility. In both cases 
there is evidence that there are fewer submarkets than districts, but 
this is more obvious for the local movers. Both classes of relocaters 
are more sensitive to the availability of supply than they are to short 
term market pressures, which suggests that first-time buyers are only a 
small proportion of in-movers; they are the only category who do not 
possess an imperfectly "index-linked" asset to finance their purchase.
7.5.1 ASPATIAL LOCAL QUT-ttQVERS EQUATION
The results for this class of movers are given in Table 7.7. These 
equations exhibit some unusual characteristics, notably that the success 
of the linear version compared with the logarithmic reverses depending 
upon the inclusion of the endogenous variables. Unemployment rates, 
vacancy changes, and local authority rents are all insignificant, 
although in the logarithmic form the unemployment rate approaches 
significance. The negative sign probably reflects the dominating effect 
of a lack of buyers over the desire to leave a depressed area. The rent
TABLE 7 .7  ASPATIAL LOCAL OUT-MOVERS EQUATION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(LOGS) (LOGS) (LOGS)
c 0. 015 -0. 04 -0.009 -17. 3 3. 02 4. S
(0.34) (-2.57) (-0.79) (-0.6) (0.32) (1.8)
BV 0. 002 0. 045 -0.28 0. 11
(0.26) (0.66) (-0.36) (0.13)1—
1 0. 82 0.81
(6.98) (21.9)
INN 0.0026 -0. 1
(0.02) (-0.93)
TVR 0. 13 0. 75
(1.36) (3.7)
LAR -0.000007 -0.000002 0.7 -0. 01
(-0.29) (-0.1) (0.5) (-0.02)
OIL 0. 008 0.0007 1. 0 0.3
(1.65) (0.19) (1.4) (1.52)
U 0.05 -0. 38
(0.27) (-1.77)
MHU 0. 014 0. 016 5. 27 4.97
(1.74) - (2.11) (3.7) (3.57)
URD 0. 003 0. 003 0. 002 0.007 0.51 0. 001
(2.54) (2.34) (1.75) (0.014) . (1.12) (0.008)
RV 0.00006 0.00004 -0.00004 -1.5 -1. 17 -0. 64
(2.31) (2.22) (-2.34) (-1.92) (-1.70) (-3.3)
BRTH 0.33 0.72 -0.004 '1.59 1. 67 0. 07
(2.63) (2.27) (-0.02) (1.44) (1.47) (0.2)
SEG -0.0004 4.9
(-1.29) (0.80)
R2 0.33 0. 40 0.73 0.35 0.32 0.95
I* 0.3 -1.2 0. 04 -0.05 0.27 0. 13
BP — — _ _ _
level result indicates that those currently in public housing constitute 
a negligible proportion of local moves. The oil dummy is positive but 
below the threshold for significance, which implies a weak displacement 
of local households either due to lack of vacancies for trading up, or 
due to existing households extracting their equity from rising house 
prices and moving elsewhere.
The MHU variable is positive and generally significant, as are births 
and the urban-rural dummy. This means that despite collinearity, there 
are two related generators of local moves; one is the effect of 
potential demographic demand, the other is the repellent impact of urban 
locations. Taken together, this means that the strongest force acting on 
local out movers is pressure on living space, particularly in urban 
areas. (The significance of the births variable falls when the 
endogenous regressors are entered which is consistent with the 
attractant effect of births on in-movers).Rateable values are always 
negative but only significant in the linear equations when the 
endogenous variables are included. It follows that households in areas 
of high quality housing are less likely to move (probably due to lack of 
suitable alternatives). SEG is insignificant for the linear and 
logarithmic equations; collinearity with RV and URD is highly likely.
The inclusion of the endogenous variables results in a substantial 
increase in explanatory power, but this is due to local in-movers and, 
in the logarithmic form, turnover. Both are positive so that at least 
some of the intra-district movers are trading up and purchasing the 
houses of local out-movers; this suggests that the local out-movers are
already existing owners and are moving beyond the district for housing- 
related reasons rather than because of short term market pressure. In 
the logarithmic model, the coefficients on turnover and local in-movers 
(0.81 and 0.75) sum to greater than unity, implying instability; this 
probably results from collinearity between the two variables. Non-local 
in-movers have an insignificant coefficient, and whilst this will result 
in part from differing spatial distributions of these classes of movers, 
it will also be due to their operation in different strata of house type 
submarkets. None of the equations show evidence of heteroskedasticity.
7.5.2 SPATIAL LOCAL OUT-MOVERS EQUATION
The spatial results for this group of movers are given in Table 7.8.
The spatial exogenous equations provide a superior fit over the 
aspatial, but there is little difference as regards the endogenous, so 
that much of the apparent spatial effect is due to simultaneity. 
Nevertheless, the I statistics show some improvement. There is no 
evidence of heteroskedasticity.
The unemployment level and its lag are insignificant so no systematic 
effect, repellent or otherwise, is operating, probably because local 
movers are already in suitable employment and are relocating because of 
changes in their vertical location in the labour market, rather than 
altering their chosen labour market. This is consistent with the 
findings for local in-movers. As in the aspatial case, the positive 
significance of births and, now, the negative near-significance of 
lagged births falls when the endogenous variables are included; this
TABLE 7.8 SPATIAL LOCAL OUT-MOVERS EQUATION
CL) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(LOGS) (LOGS) (LOGS)
C -0.048 -0.027 -0.022 4. 59 0.94 -6.34
(-4.13) (-2.3) (-1.84) (1.76) CO.58) (-2.08)
OUTL -0.055 -0.35 -0. 36 0. 19 -0. 25 -0. 18
(-0.25) (-2.03) (-1.98) (0.72) (-1.58) (-1.18)
OIL 0. Oil 0. Oil 0. 012 1. 26 0. 78 0. 72
(2.42) (2.69) (2.77) (2.45) (2. 7) (2. 5)
U -0.055 0. 14 0. 17 -0.009 0. 06 0. 1
(-0.32) (0.96) (1.18) (-0.07) (0.83) (1.44)
UL -0. 56 -0. 08 -0. 16 0. 1 0. 03 -0. 04
(— 1.51) (-0.26) (-0.49) (0.48) (0.83) (-0.36)
BRTH 0.63 -0. 05 0. 02 1. 42 0 . 05 0.34
(2.15) (-0.19) (0.08) (2.21) (0.12) (0.85)
BRTHL -0.77 -0. 18 -0. 36 1. 01 0. 72 0. 04
(-1.76) (-0.52) (-0.98) C1.97) (2.39) (0.08)
MHU 0. 022 0. 018 1. 64 1. 61
(2.65) (2.49) (1.84) (2.94)
MHUL 0. 031 0. 014 -0. 93 0. 017
(2.10) (1.13) (-0.54) (0.02)
HHSEG 0,00009 1.7.
(1.76) (3.17)
HHSEGL 0.00013 -0.5
(1.48) (-1.6)
IN 0.47 0. 41 0.63 0.58
(3.87) (3.34) (8.4) (7.83)
INN -0. 37 -0. 44 -0.34 -0. 39
(-2.42) (-2.88) (-2.5) (-3.04)
TVR 0. 18 0. 19 0.72 0.77
(1.80) (1.77) (3.19) (3.34)
URD 0. OO'i -0.00007 -0.00013 0, 26 -0. 04 -0. 05
(1.21) (-0.07) (-0.11) (1.01) (-0.27) (-0.35)
URDL 0. 002 0. 002 0.0016 1. 11 0.27 0. 16
(0.81) (1.16) (0.81) (2.9) (1. 18) (0.67)
DV 0.0001 0.08
(0.15) (0.17)
DVL 0.003 -0.009 -0.013 2.2 0. 19 -0. 09
(0.16) (-0.75) (-1.03) (2.0) (0.28) (-0.13)
R* 0.58 0. 75 0. 74 0.84 0.95 0.95
I* -1.28 -0. 7 -0. 08 -4.3 -1.7 -1.5
BP _ _ — _
underlines the fact that any impact on out-movers is through the 
availability of demand rather than direct movement generation or 
attraction. The oil dummy is always positive and significant in the 
spatial form, which reinforces the response of local out-movers to oil 
market induced pressure. Obviously this will include a shortage of 
suitably priced vacancies for households who would otherwise trade up.
The MHU variable is positively significant but the lagged version 
becomes insignificant when the endogenous variables are included. The 
situation here is similar to that for births, in that any spatial impact 
is indirect and indistinguishable from that of the dependent variables.
The urban-rural dummy and its lag are insignificant in most equations, 
unlike the aspatial version. This may arise from collinearity between 
this dummy and some of the spatially lagged regressors which means that 
housing-related moves, such as those from the city to the suburbs, are 
being decomposed into their components; that is, the attractive forces 
of peer-group areas with increased lot size acting as the "draw" to 
families with children.
The negative impact of non-local in-movers is increased in the spatial 
equations. The implication is that any desired move out of an area is 
prevented by competition from long-distance movers searching over a 
number of contiguous districts. This is in direct apposition to the 
findings for the behaviour of long distance movers discussed earlier 
which suggested search within a localised area. It is possible for this 
latter to be the case whilst finding general out-mover and in-mover
competition if the spatial incidence of these two classes of mover 
happens to be coincident, and this will only in general be the case in 
the oil-related areas. The fall in significance of the urban-rural 
dummy, partly to the benefit of long distance migrants, is also 
indicative of the very different spatial distribution of these classes 
of mover. It follows that inference of causality in this particular 
case may be inappropriate. The spatial equation yields more stable 
estimates of' the IH and TVR coefficients,
The process which emerges is of young families, primarily existing 
owner-occupiers, currently located in cities, moving to suburbs in order 
to locate with similar households and presumably to gain access to 
desirable suburban facilities and space. Such relocators are not always 
successful due to competition from employment related long distance 
movers but are dependent on in-migrant and trading up households to 
purchase their previous residences. The dependence of out-movers on in­
movers is not as great as that of in-movers on out-movers; suggesting 
that in this market segment, there is excess demand. The generally weak 
impact of spatial variables indicates that push factors predominate.
The primary driving force is demographic rather than earnings-related, 
and there is little impact from short term market effects, with the 
possible exception of those persuaded to relocate in order to realise 
windfall profits.
7 . 6 . 1  ASPATIAL CT-LQCAL GUT-MQVERS EQUATION
The results for this class of mover are given in Table 7.9. In general, 
the fit of these equations is very poor. There is a large increase in 
explanatory power when the endogenous variables are included and there 
is no evidence of heteroskedasticity. It seems a priori likely that 
this variable will be the most difficult to model given that long­
distance out-movers will be attracted by employment opportunities in 
other areas, rather than responding to effects operating in their 
district of residence. As in the local out-movers equations, whether 
logarithmic or linear forms fit better depends on whether the endogenous 
variables are present.
The only significant regressor in the exogenous equations is DV in the 
linear formulation, with a negative coefficient. The oil dummy is 
negative but falls short of significance, whilst the unemployment rate, 
the urban-rural dummy, rateable values, SEG and MHU are all 
insignificant. This indicates, in particular, that any urban or rural 
bias in long distance out-migrants is not apparent.
The endogenous variables show non-local in-movers and turnover to be 
significant and positive in the linear case, suggesting that long 
distance out-movers are in the upper echelons of the housing market and 
sell their houses to intra-district movers trading up or to non-local 
in-movers. This latter result is consistent with the predictive model 
in Chapters Four and Five which implies that all long distance movers 
will favour reduced search periods and will bid or offer house prices
TABLE...7. 9 AS.P_AT.IAL 3TQK-LOCAL QUT-MOVERS EQUATION
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
( L O G S ) ( L O G S :
c 0 .  0 3 - 0 .  0 1 - 5 . 5 - 1 .  7 5
( 0 . 7 7 ) ( - 1 . 0 ) ( - 0 . 5 6 ) ( - 1 . 3 9 )
u - 0 . 0 0 4 6 0 .  0 4
( - 0 . 0 3 ) ( 0 . 5 2 )
D V - 0 . 0 1 4 - 0 . 5 0
( - 2 . 1 7 ) ( - 1 . 7 3 )
i n 0 .  0 8 5 0 .  0 5
( 0 . 7 0 ) ( 1 . 3 8 )
I M 0 .  5 2 0 . 5 0
( 3 . 7 9 ) ( 4 . 4 2 )
T V R 0 . 2 3 0 . 3 4
( 2 . 3 6 ) ( 1 . 7 7 )
O I L - 0 . 0 0 5 6 - 0 . 0 0 7 - 0 .  2 6 - 0 . 3 2
( - 1 . 3 ) ( - 1 . 8 5 ) ( - 0 . 9 7 ) ( - 1 . 6 7 )
U R D - 0 . 0 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 4 0 .  1 3
( - 0 . 5 6 ) ( 0 . 0 1 ) ( - 0 . 2 2 ) ( 0 . 9 0 )
R V 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 . 2 1 0 .  1 5
( 0 . 3 4 ) ( 0 . 1 8 ) ( 0 . 7 9 ) ( 0 . 7 7 )
S E G - 0 . 0 0 0 0 5 0 .  0 9
( - 0 . 1 7 ) ( 0 . 0 4 )
M H U - 0 . 0 0 7 0 .  0 5 7 - 0 . 6 7 0 . 2 7
T o ( 0 . 8 8 ) ( - 1 . 4 3 ) ( 0 . 5 8 )
R 2 0 .  0 2 0 .  3 7 0 .  0 5 0 .  3 2
T ••!!•1"' 0 .  1 - 0 .  0 3 1 . 1 7  ■ 0 .  6 2
B P — _
appropriately. Conversely, local in-movers operate in a different 
market. Turnover is not significant in the logarithmic form.
7.6.2 SPATIAL NQff-LQCAL QUT-MOVERS EQUATION
The spatial results for these movers are reported in Tables 7.10 and 
7.11. A larger number of equations than usual are reported due to the 
relatively low explanatory power which results. The equations which 
show most improvement in overall fit are the linear and logarithmic ones 
which include births and the urban-rural dummy as positively significant 
regressors. This is interesting given the lack of relationship that 
exists with local in-movers, because it indicates that this is not 
purely due to the spatial distribution.
In most of the equations the DV variable is insignificant whilst its 
lagged value is sometimes significant and negative; this falls on 
inclusion of the births variable so there is a possibility of 
collinearity amongst some of the lagged variables. This negative 
coefficient implies that a shortage of vacancies in an adjoining 
district will increase the number of non-local out-movers. This is 
consistent with a number of processes, such as high competition in the 
district of residence and its neighbours either preventing would-be 
local migrants from relocating nearby or providing a more buoyant market 
for the sale of properties. The result for DV in the exogenous model is 
also consistent with these processes. Either way, there does appear to 
be some price and market pressure sensitivity amongst this class of 
movers, but this is overshadowed by the impact of demand availability.
TABLE 7 . IQ SPATIAL IQ1T-LQCAL OUT-MOVERS EQUATION- (T)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(LOGS) (LOGS) (LOGS)
C 0. 03 0. 02 -0.007 -5. 44 0. 71 -0. 6
(3.34) (1.96) (-0.7) (-4.06) (0.52) (-0.58)
o u m 0.3 0. 46
(1.18) Cl. 66)
U 0.21 0. 18 -0. 07 0. 12 0. 11 0. 08
(1.34) (1.22) (-0.45) (1.44) (1.57) (1.13)
UL 0.34 0. 45 0. 13 0.23 -0. 02
(2.55) (1.44) (0.76) (1.82) (-0.4)
DV -0.009 -0.006 -0. 36 -0.20
(-1,44) (-0,oo) (-1,26) (“Or 74)
DVL -0.025 -0. 02 -0.005 -1.61 -0.91 -0.8
(-1.87) (-1.39) (-0.37) (-2.34) (-1.41) (-1.27)
URD 0.0005 0. 001 0. 05 0.24
(0.51) (1.46) (0.32) (1.64)
URDL 0.004 0. 001 0. 07 0. 16
(2.06) (0.60) (0.30) (0.76)
RV 0.00001 0. 42
(0.81) (1.49)
RVL 0.00001 0. 03
(0.01) (0.16)
BRTH 0.72 1. 16
(2.77) (3.4)
BRTHL -0.56 -0. 79
(-1.3) (-2.33)
MHU -0.015 -0.018 0. 6 -0.82 -0.34 0. 08
(-2.3) (-2.47) (0. 9) (-1.42) (-1.65) (0.17)
MHUL -0.02 -0.005 -0. 64 -0. 81
(-2.33) (-0.42) (-0.66) (-0.79)
OIL -0.002 -0.003 -0.009 -0. 17 0. 07 -0.37
(-0.47) (-0.60) (-2.26) (-0.56) (0.25) (-1.66)
IN 0. 06 0. 05
(0,6) (0.94)
INN 0. 48 0. 34
(3. 1) (2.64)
TVR 0. 18 0.52
(2. 0) (2.67)
R* 0.22 0.32 0.28 0. 15 0. 16 0.30
T'+: 0.08 -0. 12 -0. 02 2.1 1.64 0.87
BP — — _ _ _
TABLE 7 . 11  SPATIAL. NON-LOCAL QUT-MOVERS EQUATION ( T I )
c -0.007 i o o 3. 1 i—* o CO
(-0.66) (-1.67) (1.17) (0.82)
OUTJIL 0. 16 0. 16
(0.64) (0.65)
OIL -0.007 -0.008 0. 06 -0. 44
(-1.73) (-2.57) (0.22) (-2.28)
U -0.008 0. 1
(-0.58) C1.68)
fJL -0. 06 0. 09
(-0.2) (0.84)
BRTH 1. 02 0. 59 1.24 0. 68
(3,87) (2.91) (3.62) (2.21)
BRTHL -0.8 -0.25 -0.83 -0. 03
(-2.1) (-2.1) (-2.04) (-0.3)
HHSEG -0.00005 -0. 06
(-1.16) (-0.13)
HHSEGL 0.00007 -0.52
(0.82) (-1.63)
URD 0. 003 0. 4
(2.87) (2.9)
URDL -0.001 0.23
(0.54) (1.5)
III -0. 02 0. 06 -0. 05 0. 03
(-0.17) (0.69) (-0.8) (0.55)
I M 0.56 0. 46 0. 4 0.36
(3.76) (4.2) (3.5) (3.74)
TVR -0.024 0.2 0. 06 0. 37
(-0.22) (2.86) (0.3) (2.43)
DVL -0.008 -0. 01 -0. 16 -0. 76
(-0.58) (-1.04) (-0.26) (-1.35)
R2 0.47 0. 44 0.48 0.37
I* -0.04 -0. 07 0.94 1.28
BP _ _ _
Demographic factors seem to play a role particularly in mobility arising 
from births. The measure of overcrowding has a negative impact which is 
unusual, since MHU tends to be positively associated with births, but 
births and minimal household units represent different stages of the 
family life cycle in that a high number of potential households will be 
the result of older children and young adults living with parents. It 
follows that this result implies that non-local out-movers are younger 
than other migrants, a conclusion which contradicts the hypothesis that 
this group are higher per capita income households; unless they are both 
young and high income which implies a higher socio-economic group. This 
is in accordance with the long distance migration pattern but the only 
evidence for it is the positively significant coefficient for URD in the 
later equations, where RV does not appear and SEG has been entered as an 
element of the composite HHSEG variable.
The unemployment level is insignificant in all equations but the lag 
does have an important effect if births and lagged births are excluded; 
again this indicates some correlation between the lags. The unemployment 
coefficients suggest some movement to avoid job scarcity, but this 
effect is not strong, and is unstable. The oil dummy is negative and 
significant in some equations, which underlines the view of long­
distance movers as respondng primarily to employment opportunities.
The conclusion is that the spatial formulation has only a limited impact 
on long distance out-movers, and this is also seen in the I-statistics 
which are almost unchanged compared with the aspatial. The equations 
show the continued strength of the oil market and the effect that this
has on mobility. There are some demographic determinants but these 
suggest that the long' distance migrants are younger than average. It 
rpiiuW* piyax tne main gaxermingnTs ox ioug dist-a-ucs out-moves era puii 
factors in other areas, and effective modelling of this would require 
higher order lags; these are precluded by collinearitv of nifi'her order 
lags due to the smoothing effect of the lagging process. There does not 
seem to be any particular spatial pattern for out-movers, and whilst 
their destinations may be spatially focused (as non-local in-movers) 
this will be the only category of households which may leave the system 
entirely.
7.7.1 ASPATIAL OUT-MIGRANT HEW HOUSEHOLDS EQUATION
The group of migrants whose behaviour is modelled in Table 7.12 are all 
newly farmed households who are leaving a district. This is the only 
identifiable subset of all newly formed households. Any differences 
which exist between the out-moving newly formed households and new 
households in general will be similar to the differences between 
turnover and local or non-local outmovers.
Overall, the level of explanatory power is reasonable and rises, as 
usual, on inclusion of the endogenous variables. There is no evidence 
of heteroskedasticity. The demographic variables, births and minimal 
household units, are positive and generally significant which is in 
keeping with expectations given that any form of overcrowding will 
prompt the creation of a new household if this is feasible. The result
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TABLE 7 . 12  ASPATIAL OUT-MIGRANT NEW HOUSEHOLD EQUATION
(1) (2) (3> (4) (5) (6)
(LOGS') (LOGS) (LOGS)
c 0. 13 -0. 05 -0. 1 58. 9 11.3 6. 4
(1.59) (-1.83) (-5.3) (3.61) (2.16) (2.24)
u 0. 19 0. 15 -0. 11 -0. 1
(0.58) (0.48) (-0.95) (-0.74)
OIL -0.008 -0. 06 -0. 63 -0.67
(-1.0) (-0.9) (-1.44) (-1.53)
BRTH 1. 78 0.95 2. 47 2. 39
(3.28) (1.75) (3.83) (3.47)
DV 0. 018 0.86
(1.39) (1.9)
LAR -0.000002 0.00001 -0.25 -0. 20
(-0.06) (0.32) (-0.32) (-0.25)
URD 0. 002 0. 003 -0.003 0. 08 0. 16 0.17
(1.02) (1.55) (-1.55) (0.31) (0.57) (0.60)
RV 0. 18 -0.00007 -0. 04 -1. 03
(0.03) (-2.09) (-0.09) (-2.68)
SEG -0.001 -12. 5
(-1.7) (-3.53)
MHU 0. 04 0. 03 0. 07 1.96 0. 89 2. 07
(2.64) (2. 03) (5.2) (2.50) (1.12) (2.04)
IN -0. 05 0. 02
(-0.3) (0.29)
I M 0.4 i o o
Cl. 55) (-0.2)
TVR 0.8 0. 49
(3.85) (1.44)
R~- 0.22 0.30 0. 47 0. 34 0.33 0.51
I* 0. 1 -0.31 0.06 0.2 0.84 -1.4
BP _ _
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ior Dirtas snouiQ dc assessso. xsxing i11xo sccounX Xiie fact Xiisx ix is a 
moving average. The assumption is that during the model sample period, 
expected births were those which actually occurred (in general!) in 
1982. Inclusion of the births variable is based on the hypothesis that 
mobility is a function of expected and actual births, and in particular 
that a significant proportion of newly formed households only leave 
their existing residence because of an imminent birth, or in order to 
marry with a birth shortly afterwards.
The RV and SEG variables can be seen to be acting as perfect 
substitutes for one another, in that their significances vary strongly 
when one or other is added to the equation. The strongly negative 
coefficient on each of these variables indicates that the newly formed 
households are more constrained in their choice than all other migrant 
groups. There will be some overlap in the composition of local out- 
movers and newly-formed out-migrant households, as can be seen in the 
similar reactions to demographic influences. The urban-rural dummy also 
shows some' effect but never reaches significance, partly due to the 
presence of RV or SEG. The oil dummy has a negative but insignificant 
impact; this is compatible with fewer newly forming households in the 
Aberdeen City area but with a reduced proportion of new households 
forming in the two outlying districts, who subsequently are compelled to 
leave the area to find a residence. This would indicate that the newly 
formed household's search process is a highly localised one, imposed by 
a strong budget constraint which impacts both on search and on bids in 
excess of valuations.
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The local authority rents variable is insignificant in every equation, 
so that very few oi the new households are public sector tenants induced 
to seek owner occupation because of high rent levels. It is still 
feasible that this effect operates but only on those who purchase their 
own council houses, a scheme which at the time of preparing this thesis 
was not fully implemented. No such effect is detectable in the turnover 
equation either, but this will be discussed later in this chapter when 
estimates for this variable are reported.
The DV variable yields positive coefficients which borders on 
significance in the logarithmic form. This is, as in other equations, a 
perverse result which implies price overshooting; the only circumstances 
under which it is not perverse are if out-migrant and intra-district new 
households occur in stable proportions. Given the result here for the 
oil dummy and the general incidence of counter-intuitive, but 
significant, coefficients on the DV variable this appears to be unlikely 
and consequently the price overshooting phenomenon appears to be 
pervasive.
The unemployment regressor is insignificant which may indicate that 
those new households with the financial capacity to purchase a dwelling
are spatially distributed independently of areas of high and low
unemployment; this in turn implies that they are of a higher socio­
economic group than most households in the area; this is in keeping with
the model developed earlier which posits that higher SEG groups will 
have a higher spatial scale of operation. Newly forming households 
located randomly (say) will gravitate towards their own SEG types.
It is questionable which, if any, of the endogenous variables should be 
included but in the interests of avoiding excessive multicollinearity, 
only the in-movers and turnover figures are included. Of these the non­
local in-movers have a positive but insignificant effect; the sign is as 
expected but so is the insignificance given that competition between 
these two classes of movers is unlikely. The turnover variable is 
positive and significant with- the implication that new households face 
competition from intra-district movers, both existing owners and new 
households, and leave the district due to such displacing forces. The 
insignificance of local in-movers is surprising but may reflect the 
absence of existing out-mover owners from the dependent variable; 
nevertheless the implication is that new households and local in-movers 
do not compete which indicates that they operate in different strata of 
the market.
There is little difference in explanatory power between the linear and 
logarithmic formulations.
7.7.2 SPATIAL GUT-MIGRAFT HEW HOUSEHOLD EQUATION
The spatial equations are reported in Table 7.13 and show little 
improvement in explanatory power apart from the linear endogenous form, 
which has an R2 more than double that of the logarithmic. The I- 
statistics generally show little change, but these are only indicative. 
In general the patterns of significance are similar, but it is worth 
noting that URBL and DVL are close to significance (positive and 
negative respectively) The former indicates a suburban attractive force
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IABLE 7. 13 _SPAT.IAI OUT-HIGRANT IE V  HOUSEHOLD EQUATION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(LOGS) (LOGS)
c 0. 02 -0. 07 8.68 9. 8
(0.63) (-2.8) (1.47) (2.33)
u 0.25 0.1 -0. 07 0. 08
(0.58) (0.46) (-0.47) (0.57)
UL 1. 07 0. 005 0. 09 -0.013
(1.50) (0.01) (0.31) (-0.06)
DV 0. 03 0.95
(1.89) (1.77)
DVL -0. 06 0. 04 -2. 03 0. 29
(-1.88) (2. 1) (-1.56) (0.28)
LAR -0.00004 0.00005 -1. 16 0. 57
(-0.10) (1.73) (-1.31) (0.87)
LARL -0.00002 0.00001 0.37 0.50
(-0.30) (0.46) (0.52) (0.96)
URD 0. 002 0.00006 -0. 11 -0.3
(0.79) (0. 03) (-0.34) (-1.18)
URDL 0. 006 0. 002 0.74 0. 38
(1.42) (0. 9) (1.33) (1. 1)
RV -0.00007 -0.00008 -1.29 -1.86
(-1.72) (-3.01) (-2.40) (-4.4)
RVL -0.00001 -0.00003 -0. 24 -0. 11
(-0.18) (-0.68) (-0.27) (-0.16)
MHU 0. 03 0. 04 2. 29 2. 1
(1.68) (3. 1) (2.05) (2.4)
MHUL -0. 01 -1.44
(-0.38) (-0.76)
IN -0. 04 -0. 07
(-1.93) (-0. 4)
INN -0.25 -0. 02
(-0.85) (-0.07)
TVR 0.34 1.67
(1.79) (4.24)
Rfi 0.24 0. 74 0.23 0.33
0. 15 -0.11 0.24 0. 17
BP _ _
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despite the significantly negative RV coefficient, whilst the DVL result 
suggests, as usual, price overshooting. This coefficient becomes 
significant when the endogenous variables are included, but also changes 
sign; this means that some of the lagged vacancy effect is spurious and 
that in fact, at the lower end of the market, there may be fairly rapid 
price response to excess supply. The local authority rents variable is 
positive and almost significant in the endogenous equation but generally 
this effect is not important.
The local in-movers regressor is negative (as opposed to expectations) 
and almost significant but this is not repeated in the logarithmic form 
and seems to be at the expense of the turnover variable, so the analysis 
for the aspatial equations is probably still valid. The urban-rural 
dummy is not significant whilst the rateable value coefficient remains 
negative and usually significant. Births are excluded since the IHU 
variable seems, in this case, to act as an adequate proxy for both.
The general conclusion is that spatial effects are weak, implying that 
it is primarily push factors that operate on new households. They 
appear to face considerable competition from other market actors and 
want to locate close to cities (presumably for employment reasons) but 
are barred from locating in areas of high rateable values. They are 
responsive to the attractant effect of slack markets which implies that 
for the lower end of the market (where they have no competitors) prices 
adjust more rapidly than is generally the case. Further to this, newly- 
formed households tend to have a smaller scale of spatial search and 
there is evidence that a small proportion are dissuaded from entering or
TABLE. 7.14 ASPATI AL NEV BITILDING EQUATION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(LOGS) (LOGS)
c 0. 024 i o o o tJI -4.2 0.8
(3.72) (-0.67) (-2.28) (0.6)
DV -0.004 -3.8
(-0.34) (-0.75)
OIL 0.013 0. 006 0.70 0. 5
(1.59) (0.8) (1.75) (1.43)
URD -0.002 -0.004 -0.24 -0. 15
(-1.30) (-2. 03) f-1.1) (-0.73)
RV -0 .000006 0. 03
(-0.20) (0.08)
LAND 0.0025 0. 002 -0.008 -0.007
(1.30) (1.5) (-0.1) (-0.11)
IN 0.3 0. 13
(1.7) (2.07)
INN 0.6 0.5
(2.4) (2.65)
TVR 0.5 0. 67
(2.5) (1.97)
RP- 0. 08 0. 33 0. 04 0. 23
I* -1. 6 -1. 25 0.2 0. '17
BP
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(more realistically) are persuaded to leave the council sector due to 
high rent levels.
7.8.1 ASPAT IAL BUILDING EQUATION
The aspatial results for the rate of new building are reported in Table 
7.14. The overall fit of the new building equations is poor, and 
significantly enhanced by the addition of the endogenous variables.
There is no evidence of heteroskedasticity. The linear form seems to be 
preferred to the logarithmic.
The oil and urban-rural dummies are most affected by the inclusion of 
the endogenous variables. In the case of the oil dummy, the coefficient 
is positive but never attains significance even in the exogenous form, 
so that builders are either unwilling or unable to respond to the 
manifest demand pressure in these areas. The urban-rural dummy result 
indicates an aversion to urban sites generally, but the t-ratio varies 
depending on whether the form is linear or logarithmic, being 
significant only in the endogenous linear case. The apparent effect of 
either of these two variables may arise from constraints operating on 
builders, such as zoning controls (i.e. lack of planning permission) or 
lack of suitable brownfield sites to purchase for redevelopment. The 
LAUD variable (the ratio of land held but without planning permission to 
land held with planning permission) tests the former hypothesis subject 
to the provisos discussed in Chapter Six, and whilst it has a positive 
coefficient, it is insignificant. It tends to approach significance in 
the linear form. Collinearity with the urban-rural dummy cannot be
ruled out, and there are other land-related effects passible which this
variable will fail to detect.
The rateable values coefficient is insignificant and this is the case 
even in equations (not reported) which exclude the urban-rural dummy; 
the implication being that housebuilders are not dependent on existing 
neighbourhood housing quality in order to "fix" the image of their- 
product, and housebuilders supply all strata of the market as far as 
these strata have a clear spatial distribution.
The vacancy rate variable is negative but insignificant, implying that 
housebuilders do not react to localised short-term market pressure.
This is not necessarily inconsistent with the literature discussed in 
Chapter Four which suggested that builders provide upmarket properties 
in boom times and aim for volume when the market is depressed, since the 
statement here is of the spatial distribution of building. It follows 
that housebuilders are confident of creating their own market in terms 
of the spatial location of the product; this is consistent with the 
result for rateable values, above.
All three endogenous variables have a positive impact on the rate of 
newbuilding, particularly non-local in-movers. The elasticities which 
are estimated in the logarithmic model imply instability if the spatial 
destinations of all three were to coincide, but this is unlikely. The 
strong result for these three endogenous variables is in accordance with 
the suggestion above that builders are addressing all housing market 
strata, and is also the pattern expected if builders are following a
Cf,,'h v
completion to order strategy. This in turn implies either that builders 
make no major errors in spatial targetting of their output, or that they 
possess sufficient market power viz-a-viz those offering second hand 
houses that they can guarantee occupancy of a property once built. 
Nevertheless it also highlights the dependence of the builder on the 
availability of short-term demand.
7.3.2 SPATIAL NEV BUILDING EQUATION
The spatial equation estimates are given in Table 7.15 and show some 
improvement in explanatory power over the aspatial forms in the 
exogenous case, and this is underlined by the reduction in the absolute 
value of the I-statistics; this is also apparent in the endogenous 
equations. As before, the linear equations demonstrate superior fit 
over the logarithmic.
The main points to notice concerning the spatial equations are the 
negative significance of the lagged vacancies regressor and the 
reduction in significance of the urban-rural dummy. Given that the 
t-ratio of DVL falls on inclusion of the dependent variables, the 
apparent importance of DVL may be spurious, but the coefficient still 
approaches significance in the logarithmic endogenous form. If there is 
a residual attractive effect from neighbouring high vacancy rates, then 
this is another example of perverse signs and hence of price 
overshooting.
3 0 4
IABLE 7 .  1 5  SPATIAL NEW B U T LDING EQUATION1
( 1 ) ( 2 ) .* O \ r ,1 \
(LOGS) (LOGS:
c 0 .  0 2 0 .  0 0 1 - 5 .  0 3 - ' 1 . 4
( 3 . 8 0 ) ( 0 . 1 4 ) ( - 2 . 5 5 ) ( - 0 . 4 )
RCML 0 .  1 0 . 2
( 0 . 6 3 ) ( 1 . 3 )
OIL 0 .  0 1 0 .  32
( 1 . 1 7 ) ( 0 . 7 8 )
DV 0 .  0 0 6 - 0 .  0 7
( 0 . 4 6 ) ( - 0 . 1 4 )
DVL - 0 .  0 7 - 0 .  0 1 - 3 . 2 9 - 1 . 9
( - 2 . 4 9 ) ( - 0 . 4 ) ( - 2 . 8 4 ) ( - 1 . 8 )
URD - 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 .  1 5
( - 1 . 4 2 ) ( - 0 . 7 0 )
URDL •- 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 - 0 .  4 6
( - 0 . 0 1 ) ( - 1 . 4 8 )
RV - 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 9 0 .  2 2 0 . 3
( - 0 . 4 2 ) ( - 3 . 1 ) ( 0 . 5 5 ) ( 1 . 3 4 )
III 0 .  6 6 0 .  0 1 5
( 2 . 9 ) ( 0 . 1 4 )las
i—
i 0 .  3 4 0 . 3
( 3 . 5 ) ( 1 . 3 4 )
TVR 0 .  3 5 0 . 6 3
( 2 . 2 ) ( 1 . 8 5 )
LAUD 0 .  0 0 4 0 .  0 0 2 0 .  0 3 0 .  0 2
( 1 . 8 9 ) ( 1 . 6 3 ) ( 0 . 3 9 ) ( 0 . 3 3 )
R- 0 .  1 6 0 .  3 3 0 .  ' 1 5 0 . 2 4
p t, - 2 .  1 -1. 14 0 .  1 6 - 0 .  4 4
BP _
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As indicated in the aspatiai equations, there does not seem to be any 
particular spatial bias in the pattern of building, with rateable values 
still showing no significance although in the linear formulation, the 
lagged variable has a positive impact so that there is a need, albeit 
spatially weak, for builders to use a neighbourhood image to sell their 
product. The oil dummy is now insignificant but the .LAND variable t- 
ratio rises slightly, so collinearitv may still be a problem.
As for the aspatiai equations, the endogenous variables dominate in 
terms of explanatory power in the linear case, although t-ratios are 
lower in the logarithmic form. Given the higher significance for DVL in 
this latter case, there may be some collinearitv. This may imply that 
builders can effectively manipulate vacancy levels in adjoining 
districts which is consistent with the suggestion that the builder can 
create a market, drawing demand away from other areas. The coefficient 
for turnover remains positive, indicating that those households trading 
up have, on average, found the market to be in a state of excess demand.
In conclusion, it would appear that builders are effective at spatially 
targetting demand and that (presumably through effective marketing) are 
capable of drawing migrants away from other locations. They supply 
houses in a broad range of spatial areas and to a number of different 
housing market strata, but particularly appeal to non-local migrants, 
who will wish to minimise search time. Builders are capable of 
operating with the minimum of dependence on the local housing market, 
both in terms of the state of local market pressure and local market 
quality. In practice, there are probably two classes of builders, as
has already been described in Chapter Four. National builders will 
possess considerable market power and can manipulate location decisions, 
but local builders will passively accept demand location and market 
price. Ambiguity in results may arise if the spatial distribution of 
activity of local and national builders varies.
7.9.1 ASPATIAL TURNOVER EQUATION
In the equations discussed thus far, it has become apparent that 
turnover can play a key role in the migrant behaviour of a number of 
household groups. As constructed, this variable consists of a 
heterogeneous series of migrant groups. Turnover will include newly 
formed households moving within the district and all households trading 
up; it follows that the degree of heterogeneity of the latter group will 
depend an the number of housing market strata that exist. It has been 
estimated that the average UK household moves once every seven years, 
and assuming a housing career lifetime of similar duration to that of 
employment, a figure of five or six moves in a household’s lifetime is 
implied. Of these, only a subset will be intra-district within the 
context of the data used here; further only a subset will involve a move 
between housing market strata. It follows that perhaps two or three 
behaviourally distinct intra-district migrant groups are represented by 
the turnover variable.
The aspatiai turnover equations are reported in Table 7.16 and show a 
high degree of explanatory power which is further improved by the 
addition of the endogenous regressors. The exogenous equations show that
1ABL.E....7,16 ASP ATI AL. TURSDVF R EQUALIOS
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 )
(LOGS) (LOGS) (LOGS)
C 0 . 03 0. 04 0 . 06 -1. 97 0.43 -0. 76
(2.95) (2.70) (3.6) (-2.41) (0:26) (-0.5)
U - -0.30 -0.33 -0. 48 - 0 . 08 - 0 . 1 2 - 0 . 1
(-1.69) (-1 .8 6 ) (3.21) (-2 .0 1 ) (-2.73) (-2.43)
LAR - 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 - 0 .0 0 0 0 1 -0. 42 -0.3
(-0.93) (-0.75) ( - 1 . 63) (-1.3)
OIL -0.005 -0.006 -0.25 -0.3
(— 1 . 1 1 ) ( - 1 . 4) (-1.76) (-2.24)
URD 0. 005 0. 004 0. 004 0. 25 0 . 16 0 . 16
(4.80) (3.99) (4. 1) (3.8 6 ) (2.15) (1.83)
BRTH 0.72 0. 74 0. 36 0.50 0. 50 0. 14
(2.34) (2.32) (1 .1 ) (2.42) (2.43) (0.56)
M U - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 2 -0.56 -0.57 - 1 . 1 1
(-2.05) (-2.09) (-3.2) (-2.35) (-2.42) (-3.5)
IS -0.52 - 0 . 18
(-3.7) (-2.9)
ISS -0.31 -0. 09
(-1.4) (-0 .8 )
ROM 0.34 0 . 1 2
(3.89) (2 .0 )
OUT 0.28 0 . 2 1
(1.7) ( 2 . 8 )
OUTS 0. 27 0 . 1 1
(1.54) (1 . 1 )
Rs 0. 47 0. 47 0. 67 0. 48 0. 50 0 . 62
0 . 6 0. 87 - 1 . 2 0 . 1 2 0. 74 0 . 0 2
BP TTn H H H H H
H: Heteroskedasticity
308
the linear form yields the preferred fit* but the reverse holds for the 
endogenous. There is some evidence of heteroskedasticity, especially 
for the exogenous forms, associated with the urban-rural dummy in 
particular.
The urban-rural dummy is positive and highly significant in all 
equations except the logarithmic endogenous form. This indicates that 
urban households move more frequently but are dependent on a stream of 
in-migrants to purchase their houses or out-migrants to supply them with 
houses. Hence those in urban areas are most successful. This effect 
fails to capture the probable importance of first time buyers, 
originating in the same district, in purchasing the properties of those 
trading up. The birth rate is also significantly positive, but this 
disappears in the endogenous form. Hence although some households might 
be expected to trade up in response to overcrowding, there is also an 
effect on out-movers who have positive impact on turnover; thus it is 
difficult to distinguish between these two effects.
The minimal household units variable is always negative and significant, 
so that despite houses being relatively overcrowded, local turnover is 
low. The negative significance of the unemployment variable is 
increased by exclusion of the minimal household units variable. This 
would appear to indicate that low turnover and high household formation 
potential coincide in affluent areas. Two explanations are possible, 
both of which arise from the Ermisch (1981) model discussed in Chapter 
One. The first is that average house size is greater, so that the 
marginal privacy cost to existing household members of additional
members is low. The other explanation is that for a given house, 
individuals in more affluent areas tend to have a lower propensity to 
form households, perhaps because of the high average product of the 
household production function.
The oil dummy tends to be insignificant except in the logarithmic
endogenous form, where it has a significantly negative coefficient. It
is not surprising to find some negative impact given that households 
wanting to trade up will find strong competition from non-local in­
movers, but bearing in mind the fact that such households will also be 
experiencing windfall profits due to the appreciation of their own 
property, the generally weak impact of this variable is also to be 
expected.
The unemployment level is usually significant and negative, a result 
which is to be expected given that areas of high unemployment will not 
be experiencing house price inflation at the same rate as most areas, 
and consequently windfall profits will be fewer. However, this should 
not necessarily militate against mobility within the district unless 
there exist diferential house price inflation rates within different 
market strata. This latter possibility is not inconsistent with the 
view of different spatial scales of operation for different strata. The
main reason for the reduced turnover in areas of high unemployment,
however, is the difficulty in selling the existing property.
The local authority rents variable is generally insignificant although 
it approaches the critical level in the logarithmic form. A negative
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effect would be puzzling unless it implied that those attempting to move 
from the public sector compete with other new households and by doing so 
reduce the total number of intra-district moves. (Bear in mind that the 
turnover figures are classified by tenure at destination).
The endogenous variable results are generally consistent 
with the MHU result which has indicated excess supply as being a 
constraint on intra-district mobility; these endogenous coefficients 
suggest that intra-district migrants are short of properties to 
purchase. The MHU variable is still significantly negative in the 
endogenous forms. It follows that, by creating a demand for properties 
in higher strata than the first, large numbers of MHU's compound the 
shortage; hence large numbers of potential household units may be more 
associated with trading up households than with newly forming 
households. There is some evidence of heteroskedasticity. particularly 
associated with the URD variable; this implies that there is more 
"noise" in highly urban areas, and that estimates are not minimum 
variance (although still unbiased).
7.9.2 SPATIAL TURNOVER EQUATION
The spatial equations are reported in Table 7.17 and show an inferior 
explanatory power in the exogenous case and only a limited improvement 
in the endogenous case. There is also little change in the I-statistics. 
Once again, the goodness of fit of the linear and logarithmic forms 
varies according to the presence of endogenous variables. The incidence 
of heteroskedasticity is somewhat reduced.
t a r t .k 7  -] 7  op ati AL TURNOVER ECU ATIOK
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
(LOGS) (LOGS)
c 0. 04 0. 05 -1. 19 -2 . 1
(3.45) (3.62) (-1.37) (-1 .6 8 )
u - 0 . 2 -0.38 - 0 . 08 - 0 . 1 1
(-1 .0 2 ) (-2.55) (-1.98) (-2.93)
UL 0.51 - 0 . 06 0 . 16 .0. 09
(1.28) (-0.17) (2.48) (1.56)
I jST ~0.53 -0. 15
(-3.87) (-2.33)
I NET -0. 46 - 0 . 1 0
(-2.33) (-0 .9)
OUT 0 . 1 2 0. 14
(0.69) (1.67)
OUTN 0 . 2 0 0 . 1 2
(1.13) (1.15)
RCK 0. 41 0. 13
(4.81) (2.04)
URD 0.0056 0. 005 0. 29 0. 19
(4.30) (4.27) (3.58) (2.32)
URDL 0. 003 - 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 2 0 0. 14
(1.03) (-0.52) (1.81) (1.39)
BRTH 0.67 0.55 0. 70 - 0 . 0 2
(1.98) (1.65) (3.20) (-0.8)
BRTHL 0.29 -1. 1 - 0 . 2 0 -0. 25
(0.59) (-2 .2 ) (-2.09) (-0.99)
MHU - 0 . 2 2 -0. 44
(-2 .4) (-1.37)
MHUL - 0 . 0 2 -1. 1 2
(-1.41) (-2.05)
HHSEG - 0 . 0 0 0 2 - 0 . 6 8
(-3.4) (-3.99)
HHSEGL 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 - 0 . 1 2
(1 . 0 ) (-0.58)
R* 0.47 0. 72 0.52 0.61
j* - 1 . 6 8 -1.52 0.28 - 0 . 04
BP H H H H
I
The lagged versions of the birth and M U  variables are negative and 
significant- in some cases, which reinforces the view that these 
determinants create migrant households who compete with those trading up 
in the district of interest. Both the births and lagged births 
variables fall in significance when the dependent regressors are 
entered, so there is no evidence of a direct births effect on turnover. 
Replacement of M U  with HHSEG in the endogenous equations shows an 
increase in the significance of the own-district variable but a fall in 
that of the lagged version. This endorses the conclusion that the MHU 
effect arises from those trading up rather than from first time buyers, 
who would tend to be of lower SEG.
The urban-rural dummy continues to be positive and significant, whilst 
its lagged version is insignificant, hence the decline in turnover rates 
from the city to the suburbs is very steep.
The unemployment variable continues to be significantly negative in the 
endogenous forms, but its lag is only significant in the logarithmic 
exogenous version; if households in areas of high unemployment have a 
high number of employment-related movers, then potential competitors for 
moving into an adjoining district will find more vacancies in the low 
employment areas, hence facilitating turnover where excess demand in 
higher market strata is dominant. This is a form of "gentrification" 
process, with housing-related movers of one quality strata displacing 
employment-related movers in another.
whilst the overall pattern of significance for the exogenous variables 
is unaltered from that of the aspatial form, the importance of OUT and 
OUTN falls, due to the presence of the exogenous spatial regressors. It 
follows that there is a limited spatial impact, but one which it is 
difficult to separate out from the direct effect (exogenous lagged on 
endogenous) and the indirect (exogenous on endogenous on further 
endogenous). This has proved to be a common problem and one which, 
arising as it does from multicollinearity, is difficult to resolve. The 
significance of IN and I H  rises.
The results for the turnover equations highlight a number of points. 
Firstly, there is a noticeable multicollinearity problem when all the 
endogenous variables are included, a result which is not surprising 
given the results achieved for other variables. Secondly, households 
trading up seem to have encountered excess demand as more of a problem 
than excess supply, hence the optimum strategy is to buy the new 
property and then sell the old one; this does not hold true for all 
classes of movers. This also means that in the urban areas (where 
turnover is highest) there is a sufficient supply of new households to 
complete the mobility chains. It also fallows from these results that 
most of the in-movers, at least to urban areas, are not first time 
buyers (given the negative coefficients). The heteroshedasticity and 
the mixed experience with the logarithmic and linear forms implies that 
these results hold true more for highly urban areas than for others, 
where the turnover variable will have a more heterogeneous composition.
7 , 10  SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL REGRESSOR EQUATION RESULTS
This section draws together the results for each endogenous variable to 
arrive at a coherent picture of the Scottish housing market. A few 
general observations can be made: for most equations, the inclusion of
endogenous variables and/or spatially lagged variables considerably 
increases explanatory power and in a number of cases eliminates spatial 
autocorrelation of the residuals. It is common, although not universal, 
for spatially lagged exogenous regressors to be more significant than 
their unlagged counterparts. On the assumption that each district 
approximates a submarket and that the district level is the maximum 
scale of spatial interaction, this class of results appears to indicate 
"location by default" whereby a household selects its destination by 
rejection of other locations, because of those locations' undesirable 
qualities.
A large number of the coefficient signs are ambiguous with those for the 
urban-rural dummy and the vacancy change variables giving the clearest 
results. Of these, the urban-rural dummy generally conforms with 
expectations although the vacancy change variable tends to show perverse 
signs, as has already been noted. The sign for the rate of completions 
is consistent with the vacancy change variable proxying prices, but if 
prices are generally sluggish it seems to imply that housebuilders are 
sensitive to vacancy rates rather than to prices, reflecting their 
extended information set. This agrees with the discussion in Chapter 
Four.
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There is a substantial increase in explanatory power when spatial 
variables are included, but specific effects are not clear. It seems 
that the phenomenon of spatial interaction within the housing market can 
be said to be associated with the density of housing (i.e. the presence 
or absence of the urban-rural dummy) which is as predicted in Chapter 
Four, and with the related effect of price movements even although such 
movements seem to only sluggishly adjust to demand. This raises the 
question of the dynamics of the housing market. This has already been 
touched upon as far as the speed of price adjustment is concerned, where 
it has been suggested that for the Scottish housing market, the speed of 
adjustment of prices to excess demand or supply differs from the speed 
of adjustment of market actors to those prices.
The local in-mover and out-mover variables both show some degree of 
housing-related motivation in their behaviour. In-movers respond 
locationally to attractants at their destinations, such as "peer" 
variables, but out-movers respond to locational stress factors such as 
overcrowding. Both are positively impacted by the oil dummy, and both 
are relatively unresponsive to short-term market pressures. Out-movers 
appear to be leaving urban areas, and in-movers (the same households) 
are migrating from urban to suburban areas. Local out-movers are highly 
dependent on local turnover and on local in-movers as purchasers of 
their dwellings, whilst local in-movers compete with those moving within 
the district and with newly-formed households. Local out-movers seem to 
be reluctant to move once they are living in high quality housing.
These results imply that local in- and out- movers are younger 
households, many with or expecting children. They are living in or
close to urban areas and are constrained in their relocation behaviour 
by their workplaces. There is a considerable amount of two-way mobility 
between suburbs and urban areas, but some insensitivity to the local 
market environment.
The non-local in- and out- mover variables show less homogeneity. Ion- 
local in-movers do not appear to be responding to employment related 
stimuli, and show a strong anti-urban bias. They compete with local in- 
movers to some extent. Out-movers who relocate some distance away are 
dependent on long-distance in-movers or local movers to buy their 
properties and are unable or unwilling to leave areas with depressed 
housing markets. There have also been fewer such moves from the oil- 
related areas. There is little urban or rural bias in the location 
behaviour of this group. It would appear that non-local in-movers are 
primarily elderly households moving to retirement properties, and that 
long-distance out-movers are a heterogeneous group, some of whom are 
"opportunistic", but generally constrained in their relocation 
behaviour, and responding to distant employment-based attractants at 
dispersed locations.
lewly-formed out-migrant households are also choice constrained, and 
compete with local movers. Provided the out-migrant subset of newly- 
formed households is a reasonable approximation of the behaviour of all 
newly-formed households, the results also indicate a tendency to avoid 
suburban areas. It is, however, possible that out-migrant new 
households are not representative and this result actually reflects the 
preference for higher quality (and possibly larger) houses of minimal
household units located in complex households in suburban areas. There 
is weak evidence of responsiveness to short term market pressure, but 
the coefficient is perverse.
Housebuilders avoid urban areas and areas of high quality housing. They 
show no reaction to short term market pressure but are heavily dependent 
on the presence of volume demand. However, it is passible that builders 
spatially■manipulate demand and can profitably build in areas where the 
housing market is depressed. This reinforces the view of the building 
industry as entrepreneurs who seek profitable opportunities to arbitrage 
between low land prices and potential but spatially remote demand.
There is some support for this from the land variable results but a 
number of conflicting effects are present in this regressor.
Turnover is the least spatially sensitive variable and is associated 
primarily with urban areas, with a very steep decline in turnover 
towards the suburbs. There is some dependence on the presence of new 
supply and on local in-movers, so that the overall impression is of 
movers who have limited resources and move frequently, who require 
purchasers for their existing dwelling and who are in strong competition 
with one another.
Taken together, these results seem to support the nation of the region 
as a meaningful unit of analysis. Broad flows of households are 
discernable with some correlation between mobility "triggers", life­
cycle stage, and relocation behaviour. Inter-district spatial 
influences have effects on most households but the precise impacts are
not clear. The supply of vacancies and the existence of purchasers are 
essential elements for mobility to occur, far more than the "overall" 
state of the market. There is no evidence of high Local Authority rents 
having any impact on the housing market. The "housing market" seems to 
be far from homogeneous with a number of different but interacting 
levels. Given the relative weakness of overall market pressures, it is 
the interaction between housing market levels which will determine the 
dynamic behaviour of the system.
The results for the equations discussed here have to be qualified in a 
number of ways but the most important consideration is 
multicollinearity, to which some of the other qualifications are 
related. In addition, no single reliable set of elasticities for the 
endogenous variables has been given, again in oart because of 
multicollinearity and in parn because for each equation, although 
explanatory power is high, there is no single preferred specification. 
Apart from some collinearity between regressors, the dependent variable 
divisions may be rather too crude for specific effects to be clear. It
simplifies specification considerably if the regressor data set can be
reduced to a limited number of components. In addition to reducing 
mulitcollinearity and simplifying independent regressor specification, 
any discussion of dynamics requires a set of internally consistent 
elasticities which will determine the stability of the system.
In the light of these considerations, the next section undertakes a
principal components analysis of the exogenous regressork and conducts 
some regressions on the resultant components. In addition to the
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considerations detailed above, this will provide a cross check on the 
interpretation of the results given liere.
7.11 PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS QF THE REGRESSORS
The principal components are constructed with five as a maximum in each 
group and a limiting criterion that the extracted components explain 95% 
of the variation in the.data. Hence if a 95% level of explanation is 
achieved with fewer components, only that number will be extracted. The 
components in any one group will be approximately orthogonal. Two 
groups are used, the aspatial and the spatial exogenous regressors. As 
will become apparent, this results in some remaining redundancy but this 
has to be set against the aspatial/spatial separation. Five aspatial 
and three spatial components are extracted, with the factor loadings 
given in Tables 7.18 and 7.19
7.11.1 Aspatial Components
<15 The regressors which load most highly on this factor are the 
urban-rural dummy, rateable values, and socio-economic groups. It 
follows that this is primarily a city and suburban factor; this will 
also include some element of the oil dummy.
(2) This factor is most strongly associated with moderate socio­
economic status, fairly low unemployment, and a low potential 
demographic demand. Whilst this suggests suburban areas'as far as 
social status is concerned, the lower association with rateable values
TABLE 7 . 1 8  PRINCIPAL COMPONENT FACTOR LOADINGS (LINEAR)
1 2 O 1 5
URD 0.75 0.26 0 .40 0.07 0 .21
RV 0. 82 0.39 -0. 10 -0., 01 -0. 20
SEG 0., 70 0 .27 -0. 11 -0..34 -0. 37
m h u -0. 21 0 .13 0 .S3 -0. 24 -0. 21
u -0.. 61 -0. 15 0 .21 -0. 51 0.03
OIL 0.27 -0. 74 -0. 22 0 .01 -0. 11
LAR -0.,37 0 .29 -0. 45 -0. 44 -o. 39
DV -0. 53 0.48 -0. 03 0 .07 -0. 11
LAUD 0.47 -0. 44 0 .08 -0. 60 0 .09
BRTH -0., 03 -0. 37 0 .24 0.38 -0. 76
URDL 0.71 0. s6 0 . 18
RVL 0. 90 0. 31 0. '19
SEGL . 0.98 -0. 14 0 . 0 2
MHUL 0.97 -0. 15 0. 04
IJL 0 . 18 - 0 . 8 8 -0.28
LARL 0.94 -0.25 -0. 03
DVL -0.27 -0. 53 0.79
BRTHL . 0.91 - 0 . 18 -0. 07
TABLE 7.19 PRINCIPAL COMPONENT FACTOR LOADINGS a.f
1 3 4 5
URD 0.81 0.24 0.35 0. 14 0. 19
RV 0.84 0 . 26 0 . 0 1 -0. 14 -0. 13
SEG 0.67 0. 19 0 . 08 -0.34 -0.44
MHU -0.25 o o CO 0.80 0 . 18 -0. 19
U -0.75 1 o o CO 0.25 -0. 27 0 . 1 2
OIL 0.24 -0.70 -0.42 0 . 06 - 0 . 2 0
LAR -0. 40 0.35 -0.28
CVJ01 -0.48
DV -0.48 0.57
inodi 0. 17 -0.24
LAND 0. 03
LO-s!1
O1 0. 40 -0. 69 - 0 . 0 1
BRTH -0.04 1 o o 0 . 2 0 0.45 -0.64
URDL 0. 62 0. 63 0. 04
RVL 0. 98 -0. 1 0 -0. 03
SEGL 0. 98 -0. 17 -0. 05
MHUL 0. 28 0. 65 -0. 64
UL -0. 96 0. 06 -0. 1 2
LARL 0. 97 -0. 19 -0. 05
DVL -0. 28 -0. 48 -0. 78
BRTHL -0. 97 0. 19 0. 04
and the low demographic demand implies areas with households which are 
either at the very beginning or the very end of the household life 
cycle, and possibly both. Hence it represents transitional areas which 
are not properly suburban and may include some rural areas in the early 
stages of urbanisation.
(3) This factor shows high potential demographic demand, high 
unemployment and low socio-economic status. This almost certainly 
represents depressed areas, demonstrating the tendency for unemployment 
to primarily affect those in the lower status vocations. The household 
formation model predicts that low per capita income will be associated 
with larger household size, so this result is not surprising.
(4) The fourth factor is associated with high birth rates, low 
unemployment rates, and does not score highly on the urban-rural dummy. 
Consequently, this represents high-growth rural areas; that is, areas 
where there is a higher and growing proportion of young households, and 
most moves are employment-driven.
(5) The last aspatial factor is strongly urban, but shows low birth 
rates and low socio-economic status, suggesting that it represents 
elderly people in cities and adjacent areas.
7,11.2 Spatial Components
(1) The first spatial factor scores highly on the lagged versions 
of the urban-rural dummy, and the other regressors that load highly on
unemployment levels, and with low vacancy increases. It represents 
adjacency to areas oi higher employment growth and higher demand for 
housing, so that it is a more diffuse element of the data than a 
suburban component would be.
(2) The second component scores moderately highly on the urban- 
rural dummy, but is not associated strongly with rateable values, or 
with unemployment levels and vacancy increases. This suggests suburbs 
and also adjacency to fast growing areas with pressure both in labour 
and housing markets, so that it corresponds to transitional areas.
(3) The last spatial component scores weakly on the urban-rural 
dummy and on rateable values, whilst scoring highly on vacancy 
increases. This implies association with rural and depressed areas.
It follows that the spatial regressors are reducible to three elements 
depending upon the characteristics of adjacent areas, but that each of 
these is primarily associated with the urban-rural dummy or housing 
market pressure. Given the smoothing effect of the spatial lagging 
process, the smaller number of components is not surprising.
Z.i2 .PRINCIPAL.. CQ«PQgEKT_RE.GRESSIQ«a.
The next step is to use these components in regressions, bearing in mind 
that there will be a degree of collinearity between some'of the aspatial 
and spatial variables. Six tables of regressions for linear and
logarithmic forms are reported. These consist of two exogenous (Tables 
7.20 and 7.21) and four endogenous (Tables 7.22 to 7.25), with the 
last two Tables showing endogenous variables taking the form of 
a "control" by including all dependent variables and comparing the 
coefficients with those of the first set. These control regressions are 
only carried out for five of the dependent variables, since the turnover 
equation already includes all of the endogenous regressors and the new 
household equation has interpretability problems. For the other five 
variables, this process provides a check on the robustness of estimates 
in the presence of dependent variable collinearity and hence on the 
interpretability of the coefficients. Given that the same regressors 
are common to all equations, and that the dependent variables are 
related, the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions technique (SURE)2 is used 
for the exogenous equations.
7.12.1 Exogenous Principal Component Results
Unlike the individual regressor results, there are considerable, almost 
symmetric, differences between the linear and logarithmic patterns of 
significance, and in terms of which shows superior goodness of fit. The 
main reason for this derives from the fact that each component can be 
associated with a particular subset of areas; given that there is 
evidence for spatial interaction and non-linearity, it is possible for 
there to be two classes of regressor for each dependent variable, each 
of which is important, but the elements of one enter linearly and those 
of the other interactively.
TABLE 7 - 30  PS.II1ClLP.AL COMPONENT .EXOGENOUS REGRESSIONS (SURE)
IN I M  OUT OUTN HHFR RCM TVR
c 0. 01 0. 02 0. 01 0. 02 0. 02 0. 02 0. 04
(14.1) (21.4) (13.3) (13,2) (13.9) (12.7) (37.0)
PC'l 0. 003 -0.002 0. 0007 0. 001 -0.005 -0.001 0. 004
(2.9) (-1.6) (0.65) (1.1) (-2.43) (-0.76) (2.8)
PC2 ■-0.0004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.005 0.00004
(-0.47) (-2.69) (-2.0) (-0.14) (-0.22) (-2.95) (0.03)
PCS 0. 001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.0002 0. 008 0. 002 0. 002
(1.13) (-4.53) (-3.71) (-0.27) (4.47) C1.2) (1.43)
PC4 0.0002 -0.001 0.0009 0. 001 0. 001 -0.002 0. 004
(0.13) (-1.26) (1.0) (1.14) (0.77) (-1.04) (3.7)
PCS -0.004 0.0007 -0.002 -0.0008 -0.003 -0.003 0. 002
(-4.98) (0.9) (-2.8) (-0.9) (-1.7) (-1.99) (1.64)
PCL1 0. 003 0. 001 0. 004 -0.0007 0. 001 0. 001 0.0006
(2.7) (1.21) (4.16) (-0.65) (0.51) (0.80) (0.45)
PCL2 0. 003 -0.0002 0. 003 0.0003 0. 002 0. 001 0. 001
(3.28) (-0.3) (3.67) (0.34) (0.92) (0.52) (1.1)
PCL3 0. 002 -0.003 0. 002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001
(2. 1) (-3.4) (2. 1) (-2.41) (-1.4) (-2.3) (-0.99)
R- 0.58 0.56 0.55 0. 05 0. 32 0. 26 0. 36
I* 2.4 -3.7 1.62 -0.6 0.2 0.74 1. 47
BP
TABLE 7.21 PI?INCIPAL COMPONEN? EXOGENOUS PEGRESSIONS (LOGS)(S URE)
IN I M OUT QUTN HHFR RCK TVR
c -4. 4 -4.2 -4.4 -4. 2 -3.9 -4. 1 -3.2
(-4.6) (-7.7) (-5.3) (-8.6) (-5.7) (-5.4) (-10.3)
PCI 0. 47 -0. 14 . 0.35 0. 02 -0.4 -0. 06 0. 13
(3.83) (-2.0) (3.3) (0.34) (-4.7) (-0.7) (3.2)
PC2 -0. 07 -0. 1 -0. 11 -0. 03 -0. 04 -0. 19 -0.006
(-0.7) (-1.76) (-1.3) (-0.53) (-0.5) (-2.51) (-0.2)
PCS -0. '14 -0. 11 0. 03 0.08 0.3 0.2 0.0006
(-0.94) (-1.34) (0.28) (1.05) (2.9) (1.7) (0.01)
PC4 0. 1 -0. 15 0. 24 -0. 04 0. 4 0. 09 0. 08
(0.98) (-2.92) (2.8) (-0.74) (5.3) (1.2) (2.6)
PCS -0. 1 -0. 05 -0. 07 -0. 05 -0. 12 -0.28 0. 06
<-0.93) (-0.82) (-0.7) (-0.81) (-1.44) (-3.22) (1.5)
PCL1 -1. 19 0. 08 -1. 1 . 0. 04 0. 18 0. 03 -1.2
(-9.6) (1.2) (-10.1) (0.68) (1.97) (0.33) (-9.6)
PCL2 0.57 -0-. 13 0.50 -0.004 0. 04 -0. 09 0. 04
(4. 1) (-1.6) (4.2) (-0.57) (0.4) (-0.8) (0.85)
PCL3 -0.2 0. 2 -0. 13 0. 16 0.23 0. 28 0. 02
(-1.3) (3. 0) (-1.16) (2.4) (2.5) (2.75) (0.47)
R:“;: 0. 73 0. 46 0. 78 0. 03 0. 52 0. 29 0. 33
3. 1 -1.38 2. 1 -0. 42 0.22 0. 68 -0. 91
BP _ _ _
Without regard to linearity or loglinearity, the urban/suburban 
component is significant for all dependent variables except non-local 
out-movers. It is positive for local in- and out- movers, and for 
newbuild and turnover; it is negative for non-local in-movers and newly 
formed out-migrant households. The only unexpected result here is the 
newbuild positive effect, which might be expected to be the reverse due 
to land constraints. As in the individual regressor equations, this 
component shows some evidence of heteroskedasticity in the turnover 
equation.
The suburban/transitional component has a negative impact on local out- 
movers and non-local in-movers; the first result is as expected, since 
having left the city, it is unlikely that housing-related migrants will 
make any spatially specific moves. The second implies that long­
distance movers will avoid urban and suburban destinations; this, 
is partly due to some rural areas being growth nodes, it is also due to 
this category of mover including retiring couples moving to rural 
locations.
The depressed area component has a significantly negative effect on 
local out-movers and non-local in-movers, as for the previous component. 
This implies that these areas are (not surprisingly) avoided by 
employment-related migrants, and show low levels of housing-related 
moves, which reflects the difficulty involved in selling houses in 
depressed areas. There is a positive impact an the out-migration rate 
of new households, which implies that the desire to relocate exists but
can be frustrated if the household is forced to act as a dual searcher 
in a depressed market.
The fourth component which represents high growth rural areas has a 
positive effect on local out-movers, new household out-migrants, 
turnover and new housebuilding, but a negative impact on non-local in­
movers. These results are puzzling and only, in the main, arise in the 
logarithmic form. However they are not inconsistent with housing market 
pressure displacing new households, but facilitating trading up by 
existing owners; the excess demand for housing also stimulating 
newbuilding. Whilst growth of earnings might be responsible for same of 
the shortage, it is not clear where the additional numbers of households 
come from, given the negative effect on long-distance in-migrants (who 
may be elderly and of limited resources). It follows that much of the 
additional volume of households comes from local household formation, as 
evidenced in the turnover variable.
The component which is associated with elderly households in cities is 
negatively significant in the local in- and out- mover equations, and 
insignificant elsewhere. This implies that most elderly households move 
long-distances; of those that remain, a number may be in public sector 
housing.
The high status, urban adjacency variable is negative in the case of 
local in-movers and turnover; it is positive in the case of new 
household out-migrants and the sign varies in the local out-mover 
equation. The results for the first two variables are as expected and
the new household effect is consistent with the children of middle-class 
families moving back to cities.
The adjacency to suburban and related areas is positively significant in 
the local in- and out- mover equations, and insignificant elsewhere.
This indicates the high degree of housing-related moves in outlying 
areas, with some moves closer to the city (the out-movers), perhaps 
older households wanting more central and compact accomodation.
The adjacency to depressed areas, variable shows some important 
differences compared with the direct, aspatial eqyjivalent. There is a 
negative effect on non-local out-movers and on housebuilding, whilst the 
local out-mover effect is positive. The impact on non-local in-movers 
varies. These results seem to be indicative of a "contagion1’ effect but 
one which operates imperfectly. Existing households can observe the 
possibility of their area declining and sell their properties; there are 
still some purchasers, especially non-locals, but the direct impact on 
employment does not operate, so few households become long distance out- 
movers because they are still in employment. Housebuilders also see the 
problem emerging, perhaps due to falling house prices, and do not 
invest.
Z+12.,-2.. Endogenous. Variable Principal Component Results
The main difference which emerges in the endogenous forms is the 
reduction in importance of the spatial components, indicating that at 
least some of the apparent exogenous variable effects arise, instead,
TABLE 7 . 2 2  PRINCIPAL COMPONENT AffD. JDV REGRESSIONS ( I )
in inn OUT o u t h HHFR RCM TVR
c 0. 02 0. 015 0. 003 0. 002 -0. 03 -0. 03 0. 04
(4.26) (4.82) (0.47) (0.31) (-2.1) (-2.95) (9.3)
PCI 0. 004 -0.0008 -0.002 0. 002 -0. 01 -0.005 0. 005
(4.7) (-1.1) (-2.1) (1.48) (-4.1) (-2.3) (3.6)
PC2 0.0006 -0.001 -0.001 0. 001 0.0006 -0.002 -0.0001
(0.36) (-2.1) (-1.9) (1.17) (0.37) (-1.6) (0.34)
PCS -0.001 -0.003 0. 002 0.0015 0. 007 0. 004 -0.001
(-1.4) (-3.9) (2. 8) Cl. 63) (4.24) (2.3) (-1.12)
PC4 0. 001 0.00006 0.0001 0. 001 -0.002 -0.003 0. 004
(1.2) (0.9) (0. 2) (1.06) (-1.35) (-2.3) (3.9)
PCS -0.002 0. 002 0.0003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.0015
(-3.17) (2.45) (0. 4) (-1.97) (-2.12) (-1.3) (1.25)
PCL1 0.0002 0. 003 0. 003 -0.001 -0.001 -0. 02 0.0025
(0.2) (3.5) (3. 0) (-1.1) (-0.4) (-1.08) (1.86)
PCL2 0.0014 0.0003 0. 001 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.025 0. 002
(1.77) (1.13) (1.5) (0.5) (-0.2) (-1.25) (2. 1)
PCL3 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.015 0.0006
(0.67) (-0.61) (0.3) (-0.47) (-0.5) (-1.01) (0.54)
in 0.63 -0. 08 0.27 0. 66 -0. 64
(5.2) (-0.6) (1.01) (2.68) (-3.24)
III -0.21 0. 5 0. 41 0. 98 -0. 72
(-1.64) (3.5) (1.44) (3. 8) (-3.04)
OUT 0. 62 -0.3 0. 11
(5;8) (-3.5) (0.53)
QUTH -0. 11 0.5 0.52
(-1.02) (5.3) (2.81)
RCM 0. 07 0. 27 0. 42
(1.03) (5.02) (4.4)
TVR -0.26 -0.20 0. 11 0. 14 0.91 0.65
(-2.86) (-2.64) (1.22) (1.4) (4.73) (3.6)
R;s 0.8 0.79 0.78 0.32 0.54 0.50 0.61
I* 0.94 -0. 06 1. 10 -0. 73 -0.18 -0.56 0. 21
BP _ — _ — _
TABLE...7■ 2 3 -PRINCIPAL COMPONENT AFP JDV REGRESSIONS ( I ) (T.nO£)
IN I M OUT OUT! HHFR RCM TVR
L* <~\ -rzn ~ & * J { -2. 48 -1. 65 -1.3 0. 62 0.91 -2.2
(-2.3) (-3.7) (-1.6) (-1.2) (0.45) (0.59) (-3.42)
PCI 0. 21 -0.003 -0. 06 0. 04 -0.6 -0. 07 0. 13
(2.55) (-0.05) (-0.9) (0.65) (-6.6) (-0.71) (2.9)
PC2 0. 02 -0. 05 -0. 1 0. 02 -0.03 -0. 1 0. 02
(0.37) (-1.3) (-2.2) (0.36) (-0.45) (-1.56) (0.56)
PC3 -0. 15 -0.22 0. 08 0. '12 0. 31 0. 28 -0. 1
(-1.3) (-4.3) (1.2) (1.84) (3.4) (2.76) (-1.8)
PC4 -0. 1 -0. 1 0.07 0. 004 0.26 0. 15 0. 03
(-1.4) (-2.6) (1.6) (0.82) (3.9) (2.05) (0.86)
PCS -0. 03 0. 07 -0. 04 -0. 05 -0.2 -0.26 0. 1
(-0.46) (1.65) (-0.31) (-0.95) (-2.81) (-3.26) (2.57)
PCL1 -0. 15 -0. 23 -0. 3 -0. 03 0. 2 0. 08 -0.002
(-1.21) (-3.1) (-3.1) (-0.32) (1.33) (0.51) (-0.24)
PCL2 0. 12 0. 05 0.07 . 0 . 05 -0.03 -0. 07 0. 04
(1.35) (0.9) (0.93) (0.7) (-0.33) (-0.67) (0.88)
PCL3 -0.007 0. 01 0. 05 0. 05 0.2 0. 13 -0. 03
(-0.1) (0.2) (0.8) (0.8) (2. 5) (1:3) (-0.79)
1N 0.65 -0. 03 0. 02 0. 1 -0. 12
(8.5) (-0.34) (0.24) (0.9) (-1. 51)
I M -0. 36 0. 43 -0. 01 0.7 -0. 19
(-2.7) (3.36) (-0.63) (3.6) (-1.38)
□UT 0. 93 -0. 26 0. 11
(9.58) (-4.5) (1.1)
OUTN -0. 12 0.53 0. 28
(-0.72) (5.3) (2.49)
RCM -0. 05 0.37 0. 17
(-0.42) (5.7) (2.23)
TVR -0.5 -0.27 0. 45 0.38 1.4 0.5
(-1.38) (-1.7) (2.25) (1.95) (5.3) (1.65)
R2 0.92 0.83 0.94 0.32 0.69 0. 46 0. 44
r*: 0. 94 -0. 06 1. 1 -0.73 -0. 18 -0. 56 0.21
BP — — _
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3_7.24 FR DIG I PAL CQMPQMENT AND JDV REGRESSION c T T)
IM I MM OUT OUTM RCM
c 0. 02 0. 02 0. 004 -0.007 -0. 03
(4.35) (4.9) (0.65) (-1.1) (-3.1)
PCI 0. 004 -0.00002 -0.002 0.0007 -0.003
(4.5) (-0.03) (-1.93) (0.65) (-1.5)
?C2 0.0003 -0.001 -0.001 0.0006 -0.001
(0.33) (-1.9) (-1.33) (0.66) (-0.93)
PCS -0.002 -0.003 0. 002 0. 002 0. 004
(-1. 97) (-4.2) (2.04) (2.35) (2.85)
PC4 0. 001 0.0002 0.0002 -0.000003 -0.003
(1.22) (0.35) (0.26) (-0.004) (-1.98)
PCS -0.002 0. 001 0.0006 -0.002 -0.003
(-2.5) (1.6) (0.71) (-2.8) (-2.43)
PCL1 0.0009- 0. 003 0. 002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.36) (3.6) (3. 1) (-1.39) (-1.81)
PCL2 0.0016 0. 001 0. 001 -0, 0001 -0.002
(2. 0) (1.48) (1.54) (-0.16) (-1.1)
PCL3 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0008 -0.002
(0.5) (-0.47) (0.4) (-1.0) (-1.37)
III -0. 19 0.61 0. 02 0.49
(-1.47) (4. 5) (0.11) (1.72)
I M -0.26 -0.32 0.79 1. 43
(-1.47) (-1.67) (5.0) (5.25)
OUT 0.54 -0.2 0. 12 0. 16
(4.5) (-1.67) (0.74) (0.59)
OUTN 0. 02 0. 48 0. 11 -0. 8
(0.11) (5.05) (0.74) (-3.35)
RCM 0. 13 0.28 0. 05 -0.26
(1.72) (5.3) (0.59) (-3.34)
TVR -0. 31 -0.25 0. 06 0.3 0. 74
(-3.24) (-3.04) (0.53) (2.31) (4. 4)
R;S 0.31 0.79 0.75 0.44 0.59
I* 0.94 -1.12 0.37 0.23 -1.7
_
[ABLE 7 .'25 ..PRINCIPAL .COMPONENT AMD JDV REPRESS T DUS (T T) (T.OPS)
IK I M OUT QUTU RCM
c -1. 92 -2. 24 -1.5 -0. 65 0. 5
(-1.5) (-3.2) (-1.4) (-0.71) (0.36)
PCI 0.21 -0. 02 -0. 06 0. 03 -0. 02
(2.6) (-0. 42)' (-0.85) (0.53) (-0.2)
PC2 0. 04 -0. 05 -0. 08 0.0004 -0. 06
(0.56) (-1.35) (-1.77) (0.01) (-0.93)
PCS -0. 1 -0. 2 -0. 01 0.2 0. 35
(-0.95) (-3.88) (-0.11) (3.2) (3.75)
PC4 -0. 06 -0. 08 0. 04 0. 04 0. 13
(-0.9) (-2.3) (0.87) (0.88) (1.93)
PCS -0. 05 0. 08 0. 02 -0.13 -0. 28
(-0.7) (1.7) (0. 4) (-2.55) (-4.05)
PCL 1 -0. 09 -0.2 — 0. o2 0. 06 0. 17
(-0.66) (-2.37) (-3.21) (0.62) (1.15)
PCL2 0.11 0. 036 0. 07 0. 01 -0. 06
(1.2) (0.67) (0.97) (0.19) (-0.61)
PCL3 -0.009 0. 01 0. 01 0. 08 0. 15
(-0.11) (0.19) (0.16) (1.5) Cl. 77)
IK 0. 1 0. 63 -0. 13 -0. 16
(1.01) (8.46) (-1.19) (-0.98)
I M 0. 26 -0. 63 0. 75 1. 18
Cl.O) (-3.4) (5.33) (5.74)
OUT 1.01 -0. 34 0.21 0. 36
(S.5) (-3.4) (1.59) (1.36)
QUTU -0.26 0.54 0.27 -0.78
(-1.19) (5.33) (1.6) (-3.89)
RCM -0. 14 0. 37 0.21 -0.34
(-0.98) (5.74) (1.86) (-3.89)
TVR -0. 42 -0.23 0.25 0.46 0. 63
(-1.5) (-1.38) (1. 1) (2.49) (2.23)
R2 0.92 0. 83 0.94 0.48 0.60
I* 2. 1 -1.84 0.72 -0.54 -1.24
1
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from dependence on volume variables. I:r— statistics are generally higher 
and this is taken to indicate that principal component regressions 
result in some loss of information, particularly concerning spatial 
interaction patterns. The aspatial regressor results show few 
differences compared with the exogenous forms, although some coefficient 
significances are accentuated or diminished. In a number of cases, the 
sign on the depressed areas component alters, for example in the local 
out-movers equation; this implies that aside from the dependence on 
purchasers to permit a move, even housing-related movers wish to avoid 
depressed areas. In this context, the strengthened positive impact on 
newbuild is surprising. It should, however, be borne in mind that the 
results in previous equations demonstrated that housebuilders have the 
power to create their own spatial markets more or less independent of 
local housing market conditions.
7.13 HOUSING MARKET DYNAMICS
The most important new results concern the estimates of the endogenous 
variable coefficients, both in the specific form (i.e. a supply-tvpe 
equation contains demand-type variables and vice-versa) and in the 
general unrestricted form. The estimates do not yield any major 
departures from those which have been made previously, and seem to be 
robust with respect to the inclusion of additional endogenous variables. 
Taking insignificant results as coefficient values of zero, the dynamic 
elasticities matrix from the logarithmic, specific form regressions is 
given in Table 7.26. This is as close a representation as it is
possible to achieve, given existing data, of the dynamics of volume 
changes in the Scottish housing market.
IABLE- _7_. 26 DYNAMIC ELASTICITIES
IN INN OUT OUTN RCM TVR
r '•.y i Xi 0 0 0. 65 0 0 0
III 0 0 -0.36 0. 43 0.7 0
OUT 0. 93 -0. 26 0 0 0 0
OUTN 0 0.53 0 0 0 0.28
RCM 0 0. 37 0 0 0 0. 17
TVR 0 0 0.45 0 0 0
The new household variable is omitted since it is recursively determined 
by the rest of the system. This is inaccurate to the extent that new 
households leaving one district appear as in-movers to another district, 
but the new/existing split is not known for the migration variables and 
for the model as a whole, the inclusion of the out-mover variables and 
the new household variable simultaneously would involve an element of 
double counting.
The coefficient matrix can be treated as a Markovian transition matrix, 
M. Taking a unit change in any particular variable to be given by the 
vector i, it follows that state of the system after t time intervals 
have elapsed is given by:
i(t) = CMr]t-i(0) (7. 1)
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For stability it is necessary that i(t) 0 as t -) ®, It can be seen in 
Table 7.27 that this is the case far all the jointly dependent variables 
but happens rapidly in the case of III, and OUT. but for IM, GUTS, RCM, 
and TVR, the adjustment is much slower.
TABLE 7.27 HOUSING MARKET DYNAMICS
System dynamic behaviour:-.
III Dampens quickly
I M  Oscillatory and dampens slowly
Unit
Change OUT Dampens quickly 
In:
OUTS' Oscillatory and dampens slowly
RCM Oscillatory and dampens slowly
TVR Oscillatory and dampens slowly
It follows that any change in these variables can have a prolonged 
effect on the housing market particularly if the change follows the 
causal path of high long distance in-migration rendering increased 
building and long distance out-migration feasible, leading to generally 
increased turnover. IS and OUT seem to function almost independently of
the rest of the housing market. If it is possible to argue that long
distance in-migration is primarily associated with a change in the
employment structure, either due to there being more jobs or because of 
increased rates of retirement, then the general housing market effect 
can be destabilising; this gives an erroneous impression, however, since 
it applies to volumes and at some point prices will reach a level where 
unstable volume changes are checked. In summary, the housing market 
appears to be a finely balanced web where a small change in an
employment related variable can lead to a multiplied series of moves and
new budding. Housing related moves seem to be self contained and only 
impact on employment related moves indirectly, through local turnover.
It is interesting to compare the volume based dynamics with the 
sensitivities to the vacancy change variable and its spatial lag.
Average values for these are set out in Table 7.28. In general, xhe 
market sensitivity results do not conform to those expected. There are 
a number of possible reasons for this. The results with respect to the 
lagged variables will appear perverse if the average spatial submarket 
size is greater than the average district size, such that the lag 
effectively measures the same effect as the own district variable. If
the district and submarket boundaries correspond, then the perverse 
signs can imply one of two possibilities. Either the demand for housing 
follows Veblen considerations such that price levels, and by implication 
price changes, are treated as indicators of quality or the explanation 
lies in the housing market dynamics, encompassed in the a,b, and y 
coefficients.
IMM
OUTM
RCM
28 MARKET SEN SIT IV IT IES
DV DVL Implied dynamics
0 1.8 Mu reaction to general market pressure
Spatial sensitivity is Veblen
•0.55 -2.2 Veblen sensitive
Spatial sensitivity may reinforce this
0 1.1 Mo reaction to general market pressure
Spatial sensitivity correct
-0.35 -1.2 Correctly signed as a supply variable
Spatial result valid if submarkets are 
large
0 -2.6 Mo reaction to general market pressure
Spatial result valid if submarkets are 
large
HHFR 0.9 - 0.8 Veblen sensitive
r“> r-.
As estimated,' the DV coefficient is given as:
Di = aV DV - aPt-i + Z ' (8.2)
Here* Z represents all exogenous influences, spatial lags and the 
intercept. Since data on prices is not available, it is possible for 
coefficient bias to appear if vacancy changes and prices are correlated, 
with the effect outweighing that of "i. If vacancies as a whole tend to 
lead the behaviour of prices, then it is possible for individual 
components of demand and supply to be reacting to past vacancy rates 
reflected in current prices. It is not possible to settle this issue 
without more detailed price data.
As far as the Veblen effect is concerned, this proxies a series of 
motives, particularly the fact that housing is an investment as well as 
a consumption good, and demand will be conditional upon the expectation 
of a higher future realised price. Hence the fear of contagion of 
decline from contiguous areas may serve to negate the price allocation 
procedure.
It follows that on the basis of published data it is not possible to 
distinguish between Veblen behaviour and long lags in vacancy-price 
change relationship. This is discussed further in the section on 
possible model expansions in Chapter Eight.
There ere a number of important limitations to this study which must be 
borne in mind. These are:
(1) The implied dynamic adjustment mechanism or its empirical proxy may 
be invalid. This latter depends upon equating (S-D) and vacancy 
changes; efforts have been made to render this proxy as accurate as 
possible.
(2) The results may also be affected by the housing homogeneity 
assumption (attempts to circumvent this failed because spatial structure 
proved to dominate). This is probably not crucial except for some 
particularly unusual contiguous districts (e.g. Bearsden and Clydebank)
(3) This study can only distinguish between aspatial models (assuming th 
district to be the basic spatial unit) and some form of spatial model. 
Distinguishing between spatial models would require a longer time series 
of data for each district to remove spurious correlations due to 
movements in some third, time-dependent variable (e.g. tax and interest 
rates). This would also provide guidance as to the suitable form for a 
V-matrix viz-a-viz higher-order lags.
(4) The tendency for the spatial lagging process to smooth the data 
results in multicollinearity if lags of greater than first order are 
used. This places further restrictions on the spatial hypotheses that
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can be tested and has important implications for the spatial econometric 
literature in general.
(5) The use of ordinary least squares as an estimation technique. Given 
the strong importance of the endogenous variables with a degree of 
orthogonality with respect to some of the exogenous regressors, 
instrumental variables is inadequate, as a technique, whilst as 
discussed previously, the more esoteric spatial econometric estimation 
methods are not yet suitably developed for this form of problem. The 
regressions reported do permit the more robust relationships in the data 
to be detected and it is questionable whether the data are sufficiently 
"clean" for more sophisticated methods to be used.
It follows that the main limitations of the model presented here refer 
to the data used. Ail the data available have been employed, but this 
only yields a quasi-dynamic set of cross sectional observations. It is 
possible to span more time periods but only for the whole of Scotland; 
the availability of time series is limited anyway. The Census data are 
available for smaller spatial units but some of the data used, such as 
new building, are not readily available at sub-district level. Price 
data is available in the Register of Sasines but has not been 
categorised by Local Authority District. It follows that this study 
has compromised between the various partially complete data sets. The 
availability of more disaggregate spatial data would permit 
investigation of the particular types of spatial process operating, 
subsumed here within the contiguity spatial interaction process. The 
network and hierarchy processes are the most likely to be operating in
housing markets and smaller spatial units would allow discrimination 
between these. This would be further served by a longer run of time 
series on the spatial units, and by disaggregation of the jointly 
dependent variables into more strata. If such runs of data were to be
made available, the econometric issues to be addressed would be
formidable since spatial and temporal dynamics are being simultaneously 
modelled. The other main limitation is the V-matrix; this has had the 
first order contiguity process imposed, but the structure would have to 
be more complex for hierarchy or network processes and finding the 
appropriate matrix would be largely a matter of trial and error. The . 
solution employed here has been to use a simple assumed spatial 
structure which allows GLS to be used as approximately consistent. A
more detailed empirical investigation of space in the housing market 
would require:
1) Econometric software capable of solving the joint problems of 
simultaneity of determination between variables and observations. At 
present, no analytical solution for this exists (Bennett (1979))
2) Software, preferably within the same package, which is capable of 
handling large matrices for carrying out data transformations with the.' 
possibility of searching for structural breaks.
3) A facility for readily calculating spatial autocorrelation 
statistics under the assumptions of normality and randomisation, 
preferably as part of the same package for the requirements set out 
above.
Such software is not currently available but would be a prerequisite to 
a more detailed spatial study of the housing market.
7.15 CONCLUSIONS
It is not possible to test all parameter restrictions with the 
available data but some results are fairly clear and the main 
conclusions are as follows:
(!) Spatially lagged variables in general add more explanatory power 
than additional own-district variables, but this can only be tested for 
first order lags.
(2) Endogenous variables add more explanatory power than additional own- 
district variables.
(3) Variables representing socio-economic profiles tend to have more 
success than those representing market conditions, such as local 
authority rents, land release and vacancy rates (latter more mixed).
(4) Principal components analysis of the explanatory variables yields 
some readily interpretable components primarily associated with spatial 
characteristics of sub-groups of districts.
G  4  G
(5) The basic spatial structure of the V matrix (in terms of value/zero) 
is much more important in determining the fit of spatially lagged 
equations than the detail of the non-zero V matrix elements.
(6) Log-linear and linear specifications show no consistent best fit.
(?) Although general trends dominate the data and lead to some fairly 
conclusive results, a number of the estimated parameters are unstable 
and leave considerable ambiguity, so that the issues raised here have by 
no means been settled.
Taken together, these conclusions indicate that local housing market 
volume conditions seem to be crucial in determining the rate and 
direction of intra-regional mobility (i.e. relocation behaviour). On the 
basis of the significance of vacancy rates, short term market pressure 
has only a limited rationing effect since much of the rationing has 
already taken place via socio-economic stratification. Hence within 
each socio-economic "submarket11 demand functions are highly price- 
inelastic and may even be Veblen. Supply response within any small area 
will depend primarily on newbuild which in turn will be hampered by land 
availability and the existence of a suitable portfolio of land. In terms 
of A,B, and T, the values of A and B are probably low relative to T, so 
that prices will oscillate through long periods of time as they find 
their equilibrium level. (If the investment demand for housing is 
strong then expectations can become self-feeding.) The results only 
indicate the relative temporal responsiveness, not the long run 
equilibrium elasticity values. There are good reasons for this, in that
it takes time far searching households to put mobility plans into 
reverse and for an apparently local phenomenon to be recognised as 
widespread. The implied dynamic for the housing market is one of 
ultimate stability although there is the possibility of a long damping 
time for some oscillations. There seems to be a difference between 
local and long distance movers in their reaction to price as suppliers, 
with long distance movers acting more as classical suppliers, presumably 
withdrawing their equity from areas of rising house prices. Qn the 
basis of these results it is also possible that, for similar profit- 
related reasons, mobility will fall in depressed areas from a 
combination of lack of demand and low house prices.
With these conclusions in mind, the next chapter will outline some 
possible extensions and areas for future research.
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C KAPTEx< EIG HT 
EXTENSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
5 .1  IIITPQDiICT IQS'
This chapter discusses possible expansions and adaptations of the 
spatial housing model. As constructed, the model is designed for use at
a relatively high level of spatial aggregation.' using first order
spatial lags and one year changes in the dependent variable data series. 
The level of spatial aggregation reflects the horizontal classification 
but the matrix format can be extended to the vertical classification. 
This is discussed in Section 8.2.1. The use of first order spatial lags 
reflects, in part, the limitations of the spatial lagging process, where 
the W matrix is powered before being used to transform the data.. If it
was possible to specify a priori the likely pattern of interaction
between non-contiguous spatial units, then an alternative to the 
powering technique could be used to lag the data. This would appear to 
involve a large element of "trial and error", so it is probably more 
suitable for use in testing the strength of particular spatial links, 
such as between cities or between areas with similar or related 
employment structures. This is discussed in Section 8.2.2. The use of 
one year changes in the dependent variables primarily reflects the 
availability of data at this particular spatial scale. It would only be 
feasible to collect spatial time series data for a small area but the 
regional effects discussed in this thesis might not be detected at a 
smaller spatial scale. It would be more realistic to collect price data 
and to combine it with vacancy data held by Local Authorities, and 
estimate dynamic reduced forms for longer time periods. Possible 
formulations for this are discussed in Section 8.2.3.
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6^_a_5XP a m i om ...m... the basic  model
8.2.1 Vertical Classification Models
It is possible to apply the model developed here to interactions between 
house types within a given submarket, effectively using the vertical 
classification rather than'the horizontal employed throughout this 
study. This is very close to the model developed by Sweeney (1974) and •
Gerber (1985). The model in log-linear form uses the A and B matrices
of elasticities as employed throughout this thesis, but instead of
spatial units the rows and columns of the matrices refer to house types. 
In an owner occupier market, the decision to demand is simultaneously a 
decision to supply, so it would be reasonable to expect some 
relationship between the cross elasticities. For example, if the price 
of house type j falls, there is an incentive for all non-type j house 
owners to demand houses of type j in preference to their own and hence 
for them to supply houses of type i * j . In a pure owner occupier 
market with one household per dwelling and no newbuild or household 
formation, it follows that:
£ :i. - a j ,j ( 8 . 1 )
liiijaij = b,i,i ( 8 . 2 )
Equation (8.1) states that all those who demand houses of type j must be 
selling their own houses of type i*j. Equation (8.2) states that all 
those selling houses of type j must be demanding houses of type i*j.
This assumes a high degree of substitutability between all house types.
In practice, if there exists some form of commodity hierarchy, it is 
likely that many of the cross elasticities will be zero. This would be 
the case if market price movements were within a narrow range of the 
equilibrium price level for a particular type of dwelling, and the 
household's expectation of capital gain prevents house prices moving 
too far from their equilibrium values (although the equilibrium price 
levels may themselves be appreciating through time). The price gaps 
separating quality levels would place restrictions on the scope for 
trading up, In the limiting case, where households only trade up and 
only to the next hierarchy level, the A matrix is diagonal with the last 
diagonal element equal to zero, and the B matrix has the non-zero 
diagonal elements of A on the next diagonal to the right. The fact that 
those at the top of the hierarchy have no further level to which they 
can move will tend to create excess demand for the upper end of the 
quality hierarchy and hence, ceteris paribus, for house prices to 
inflate faster there. This is in keeping with the vacancy transition 
models where a common conclusion is that newbuild at the upper end of 
the market will help all households by aiding the filtering process (and 
by reducing the cost of housing generally).
In practice, households trade down as well as up, new households are 
always forming, and newbuild occurs at a number of different quality 
levels. This renders it unlikely that the pure commodity hierarchy 
model will be valid, and also that the coefficient restrictions in (8.1) 
and (8.2) will not hold. Instead, there may be a mismatch in 
elasticities such that at the upper end of the hierarchy, demand is
relatively insensitive to price changes (which seems to be borne out by 
this thesis) but supply may be more responsive as households realise 
their investment or households break up through death. At the lower end 
of the hierarchy, demand may be very price sensitive (again borne out in 
this study). Supplv will be less price sensitive, with it being 
uneconomical for households to realise their investment and unprofitable 
for builders, particularly during times of low volume. Such a 
presentation sheds considerable light on the supply/demand driven 
debate; this study has indicated that the housing market can probably be 
divided into groups each of whom is subject to one or other of the 
demand and supply constraints (and some will be subject to both). • 
Comparison of estimated A and 3 matrices would indicate the points of 
separation of such groups.
8,2.2 Higher Order Spatial hags
Instead of powering the V matrix, it is possible to impose an assumed 
network. In the case of a regional housing market based around 
employment nodes, it is likely that the response to any given employment 
stimulus will diffuse through the nodal pattern over time.
Hence the higher order w matrices would reflect the secondary and 
tertiary nodal structures and would aiiect the model response in time 
ttl, t+2 , to the point where no further exogenous input changes were 
occurring as in the following reduced form:
Pt- — 80 i  8 1 V I E I t  + 83V3E3 + . . . . . . t  'j< ■, ( 8 .  d )
where 8 0  is all constant influences
Wt.. is the weights matrix representing the spatial areas affected 
at time t by the exogenous stimulus to employment 
Et. is the employment change vector at time t 
8 -t are the reduced form coefficients 
■'/■1 is the lagged price coefficient
For this form of model to be operational, it would be necessary to have 
a large number of smaller spatial units and time series observations on 
those units. It would also require that the periodicity of the price 
data conform at least approximately to the speed of transmission of the 
employment changes. This formulation would be useful given that the 
zero/non-sero structure of the W matrix has been found to be important, 
since it would give a clearer indication of the fundamental spatial 
structure.
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6 . 2 , 3  P r ic e  and Vacancy E quation  Forms
Throughout this study the assumed price adjustment process, linear or 
* log-linear, is of' the form:
A? = -F(S - D) (8.4)
with f = V [13 and excess demand (S - D) = vacancy changes. A variety 
of other forms could have been used, such as:
AP/P = -r(S - D) (8.5)
Eouation (8.5) states that rates of change, not absolute changes in the 
price level, is a function of absolute excess demand or supply. This 
could reflect builders operating a fixed profit margin and reacting to 
land cost increases. Over short time periods, it is not possible to 
distinguish between (8.4) and (8.5), and difference is irrelevant if 
demand and supply are also sensitive to the same form of price term.
AP = -r((S - D)/D) (8.5)
Equation (8.6) normalises the excess demand term on demand volume 
It is also possible to normalise an supply or on an average of the two, 
provided it is possible for each volume to be separately distinguished. 
In this study, the vacancy change term is normalised on the previous
period vacancy level, to eliminate the effect of different sizes of 
spatial units.
a p = ~ri to - dj - r^ca s  - abi - Fs Ca '^S - a ^di - ... (8.7)
Aquation (8.7) assumes price setters are responsive to changes in the 
supply/demand balance and hence to changing trends rather than to 
chronic excess supply or demand.
A ?  =  - F t  (S t.  -  DO -  ( S t - 1  -  D t - 1  )  3 -  . . .  ( 8 . 8 )
Equation (8.3) assumes price setters are equally responsive to previous 
period excess supply and demand as well as current levels, which 
suggests very slow adaptation to market conditions.
AP = —i i L St.. — L)t.. J ~ r2[ St — i — i)t.— i 3 - . . . (8.9)
Equation (8.9) assumes the price setter’s historical information can 
be extended indefinitely, but has a different responsiveness to the 
market environment prevailing in each time period. Obviously, forms as 
complex as the latter two require considerably more data than is 
available here but would be a useful topic for further study. The 
important point is that this class of functional forms represents the 
core of a housing market model. It can be expanded, as it has been in 
this study, to capture spatial effects, although this study has also 
shown that the simplest form leaves a number of unanswered questions.
It can be condensed by making the "lumped system" assumption as in a
macro model, where the number of submarkets is assumed to be one. The 
determinants of demand and supply can be included if direct observations 
of these variables are unavailable, again as used in macro models. With 
sufficient data, combining cross section and time series, it can be used 
to test a wide variety of hypotheses about housing market phenomena 
whilst making the assumptions underlying those hypotheses explicit.
As a further extension, it is clear from the results discussed here that 
there is a possibility of non-zero off-diagonal elements in the F 
matrix. This effectively means that price setters will take the degree 
of apparent excess supply or demand in adjoining submarkets into 
account. This considerably complicates the dynamics of the spatial, 
housing model and for it to be operationalised would require the longer 
runs of data discussed above. An alternative form of spatial submarket 
classification is the diagonalisation of the F matrix which will 
correspond to the structure of housing market professionals' information 
fields. This is essentially another version of the structural breaks 
problem, which in the spatial case is intensive of computing time.
8.3 SIGNIFICANCE FQ5 THE HOUSING MARKET LITERATURE
This study has implications for a number of the papers discussed in the 
first three chapters, and it is worth summarising the main points of the 
literature review.
(1) The majority of models deal in terms of long-run equilibrium, 
assuming that such an equilibrium exists and is stable (i.e. attainable)
(2) The dominant assumed tenure is private rental, this being one of the 
main reasons for the long-run equilibrium assumption.
(3) Space is assumed to be a source of transport costs only, and the 
market operates under perfect spatial information.
'.4/ iii vacancy Transition models, The marmex process is assumed to os 
irrelevant due to volume constraints and over long periods of time the 
operation of the housing market can be represented by a set of constant 
transition probabilities.
(5) The housebuilding industry is sluggish to respond to the demands of 
the housing market and this is responsible, in part, for the tendency 
for house price inflation to exceed general price inflation.
These paints are discussed in turn below:
<1) The indications are that the dynamic behaviour of the Scottish 
housing market does not correspond either to the pure oscillatory form 
of Blank and Vinnick, or to the perfect one quarter adjustment of Artis 
et al. Instead, each strata of the housing market has its awn form of 
damped or oscillatory damped behaviour with varying time periods to 
return to equilibrium. This result holds for Scotland but in housing 
markets which have a more substantial speculative element such as that 
of the South-East of England, less stable oscillation is possible over 
longer time periods.
(2) The explicit owner-occupier tenure implies that Veblen effects, 
where quality is judged by price, cannot be rejected. For similar 
reasons (and the two views may be observationally equivalent in many 
cases) the investment role of housing appears to dominate the timing of 
many mobility decisions. This is directly relevant to the large range 
of studies based on rental tenure which find a negative signed price 
elasticity of housing demand. The suggestion is not that demand does 
not respond to market pressures at all, but that the expectation of 
continued house price increases may dominate the demand for housing.
The fact that most of those who demand are already owners means that 
house prices have a built-in source of inflationary pressure since the 
sale of one property can be used to finance the purchase of the other. 
The housing system can accommodate rising prices with a given inflow of 
funds if the rate of transactions (i.e. mobility) adjusts downwards.
(3) Spatial effects operate at a higher scale than might be expected if 
transport costs alone were the source of friction of distance, and the 
general level of spatial interaction implied by this study gives some 
support to the notion of information fields and search effects at the 
regional level. These effects operate in addition to those of the urban 
and metropolitan levels.
(4) It is necessary to draw a distinction between the volume and value 
approaches to conceptualising the demand for and supply of housing; each 
has its own characteristics with volume being associated with links 
between submarkets and value being associated with variations within 
submarkets. Between submarkets, the volumes of households trading up
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will be the most important feature, since all mobility chains are 
dependent on the existence of buyers from the next level. Within house 
type submarkets, households may be sensitive to very small house price 
variations. Overall, it is not valid for a macroeconometric model to 
assume that there exists a stable relationship between say, per capita 
incomes or the flow of funds into Building Societies and house prices, 
without standardising for the number and type of transactions, with 
regard to hierarchies and spatial units. The conclusions of the Markov 
chain models are that either vacancies or first time buyers drive the 
housing market. According to this study, vacancies are more important 
further down the hierarchy, whilst the existence of demand to allow 
trading up is important further up the hierarchy. This may reflect the 
state of the market during the sample period of the study;- these 
findings may be reversed in other time periods. nevertheless, it is
clear that it is unrealistic to expect one side of the market, supply or
demand, to dominate all levels in all time periods.
(5) It is by no means clear that the building industry is sluggish to 
respond to markets. It may be sluggish with respect to prices, which 
could reflect land shortages, although the apparent insignificance of 
local authority land release behaviour suggests that the land constraint
is in the cost of land which may rapidly be bid up so as to discount
price increases. It follows that the builder is more heavily dependent 
on the existence of demand in locations which are profitable, and there 
is some evidence that the builder can influence the spatial location of 
demand. It follows that the builder has every incentive"to reinforce 
high price levels through, for example, product differentiation.
8. 4 POLICY IMPLICATION'S1
Current U.K. Government policy is aimed at encouraging owner occupation 
by a number of specific means. These include the manipulation of the 
system of Local Authority finance to effect higher real rent levels in 
the council sector than has been the norm. For those tenants not in 
receipt of subsidy, there is an incentive to move towards owner 
occupation, particularly given the extension of the "Sight-to-Buy" 
legislation. Owner-occupation has also been encouraged by some 
deregulation of land release policy, although this has led, on 
occasions, to conflict between housebuilders and planners. Some Local 
Authorities and builders have attempted to quantify household demand, 
and one of the techniques which has been suggested is that of the 
minimal household units approach. Differential rates of house price 
inflation in the UK have been blamed for reducing labour mobility, and 
it has been suggested that policy should be directed to minimising the 
impact of this effect.
Un the basis of the findings in this study, it is possible to comment on 
these aspects of policy:
(1) Local Authority rent increases may increase owner occupation 
levels. However, the council house sales programme has been intended to 
"create” a new set of owner-occupiers who possess an investment, and 
assessing the true effectiveness of the council house sales programme 
will require a period of years when there has been sufficient mobility 
within that sub-sector to indicate that those who buy their council 
houses find that marketability is identical with the housing market in
general. On the evidence collected here, there is a slight tendency for 
movers to avoid areas of high council rents, and by implication to avoid 
those areas where council house sales have been highest. Other 
explanations such as lack of supply are possible, but it is not yet 
proven that ex-council tenants will be able to realise their investment.
(2) Land release may be an inefficient way of reducing the real cost of 
housing if land prices are bid up to reflect market demand. This is 
probably one reason why housebuilders acquire considerable land banks 
with limited or even with no planning permission, with the intention of 
exploiting profitable market opportunities as they arise in the longer 
term. This can be contrasted with the study by Kellis and Longbottom 
(1981) which concluded on the basis-of a nationwide macroecanometric 
model, with no spatial elements and no land release regressors, that 
Local Authorities in the U.K. should zone more land for housebuilding in 
order to reduce the real cost of housing. This study has indicated the 
severe limitations and implicit spatial submarket assumptions which 
macroecanometric modellers must address when they attempt to make 
spatial prescriptions.
(3) A high ratio of potential to actual households is more likely to 
indicate an inability to demand for economic reasons, rather than the 
existence of latent demand'1 The recurring finding that an area with a 
large number of complex households is less likely be a source of demand 
and less likely to have high numbers of mobile households may confirm 
Ermisch's suggestion that the relationship between utility and household 
size may not be monotonically decreasing, and implies that the turning
3 0 9
paint in the relationship is a function of other variables such as 
socio-economic grouping, urban/rural location, and the employment 
prospects in an area. It is to be expected that optimal household size 
will increase as the cost of space falls (i.e. rural areas) and that 
when employment prospects are poor or per capita incomes are low, it is 
optimal to spread the fixed costs of housing.
(4) A flat housing market may be damaging to the operation of the 
labour market, not because of notional price differentials but because 
of the lack of volume demand for houses in depressed areas.The fear of 
’’contagion" of low prices or slack demand leads to a bandwagon effect on 
supply in adjoining districts. A classic example of this is the South 
Bronx in Hew York. There is a tendency for such effects to spread, 
until they meet a barrier in the form of a housing market with 
employment related buoyancy, where demand may spill over into the 
depressed areas, bringing windfall gains to the incumbent households. 
This has been a noteable feature of the London housing market in recent 
years. Hence an owner occupier housing market can be a useful vehicle 
for the redistribution of wealth. Under such circumstances,
"gentrification" may be a desirable effect.
8.5 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has discussed possible extensions to the regional housing 
matrix model and has indicated how the findings of this study contrast 
with those of the existing literature. A number of policy implications 
follow and these indicate that whilst the present policy of expansion of
owner occupation can be desirable under certain circumstances, there are 
a number of aspects of the specific means used to encourage owner 
occupation which may have undesirable side-effects. The next chapter 
summarises the study.
CHAPTER NIUE 
UHMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
9. 1 SUMMARY AND CQITCLUSIQffS
This chapter summarises the main conclusions of this thesis and relates 
them to the literature reviewed in the first three chapters. This 
thesis has developed a framework for the theoretical analysis and 
empirical estimation of a dynamic regional owner occurier housing marke 
model. These aspects have been selected as mutually interdependent but 
relatively neglected areas of the existing housing market literature.
A more detailed examination of this literature shows/ in Chapter One, 
that the utility maximising concept is a powerful one, and has been 
applied in a broad variety of housing market models which progressively 
reduce the level of analytical abstraction and introduce notions of 
heterogeneity, both of houses and households. In addition, they 
incorporate the idea of mobility and hence of the process of change 
within the housing market.
In Chapter Two, it was seen that geographic models which do not 
explicitly employ the utility maximising paradigm can be shown to nest 
within it. Geographic models are generally based on ideas originating 
in the natural sciences, but it is possible to state most such 
formulations as special cases of a general gravity type model. It 
follows from these two chapters that the twin notions of spatial 
structure representation and utility maximisation prove to be recurring 
in the attempt to represent the operation of the housing market, and 
this reflects the essence of the housing market as a spatial system 
consisting of competing individuals.
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his system is one which evolves through time, and this aspect, although 
studied in detail in Chapters One and Two, is abstracted from price 
movements. By contrast, in Chapter Three it was shown that the dynamic 
evolution of prices and volumes is the central premise of 
macroeconometric models. The dynamic behaviour of the housing market is 
a crucial issue, but one which cannot be properly defined without some 
form of disaggregation, particularly with respect to space and when an 
owner occupier tenure dominates.
Although there are a number of studies of tenure choice, these do not 
generally reflect the market implications of the fact that for most 
households, the decision to buy is simultaneously a decision to sell. 
This idea is examined in Chapter Four where it is argued that the dual 
role places a time constraint on decision making and hence raises 
questions about the flow of information to the owner of an existing 
house. It also means that owners of existing houses compete more or less 
directly with the builders of new houses. This is particularly 
important given that the building industry in the U.K. has been 
transformed in the last 15 years and is now capable of a much more rapid 
response to market trends than has been assumed in most existing models. 
It follows that an information asymmetry exists between owner occupiers 
and builders, with corresponding impacts on the determination of prices. 
It.is possible that each set of market actors will respond to market 
signals other than prices. This is particularly the case for owner 
occupiers, who themselves own an appreciating asset, and hence for whom 
price rises may have only a limited rationing effect. Another aspect of 
housing market analysis discussed in Chapter Four is the concept of
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housing market dimensions. It is argued that there are three key 
dimensions: space, time, and house type. It is not possible for any 
model of the housing market to be complete without at least a crude 
incorporation of all three dimensions, and in retrospect it is explicit 
lack of account of at least one of these dimensions that characterises 
most of the models discussed in the literature review of the first three 
chapters.
Chapter Five constructs a theoretical model of a regional housing market 
on the premise that market actors display some responsiveness to prices, 
and that prices may not adjust perfectly within any given time period. 
The model is specified in matrix form and can be linear or log-linear, 
although the log-linear farm gives price elasticities directly. The 
matrix dimensions correspond to the different categories of house type, 
and/or spatial unit. The A and B matrices represent the response of 
demand and supply sides respectively to prices, and the r matrix gives 
the response of prices to the demand/supply imbalance prevailing.
A detailed comparison of the theoretical framework of the regional 
matrix model with existing housing models is given in Carruthers (1938), 
but the salient features are summarised here.
Within this framework, it is possible to classify the utility maximising 
models of Chapter One according to the assumptions made about the forms 
of the A, B and T matrices. It is usual to assume that r = CA+B] 
that is, that equilibrium is achieved within one time period of any 
exogenous change. Simulation models place zero restrictions on the A
matrix, such that interactions between areas may only occur if they are 
of similar house type or socio-economic profile.
The gravity, entropy and vacancy formulations of Chapter Two model the 
flows of persons independent of' the level-of house nrices, which implies 
zero restrictions on the A, B and/or the F matrices. The housing system 
in these models is, to a greater or lesser extent, a function of the 
exogenous variables which represent attractor and repellant forces. In 
the context of vacancy and mobility models, zero coefficients are 
implied for almost all variables except those which determine vacancy 
and new household generation respectively.
The macroeconometric models of Chapter Three effectively assume a 
regular structure for the A, B and F matrices relative to the spatial 
distribution of any variable which is a source of exogenous shocks to 
the system. If this condition is not satisfied, the spatial invariance 
of macroeconometric models rests on each submarket, or spatial zone, 
interacting identically (including zero interaction) with all other 
zones. For most spatial systems this implies no friction of distance 
beyond a certain point. Most macroeconometric models assume rapid and 
even instantaneous movements to equilibrium, which implies that 
F = C A + B3-1 .
Chapter Five also demonstrates how the weights matrix developed in 
spatial econometrics can be used to operationalise the model. This does 
involve placing certain restrictions on the extent of spatial 
interaction, in particular assuming that for the data set used in this
study, one spatial lag is generally sufficient to capture all spatial 
interaction effects. It is further necessary to assume that the A, B 
and f matrices can be reduced to tail + a-V] , [biI + b^V], and Y I ; this
corresponds to uniform elasticities and cross-elasticities of demand and
supply, and uniform price response to supply and demand imbalances. It 
follows that V represents the friction of distance and can further be 
used to correct for heterogeneity of house types between spatial zones.
Due to lack of explicit price data, the model is cast in vacancy change 
form. This obscures the dynamic response since it is not passible to 
separate out the effects of a,b, and V » but it is possible to make
statements about the dynamics of the system as a whole.
After examining the insitutional and economic background in Chapter Six, 
which also discusses the specific data series used, Chapter Seven gives 
detailed estimates for the spatial model. These estimates indicate the 
following main conclusions:
(1) The sensitivity to market pressure varies for different classes of 
movers and is higher for those who are newcomers to the housing market. 
(Rejection of uniform a). In addition, each social stratum acts as a 
quasi-autonomous submarket.
(2) Spatial effects are strong and the spatial location process can be 
characterised by the rejection of alternative locations as much as the 
selection of the actual destination. The significance of- the market 
pressure variable in own district and spatially lagged form, and the
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caiman occurrence of perverse coefficients for this variable, implies 
that either the investment role (that is, inflationary expectations) of 
housing dominates or the off-diagonal elements of T are non-sera.
(3) The successful operation of the market when the predominant tenure 
is owner occupation depends more on the presence or absence of volume 
supply and demand, rather than prices, for the reasons outlined in (2). 
However, the dynamic response of such volumes is stable, albeit 
oscillatory, and this permits a more precise statement about house nrice 
dynamics in the Scottish housing market:
(9. 1)
a + b a + d
(4) Although in volume terns the rapid response of the building 
industry is confirmed, there appears to be a significant degree of 
insulation from short term market pressures, with some evidence of an 
ability to spatially manipulate demand and tentative evidence that the 
land zoning constraint is not binding. <B non-uniform)
(5) Local authority rents have little impact on the mainstream housing 
market, and those council tenants who have chosen owner occupation due 
to rising rent levels have probably purchased their own council house 
rather than joining the housing market. For new households, the key 
factor will probably be the non-availability of council housing rather 
than its rent.
I
3oo
It is not passible, within the scape of this thesis, ta collect ana 
analyse price data to permit quantitative statements to be made about 
the A, B and T matrices, but this study has shown the likely route that 
such an exercise could take and has indicated that it would be a 
fruitful project.
The major conclusion of this work is that the spatial scale of operation 
of the housing market is sufficiently high in Scotland (and probably in 
the U.K.) to render the region the appropriate level of analysis, rather 
than the individual urban unit. In addition it has shown that a.uestions 
of dynamic stability are of paramount importance in a spatial owner 
occupier market, and that in Scotland, the housing market is dynamically 
stable.
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MOTES TO CHAPTERS
1. In Alonso's model the household chooses land price, whilst in Muth's 
the house price is exogenous and entry to the market by suppliers 
eliminates excess profit by bidding up land prices.
2. Muth explicitly introduces supply with perfectly competitive factor 
markets.
3. Strazheim's submarket groupings satisfy similarity and compactness. 
It is not clear whether simplicity is also satisfied.
4. In practice two income measures are used - one is actual income
which is affected by policy, the other is a permanent income 
measure.
5. Graves and Linneman (197S) have suggested that "non-traded goods" 
may be crucial in the mobility/migration decision.
6. There are 72 household types and 27 house types.
7. There are three possible quality levels, defined ad hoc. .
8. For this reason Porell describes the IBEE model as an equilibrium
model even though it eschews the long-run equilibrium concept.
9. c.f. Struyk, below.
10. This term captures measurement errors as-well as individual taste 
variations, and also covers bounded rationality.
11. In this case Tobit estimation is to be preferred
12. Two-stage least squares is used. Simultaneity is not apparent for 
the 30-44 age group and for the over 65's.
13. Generalised least squares to remove heteroskedasticity does not 
significantly alter coefficient values.
14. This includes quadratics to approximate the various portions of the 
S-curve.
15. By contrast, in the HUDS model tenure is the last aspect chosen.
16. The coefficients on permanent income and prior house value are the 
most stable.
17. These effectively employ a sub-sample.
18. Strictly speaking, this is not a utility maximising model.
19. This is valid because random deviations from the expected pattern 
are assumed to be due to search costs which are assigned a random
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normal distribution.
20. They find households to be more sensitive to under consumption.
21. It might be argued that for a "satisfied" household, actual and 
desired demand coincide, although "satisficed" might be a more 
appropriate term.
22. Jlaclennan (1982) suggests inclusion of finance search.
23. Maclennan (1977) suggests a further division of choice space into 
perceived and non-perceived, as well as the usual feasible and non- 
feasible.
24. Anas (1981) estimates an "aggregate equivalent" to the multinomial 
logit model in which commuting mode as well as zone and dwelling are 
chosen.
25. The size of the data set precludes use of logit or probit estimation 
of the limited dependent variable "household size" but the 
instrumental variables technique is used to allow for simultaneity.
26. The IBER-HUDS model in effect assumes perfect information.
27. Analysis to determine the existence, stability and 'uniqueness 
properties of a model of this size is likely to be infeasible.
MOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
1. This model is not, strictly speaking, the subject matter of this 
chapter, but it provides a link between utility maximising and 
'geographic approaches.
2. If cci = 3,-j = 1 and tij = 1/dij then the Alonso form yields the 
gravity model.
3. The derivation of this formula is given in the appendix to this 
chapter
4. It is possible to have a decay function which is not exponential, 
such as an inverse power function.
5. The housing-specific expenditure proportion is applied to income net 
of travel costs, so there is some "gross price" effect (c.f. Chapter 
One)
6. For example, within a city relocators are likely to be following a 
housing "career" whereas interurban migrants are more likely to be 
changing jobs.
7. The terms "Markov Chain" and "Markov Process" are used 
interchangeably here, although strictly speaking there are 
differences. These differences are not significant for the purposes 
of this discussion.
3. That is, pt.j is the probability of moving to the jth state
conditional on having been in the ith state immediately prior to 
moving,
9. Some writers use the phrase "Time Homogeneous" to refer to 
stationarity. This usage will not be employed here.
10. Ginsberg (1972a) paints out that this feature renders McGinnis' 
model semi-Markov.
11. This will be the case provided life-cycle and house choice 
relationships are not too strong.
12. The derivation of this model is given in the appendix to this 
chapter.
13. In the more complex versions considered in this chapter, 
heterogeneity could be incorporated by making v* an 
"average" of characteristics.
r r r ^ T T r r *  *rr\ , ^ t t  \ ‘D T I T 'D  ' r 'L T ‘D 'C T ?ihui^o iu UnAr lur. inhnn-
1. . V/iii tsnead ]Ba.i£SS iXOme modifications tD Variables for two- Stage least
squares estimation, such as separating out the house price and cost 
of capital components; hence prices entered in the demand and supply 
equations are compatible.
2. Neuberger and Nichol (1976) find that in some cases the estimated 
coefficients on lagged prices is greater than 1, implying 
instability.
TO CHAJ
1. In the Elimination By Aspects model, the individual makes a series 
of choices from a set of different aspects (characteristics) and either 
accepts or rejects such aspects outright. Hence the notion of degrees 
of substitutability is ignored.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVI
1. The equilibrium price may be a static or moving equilibrium. A more 
general version of this model which includes a definition of stock 
equilibrium is given in the appendix to this chapter.
2. For proof see Chiang (1979) p.139
3. Proof: Consider two different vectors of' exogenous variables value 
distributed randomly within the spatial system. The aggregate value o 
each vector is identical, and hence:
LTli = iTXs
where i is a column vector of units and Xi and Xa are the vectors of 
exogenous change (such as employment). From the equilibrium condition 
in (5.8), spatial invariance requires:
i” 1 (A+B)"1 Xi = i"'1 (A+B)-‘X2
By the rules of matrix algebra, if (AfB) is diagonal, then so is (A+B).
1, and if all diagonal elements of (A+B) are identical, then all the 
elements of the exogenous change vectors are given equal weight. It 
follows that the spatial invariance condition given above must hold, but 
only as applied to average values (of, say, house prices). By a similar 
argument, if in addition all the off-diagonal elements are identical, 
but not equal to the diagonal elements, all the elements of the
cn
exogenous change vectors are again given equal weight, once each row of 
the (At 3)""' matrix has been multiplied out. Further aggregation by the 
vector of units results in an identical aggregate figure. Taking these 
two arguments together, the block diagonal form of the latter type of 
matrix also yields a spatially invariant result.
A simple example is given below:
It is assumed that Xi + x- = y-t + y-;: where Xi , x^, y-i , and are 
elements 01 the vectors x and y respectively. In is necessary to prove
that iT'Ax = iTAy, where A is given by:
A =
3 . 3  i
iTAx = a-iXi + a2S2 + a3x-i + a, xs
= a  i ( X i  + -f a - j  (X-i t  X:i::)
= a i  ( v - i  t  y :::;> t- a.s(yi + y:s) . Q . E .  D
4. Phase and Coherence are the measures used in spectral analysis whic 
correspond, respectively, to the degree of temporal coincidence of 
cycles, anq m e  qegree of overall correlation Qexwesn two cyclical 
series.
NOTE TO CHARTER SIX
1. Scottish Office (1983). Given that some of the variables used in 
the factor analysis and some of the variables used in this study will 
coincide, some coilinearity is inevitable.
1. Inclusion of endogenous variables as regressors will almost 
certainly result in simultaneous equation bias, and instrumental 
variables should be used in the estimation process. However, the data 
set used here did not yield a good set of instruments, and the 
explanatory power of any instrumental variable regressions was very low. 
This is likely to result from the endogenous variables being highly 
correlated with one another, whilst the exogenous regressors alone do 
not predict the endogenous variables well. Hence•replacement of the 
endogenous regressors with variables constructed from the exogenous 
regressors will result in low explanatory mower due to the highly 
simultaneous nature of the model.
2. Seemingly Unrelated degressions refers to the technique used when 
the model is not simultaneous, but there are reasons to believe that 
disturbance terms are correlated across equations. In this case, the 
common regressor set and the correlation between the dependent variable 
of each equation renders it probable that the SURE technique is 
necessary. This involves adjusting the standard errors to take account 
of the disturbance term correlation.
3. The Veblen effect is one where individuals judge quality by relative 
price, and assume that a positive relationship exists between the two.
It follows that positive own price elasticities can arise if Veblen 
effects are operating.
IQXE.
1. The difference being that a high ratio of potential to actual may 
indicate that a large number of households are searching (i.e. 
demanding); the results of this study seem to indicate that households 
which are relatively overcrowded are not searching and hence are not 
active in the market.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER TWO: .DERIVATION QF THE EFTRQPY FORMULA AMD THE 
MARKOV CHAIM MODEL
A2,1 Derivation of the Entropy Formula
The problem is stated as: how many assignments of individual workers to
origin-destination routes are possible?
Given that, where T are the number of trips in the whole system, and 
are the number of trips from i to j :
T = Zi.li Ti j CA2. 1.1)
the question becomes: how many ways can Ti i be selected from T ?
Denoting the number of ways by K T n ) ,  combinatorial theory states:
T!
N O N  -, ) = ------------  (A2. 1.2)
T n !  (T-Tt •, )!
Selection of Tis has to be made from the remaining T - T n , giving:
(T-T,,)!
H(T-1S) = ------------------  (A2.1.3)
T12! ( M n - T i a ) !
and so on for all T ;i.j.
The total number of assignments is the product of M(T±j) for all T u ,  
given by:
T!
S = -----------  (A2. 1.4)
IT T u  !
i  j
Substitution of (A2.1.1) into (A2.1.4) gives the entrony formula.
O f o
A2.^ _2. ..-Derivation of the Harkov Chain Model
Def ining v :j. .-i as the probability that a vacancy in i moves to j, the 
total number of vacancies arriving in j by virtue of the operation of 
the system alone is given as:
where I is a l*k vector and V is a k*k matrix, and k is the number of 
sub-categories (house-quality ranges in White's model, zones in Porell's 
model). If it is assumed that the system is not a closed one, i.e. that 
S.iVij * 1, then a vector of new vacancies arriving from outside the 
system is included:
m.i = I i m :j. Vi. j (A. 2.2.1)
where v :i. ,i are the transition probabilities. 
In matrix form this is:
I = I V (A.2.2.2)
(A. 2
K = (I - 10-1 F (A 4)
Q.E.D.
ArTSKDIl-TQ-CHAPTER FIVE.;.. .A._STQC.K ..BOHI LIBRIUM VERSIOfl 0? THE
R501 ORAL.. MODEL
The stock equilibrium version of the regional model is a more 
generalised form and can be represented as follows:
APt. P i (AHfr, t ~ AH.d t. ) ~  (iln-.it. “ rid t.)
where and H.~it refer to n M  vectors of the stock supply of and 
demand for housing, respectively, at time t, and ail other vectors and 
matrices are of the same dimensionality as the main model. In addition:
Qc)t., Q m and Pt are as defined in equations (5.4) to (5.6). Id and id: 
are the n * n matrices of price adjustment parameters corresponding to 
the flow and stock positions respectively. As in the main model, these 
can be reduced to y  t L-, and The main difference with respect to
the flow model is that even if the market is in flow equilibrium, stock 
disequilibrium will result in price changes up or down, depending on 
whether the stock postion is one of excess demand or excess supply. The 
stack demand may be chronically above the stock supply if prices do not 
move at sufficient speed so as to clear the market in each time period. 
As the stock disequilibrium increases, prices will change more rapidly 
until it is possible that the flow position will be one of excess 
supply. Eventually, this process should bring about a return to 
equilibrium, although t h e .speed with which it does so will be a function 
of the sensitivity of demand and supply to prices. The attainability of 
equilibrium will depend on the signs of the price elasticities.
The formulation given in this appendix implies that the underlying 
demand and supply functions are specified in stock terms. There is no 
particular reason why the specification of stock demand and supply 
functions should significantly differ from that of the flow functions 
used in this thesis, although given the long run nature of the stock 
equlibrium the asset demand for housing may become more important, This 
will include the response of all households to a once and for all 
alteration to the price of housing as a result of a spatially specific 
tax or subsidy being imposed. The effects of such a "one off" event may 
not be detected in a one time period flow model.
In practice, the model estimated in this study aggregates the stock and 
flow demands together, and estimates which allow inferences to be made 
about the single y  parameter actually pertain to the two price 
adjustment parameters, y- i  and y ^ .  In a short run model, it is likely 
that y *  is small relative to y - t ,  so this aggregation is unlikely to have 
a significant impact.
A H ®  t. - (A. 5
AH.-1 !■. — G'-j t- (A.5.3)
A££miX-IQ-.QHAPTER SEBaft:___DATA SOURCES. TRANSFORMATIONS.
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS. AND DATA LISTINGS
Listed below are the primary data sources, along with any • adjustments 
which have been made for estimation purposes. For Census data, the QPC 
cell number is given.
VARIABLE
IP
LAR
OIL
URD
BRTH*
RV
SEG
LAND
NHIP
DTH*
DEFINITION
Male unemployment rate
Average unrebated Local 
Authority rent level
Oil dummy
Urban-rural dummy
Birth rate
Average rateable value
wTs where w is a vector 
of average pre-tax wage 
rates for adult males by 
socio-economic group, and 
s is a vector of the 
proportions of adult males 
in each socio-economic 
group.
Ratio of land held without 
planning permission to 
land held with planning 
permission; measured in 
terms of "potential 
dwellings".
Potential household units 
Assumes 3 adults to be 
maximum per household.
Death rate per head of 
population
SOURCE
1981 Census, OPCS 860
Scottish Housing 
Statistics
Imposed a priori
Scottish Office
Registrar General for 
Scotland
Scottish Housing 
Statistics
Family Income Survey 
and
1981 Census 
OPCS 4877-4895
Scottish Office 
HSIU No 20 
Table 6
1981 Census 
OPCS 2253-2260 
16+ only
Registrar General 
for Scotland
IF* In-movers to a District
in the past year who are 
now in owner-occupation 
and whose move originates 
outside the District but 
from the same Region.
IFF* In-movers to a District
in the past year who are 
now in owner-occupation 
and whose move originates 
outside the District and 
from another Region.
GUT* Out-movers from a District
in the past year who are 
now in owner-occupation 
and whose move terminates 
outside the District but 
in the same Region.
OUTH* Out-movers from a District
in the past year who are 
now in owner-occupation 
and whose move terminates 
outside the District and 
outside the Region.
HHFR* An estimated subset of all
out-movers, being those who 
have formed new households:
HHFR = ESTVAC - DV
where ESTVAC = OUT+OUTH+RCM 
tDTH-IM-IMH
RCM* Rate of completions of new
private sector houses
1981 Census
1981 Census
1981 Census
1981 Census
Composite of 
other variables
Scottish Housing 
Statistics
TVR* Movers within a District 
during the past year
1981 Census
DV:t: Change in vacancies
1980-81, calculated as 
8x%QOxVRU, where for any 
given District, '8 is the 
average ratio of dwellings 
to rateable units, %Q0 is 
the proportion in owner 
occupation, and VRIJ is 
the number of vacant 
rateable units.
Registrar General 
for Scotland
* : Variable is deflated by the number of owner occupiers, or adjusted 
by the proportion of owner occupiers, as appropriate.
DATA LISTImtS
The following pages list the data used in regressions. The data 
each district are listed in the fallowing (Region) order.
:ar
11
2.
3.
4.
5.
6. 
7. 
3.
9.
10. 
11. 
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20. 
21. 
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
Berwickshire
Ettrick and Lauderdale
Roxburgh
Tweedale
Clackmannan
Falkirk
Stirling
Annandale and Eskdale
Mithsdale
Stewartry
Vigtown
Dunfermline
Kirkcaldy
Sorth East Fife
Aberdeen City
Banff and Buchan
Gordon
Kincardine and Deeside 
Moray
Badenoch and Strathspey
Caithness
Inverness
Lochaber
Mairn
Ross and Cromarty 
Skye and. Lochalsh 
Sutherland 
East Lothian
29. Edinburgh City
30. Midlothian
31. Vest Lothian
32. Argyll and Bute
33. Bearsden and Mi Ingavie
34. Clydebank
35. Clydesdale (Lanark)
36. Cumbernauld and Kilsyth
37. Cumnock and Doon Valley
38. Cunninghame
39. Dumbarton
40. East Kilbride
41. Eastwood
42. Glasgow City
43. Hamilton
44. Inverclyde
45. Kilmarnock and Loudon
46. Kyle and Carrick
47. Monklands 
43, Motherwell
49. Renfrew
50. Strathkelvin
51. Angus
52. Dundee City
53. Perth and Kinross
54. Orkney Islands
55. Shetland Islands
56. Western Isles
The unnormalised inter-district distance matrix used for weights 
construction is also given. The, numerals in brackets correspond with 
the district numbers given above, and for each district there are 56 
entries corresponding to its potential neighbours. Only contiguous 
districts (including those connected by road bridges) are given non-zero 
values. Distances are in miles and measure the straight line between 
estimated centroids.
OC>4-
. U LAR . OIL URD> BRTH
(0)0)0* l ;• 0). 0*0*959 4 6 3 .5 4 0 0 4 0 .0 0 0 0 0 1. 000*00 ■ 0.0*1820*
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•, 0*0*0 5) 0 „ 0 0 5 3 5 3 7 3 .6 2 9 8 8 0 .0 0 0 0 0 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0*. 0 2 6 1 7
(0* 0*0*6) 0 .  0*0*215 3 4 7 .5 9 0 0 9 0« 00 0 00 4 .  0*0* 0*0)0* 0*. 0*240*7
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* *00) 13) 0 .0 0 2 1 5 4 2 0 .2 7 0 0 2 0 .0 0 0 0 0 3 .  0*00)0)0* 0 . 0 2 5 6 6
03014> O. Of- 4 9 6 .9 7 9 9 8 V 00000 2 .  0*0) 0*0)0 0 . 0 2 1 6 6
(0*015) 0*. 0)0)070. 3 1 0 .4 5 9 9 6 1 .0 0 0 0 0 5 .  0*00)0*0* 0 . 0 2 1 1 2
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(0*0 21 ; 0*. 0*0 764 3 5 8 .  100*10 0 .0 0 0 0 0 1. 0*0* 0*0*0* 0*. 0)2730*
((0*022) 0*. 0*0354 4 4 7 .  030*0)3 0 1 00 0 0 0 2 .  0*0*0*00 0 . 0 2 6 4 3
(0*0)23) 0 .  0* 150*3 4 2 7 . 9 6 9 9 “ 0 .  0004*0 2 .  0*0)00)0* 0*. 0*2940)
(0*0*24 ) 0 .  0*2293 390.. 2 3 0 0 0 0 „00 0 00 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 .  0)2527
(00:25) 0*. O'0*362 429 -  0 9 009 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1. 0*00* ’0*0) 0 . 0 3 1 3 1
(0 0 2 6 ) 0 .0 4 2 3 9 4 1 9 .7 3 9 9 9 0 „ 0 0 0 0 0 1. OC)0*0*0 0 .0 2 6 3 1
(00 2 7 ) 0 .0 1 7 9 9 4 5 3 .  350*10* 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1. 0*00)00 0 . 0 2 2 6 5
(V'Jlci) 0*. 0**0227 3 7 9 .6 8 9 9 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 2 .  0)0000 0 . 0 2 1 3 6
(0*0 29) 0*.. 000-0? 4 96 .  100*10* c .0 0 0 0 0 5 .  0*000*0) 0 . 0 1 9 4 2
( O 'O'30 ; 0 .  O'GO 96 7 7 3 .9 3 9 9  9 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 .  000*0*0* O'. .0*2620
(00 3 1 ) 0 . 0 0240 4 2 5 . 3 2 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 2 9 4 9
(0*032) 0*. O' 0*3 90* 5 0 6 .  20*996 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1. 0)0 0*0*0 0 . 0 2 5 2 7
(00*33) 0 .0 0 2 7 2 4 60:. 10*0)10* 0 .0 0 0 0 0 4 .  0)0)00*0: 0*. 0*20*43
*0034) 0.  00*927 3 6 6 .1 1 0 1 1 0 . 0 0  000 4 . 0)000*0* 0*. 0*2346
(0*035) 0 .  00:50*6 390*. 280*0*3 0 .0 0 0 0 0 2 .  000*0:0) 0 .  0*2621
(00:36) 0 .0 0 4 8 3 4 6 4 .2 0 9 9 6 0.. 0 0 0 00 3 .  0)(.) 0*0)(.). 0* . 0 3 1 1 3
(0 0 3 7 ) 0.00*974 3 8 7 .8 5 0 1 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 2 .  0>0* 0*0*0* 0 .0 2 4 1 1
(*..* O 3 8. 0*. 0*0'346 371 . 50*0)0)0) 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 .  000*0*0 0 .  0*2642
(0*039) 0). 0:0*448 3 8 9 .5 9 0 0 9 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 2 8 6 3
(0:0*4 0) 0 .0 0 2 8 9 4 3 3 . S8989 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 .  00*0*0*0 0 . 0 2 4 4 1
(00 4 1 ) 0). 0*020:2 * 4 1 . 8 7 9 8 8 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 4 .  00*0)00* 0*. 0*2312
(0042 ) 0 .  O' 0 0 74 ^■36»25000 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 5 .  0*00*00: 0 .  0*2253
(0043) 0 .  0*0-383 3 2 5 .3 9 9 9 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 4 .  0*00*0)0* C. 0*2838
(00 4 4 ) 0 .0 0 4 4  1 3 7 9 .6 3 9 8 9 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 4 .  00*0*00* 0 . 0 2 4 3 5
(00 4 5 ) 0*. 00*445 4 1 3 . 3300S c . 0 0 0 00 3 .  0*0:00*0* 0 . 0 2 4 8 3
(0046 ) 0 .  0)0*273 3 2 3 .0 7 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 .  00)0*0*0' 0 . 0 2 1 1 6
(0047 ) 0 .  O'04S3 3 7 9 .6 3 9 3 9 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 4.00*0)00 0 . 0 2 3 7 7
(0 0 4 8 ) 0.0*0321 3 8 4 .6 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 4 .000*00 0 . 0 2 5 9 9
(00 4 9 ) 0*. 0 0 1 48 3 7 3 .9 3 9 9 4 O'. 0*0000) 4 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 2 4 1 5
(0 0 5 0 ) 0*. 00*225 44 4 . 3 3 0 0 8 0*. 00*0)00 3 .0000*0 0 . 0 3 0 0 0
(0 0 5 1 ) 0 .0 0 2 3 1 4 1 7 .5 2 0 0 2 . 0*. 00*000) 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 2 3 3 3
(0-0525 0. 00*211 3 0 7 .1 2 0 1 2 0 .  0)0*000 5.00*00*0 0 . 0 2 1 6 8
(00*53) 0 .  OC174 3 9 3 .1 3 9 9 4 0*. 0*0* 0*0)0 2 .  00*0*00* 0 . 0 2 1 i  2
(0 0 5 4 ) 0 .  00*878 4 1 2 .5 0 0 0 0 0 .  0*0*000 1. 0*000*0* 0 . 0 2 4 1 9
(0 0 5 5 ) 0 .  0*0451 4 1 5 .3 7 0 1 2 0). 0)0*00*0: 1. 0)0*0*00* 0*. 02981
(00:56) O „ '..* 1 6 J. 4 9 2 .9 7 9 9 3 0. 0*00)0*0 1. 0*00*00: 0*. 0 2 3 4 3
RV
2 0 7 .0 0 0 0 0
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1 9 9. 000<j0 
2 1 3 .  0)000)0; 
2 7 9 .  00)0)0)0) 
2 6 7 .  0000)0 
30>7. 00*0)0)0) 
2 2 6 .  000*00) 
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293.0)00*0)0 
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2 4 5 .  0000)0) 
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2 1 5 .  000*0)0) 
150. 00)0*00
256.00)0)0*0* 
1SS. 0 0 0 0 0  
2 4 S . 000*00
1SS. 
119.  
126.  
3 2 8 .  
2 8 6 .  
2 9 3 .  
2 8 7 .  
211.
2 1 3 .
2 9 6 .  
3 4 0 .  
2 2 9 .  
2 6 6 .  
334 . 
3 8 3 .  
4 2 4 .  
2 0 5 .  
3 0 6 .  
2 8 5 .  
2 7 1 .  
3 5 0 .
2 9 7 .  
2 8 0 .
000*00) 
000*0)0) 
00) 0*00* 
000)00* 
0)00)0*0) 
OC* 0:0)0* 
00*0)0*0 
0 1)0*00* 
00)0*00) 
00*0)00 
00*0)0)0 
0000*0. 
00)0*0*0* 
00000 
000)00* 
000)0)0* 
00*000 
0*0*000 
0*0* 0*0)0* 
0*0000 
00000 
00000 
00000 
000*00
2 8 1 .  00*0*00
3 2 8 . 0 0 0 0 0  
2 1 6 .  00)0*0*0)
2 4 5 . 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 8 . 0 0 0 0 0  
110*. 0*0* 0*0*0 
1 1 4 .  0*0* 0)0*0*
8 5 .  0*0* 0)0*0*
SEG .
3 9 .7 9 8 1 4  
4 4 .1 3 2 2 6  
4 2 .2 2 1 4 2  
4 4 .2 2 6 8 5  
4 5 . 0 0 7 0 3  
4 3 . 8 4 2 4 8
4 0 .8 6 2 1 8  
4 4 . 5 5 8 5 6  
4 2 .3 1 8 0 2  
4 0 . 2 7 2 7 3  
4 4 .1 3 3 6 1  
4 3 .  2*0)839 
4 6 .2 1 5 6 3  
4 6 .  7*.)6 6 6 
4 0 .  6*0*4 93 
4 7 .5 3 8 9 6  
4 7 .1 7 6 7 1  
4 1 . 4 6 7 6 8  
4 4 . 0 3 2 2 8  
4 4 .4 9 2 6 1  
4 9 . 7 4 2 9 7
4 6 . 4 9 5 8 3
4 2 . 7 1 9 0 7  
4 2 . 3 0 6 5 5  
4 1 . 4 7 7 6 0  
4 6 . 5 7 1 8 7  
5 0 .  50*772 
4 7 . 0 2 6 2 0  
4 3 . 3 9 3 3 4  
4 4 . 3 0 2 3 7  
6 2 . 5 9 / OV 
4 5 . 4 4 0 9 0  
4 5 . 9 9 6 8 6  
4 8 . 6 9 6 0 6  
3 3 . 7 6 3 9 0  
4 4 . 1 2 2 7 6  
4 6 . 0 1 9 3 3  
5 0 . 0 4 9 1 6  
6 3 . 6 3 7 1 8  
4 3 . 0 9 3 6 7  
4 7 . 9 3 3 0 4  
4 2 . 9 3 5 4 2  
4 4 . 1 5 0 0 5  
48., 5 4 3 9 9  
4 2 . 5 4 8 4 9  
4 2 . 8 7 5 4 0
4 6 . 7 8 7 9 8  
5 4 . 0 6 8 5 7  
4 5 . 6 / O5 —, 
4 5 . 6 3 2 4 3  
4 6 . 3 0 7 5 4  
O  r O  6  6  4 
4 2 . 1 3 7 9 9  
4 0 . 1 9 6 5 6
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